I speak as a rank amateur in the bird behaviour department, Steve. I
thought it was a learned behaviour but I could be wrong. But it doesn't
matter does it? Capacity to learn is spread across the Animal Republic, if
not wider. Tell me more about the dissolution of the Nature/Culture
distinction?
Andy
At 11:56 PM 7/09/2007 -0700, you wrote:
>Andy,
>
> I have a queston concerning your example of the chick recognizing the
> profile of the predator. The last time I read or saw anything about the
> phenomena of the chicken's reactions to hawk shadows, it was used as an
> example of instinct, inherited imprinting, no learning in the sense of
> interactions between individuals, simply something in the physical
> wiring, coded in the genes. So I'm wondering if there are more recent
> studies about this.
>
> It wouldn't surprise me to find that that so-called "imprinting" is
> really a learned behavior. Some years agon I heard a delightful,
> space-shaping, NPR boadcast concerning bird songs. It appears that
> new-born song birds don't just start singing while waiting for mom to
> stuff a worm down their throats, but must learn the songs through
> interaction with mom while still in the nest. . But beyond that,
> different flocks (territorially defined by the ornithologists pursuing
> this work), have slightly different ways of producing the species-related
> songs. Inidividual birds who end up in a flock different from that in
> which they were born learn the variations of the songsnof the new
> flock. So I would really like to know if there is something similar for
> chicken predator recognition.
>
> I'm sure you can see how this would relate and hopefully dissolve the
> nature/culture distinction and thereby dissolve the nature dialectic conundrum.
>
> Paul Dillon
>
>Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> Welcome Geoff. It's good to hear new voices.
>
>Many animals are intelligent though, and respond to their environment by
>learning. Whatever "agentive" means, I don't think that a chick learning to
>recognise and a avoid a predator by learning the shape of their silhouette
>is thereby "agentive". Surely it's what you mention in passing, that our
>environment is cultural, that is, we adapt to products of previous
>generations and create more cultural artefacts in the process?
>
>BTW, what *do* you mean by "agentive"? :-)
>
>Andy
>At 11:50 AM 8/09/2007 +1000, you wrote:
> >Hi I'm new here and feeling my way through these ideas.....
> >
> >On natural selection, while a driver might be chaos and random
> >mutation, the important thing is not the mutation but the adaptation.
> >What matters is the relationship between the organism and its context.
> >Human learning is not best described in these terms but as a fast
> >track (non genetic) form of adaptation. The difference between our
> >genetic and cultural adaptations is that our cultural adaptations are
> >not random but responsive (agentive) to the physical and cultural
> >niches that we are adapted to via our abilities to, amongst others,
> >learn and, importantly to forget. Our practices, those things that
> >we've already learned, underpin our ability to learn and or respond to
> >changes in our relationships to our physical/cultural world(s).
> >
> >Cheers, Geoff
> >
> >On 08/09/07, David Kellogg wrote:
> > > Steve and Andy:
> > >
> > > Here's a puzzle. On p. 120 of "Mind in Society", the Afterword by
> > Vera John-Steiner and Ellen Souberman begins with the following epigraph
> > (pardon the long quote, but it's necessary to explain the puzzle):
> > >
> > > "The great basic idea that the world is not to be viewed as a complex
> > of fully fashioned objects but as a complex of processes in which
> > apparently stable objects, no less thatn the images of them inside our
> > heads (our concepts) are undergoing incessant changes. (...) In the eyes
> > of dialectical philosophy, nothing is established for all time, nothing
> > is absolute or sacred. On everything and in everything it sees the stamp
> > of inevitable decline; nothing can resist it sav the unceasing process of
> > formation and destruction, the unending ascent form lower to higher--a
> > process of which that philosophy itself is only a simple reflection
> > within the thinking brain."
> > >
> > > You can see that this quote, if accurate, answers quite well Andy's
> > question about in what sense nature can be said to be dialectical. It is
> > the same sense in which dialectical philosophy can be said to be
> > dialectical, and for the one and same reason: dialectics is simply a
> > description of how change takes place.
> > >
> > > But IS the quote accurate? Here's the SAME passage from my copy of
> > Marx and Engels' selected works (Moscow: Progress, 1970, Vol. 3, pp.
> 362-363):
> > >
> > > "The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as
> > a complex of ready-made things but as a complex of processes, in wich the
> > things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the
> > concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and
> > passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentality and of all
> > temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the
> > end--this great fundametnal thought has, especially since the time of
> > Hegel, so throughly permeated ordinary conscousness that in this
> > generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge this
> > fundamental though in words and to apply it in reality in detail to each
> > domain of investigation are two different things. If, however,
> > investigation always proceeds from this standpoint, the demand for final
> > soclutions and eternal truth ceases once and for all; one is always
> > conscious of the necessary limitation of all acquired knowledge, of
> > > the fact that it is conditioned by the circumstances in which it was
> > acquired."
> > >
> > > NOTHING here about the "reflection of the dialectics of nature" in
> > the thinking brain--only the much weaker idea that the transience of
> > concepts is reflected in the limited nature of human knowledge! That's
> > the puzzle.
> > >
> > > I'm sorry if I sounded flippant in my last post--my position is
> > rather like that in the SECOND version of Engels' quote (not the version
> > in Mind in Society), and it's quite serious. I think that the idea that
> > Jews are a particularly intelligent race (and also the idea that
> > fertility and intelligence are inversely correlated, and this somehow
> > represents a threat to human survival) is a very serious misconception
> > about the relationship between ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Humans
> > "choose"; nature "selects", and for humans to "choose" to select when
> > they cannot even manage to make economic and social relations obey
> > rational will is a little like a lay person trying to cure obesity by
> > vivisection rather than by diet and self-control.
> > >
> > > Right now, I think that the attempt to reduce human creativity to
> > chaos/complexity is flawed in the opposite direction; not too much
> > chutzpah but too little. It reduces learning to a trial-and-error process
> > driven by random variations. Lorenz's wonderful book "The Origins of
> > Chaos" points out that MOST games are not good producers of chaos, either
> > because they are really random (and chaos is only apparently random) or
> > contrariwise, because they are subject to deliberate strategy and skill
> > (he gives the marvelous example of pinball, which was initially banned in
> > his hometown as a game of chance, but then legalized as a game of skill).
> > >
> > > Natural selection really is random and bottom up, at least at first.
> > But it gives rise to humans, and these replace natural selection with
> > human choices, at least in the terrain of ideas. Learning is not usefully
> > described in chaos/complexity terms; the principle of human choice has
> > clearly replaced random variation and natural selection as soon as the
> > process of variation itself is subject to volitional control (as soon as
> > people start to generate particular language strings and not others and
> > then select these).
> > >
> > > Amongst humans, at the level of culture, language, games, and that
> > great cultural language game we call philosophy, the idea of deliberate
> > choice is clearly more powerful than the principle of natural selection.
> > That is why I think nature is dialectical, at least in the weak sense of
> > incompletable (if you will pardon a bit of volitional linguistic
> > creativity) indicated by Engels.But dialectical philosophy is a
> > non-natural selection rather than a natural reflection of the dialectics
> > of nature in the human brain.
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Seoul National University of Education
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > Steve, could you give a simple, 2 or 3 lines maybe, explanation of
> > what you
> > > *mean* by "nature is dialectical"?
> > > Andy
> > > At 09:23 AM 7/09/2007 -0700, you wrote:
> > > >This is a dense but not too long post on this discussion of volition and
> > > >complexity theory. I think we bump into the question of whether "nature
> > > >is dialectical" in thinking about the question of how complexity theory
> > > >can figure into the study of consciousness. Yesterday I sent David
> > > >Kellog some links to Ethel Tobach (integrative levels) and Ken
> Richardson
> > > >(levels of self-regulation), two authors I find to be on the right
> > > >track. Both Tobach and Richardson use important ideas from CHAT in their
> > > >theorizing, and have a strong leaning toward integrating natural and
> > > >social science, in ways I find both dialectical and materialist.
> > > >
> > > >Vygotsky was a strong advocate of Engels' position that nature is
> > > >dialectical, as was of course Marx, who I believe contributed two
> chapters
> > > >to the book Anti-Duhring, where Engels develops this concept. The
> > > >Dialectics of Nature by Engels, a manuscript never published in Engels'
> > > >lifetime, was first published in Russia in the 1920's and is clearly
> > > >influential on Vygotsky, who quotes it favorably numerous times in his
> > > >manuscript "The Meaning of the Historical Crisis of Psychology"
> > > >(1927). But this is a minority viewpoint today, it seems.
> > > >
> > > >I found myself spending some time browsing the book Mike mentioned
> earlier
> > > >this week, Human activity - contributions to the anthropological
> sciences
> > > >from a perspective of activity theory by Benny Karpatschof, available
> > > >online at http://informationr.net/ir/12-3/Karpatschof/Karp00.html . This
> > > >book is a rich and highly worthy exploration of the philosophical
> > > >underpinnings of CHAT, one of the best I have seen on that level, but
> > > >Benny adopts the position that nature is not dialectical, disagreeing
> > > >sharply with Engels - and therefore, Marx, Vygotsky, Leontiev, and
> all the
> > > >classical Marxists on this question. This idea that Engels was wrong,
> > > >that nature is not dialectical, that dialectics does not apply to nature
> > > >(Karpatschof allies with Sartre on this), is quite popular among many
> > > >dialectical thinkers today, all around the world. The position I lean
> > > >toward, that nature is dialectical, is a minority view today.
> > > >
> > > >I think we bump into this question of the dialectics of nature every
> time
> > > >we try to integrate explanations across different domains of
> complexity -
> > > >from the behavior of atoms, to genes, to embryos, to children
> learning to
> > > >speak, for example - so the question "is nature dialectical?" is both an
> > > >ontological question (what is the nature of reality) and epistemological
> > > >(how do we know anything). I think Andy's remarks offer an excellent
> > > >basis for a critique of the incorrect view that conscious human behavior
> > > >(volition) can be reduced to the laws of complexity science. But if
> we go
> > > >the route Benny Karpatschof suggests and reject the thesis that
> nature is
> > > >dialectical altogether, I think we can lose a vital link between the
> > > >natural and the social, both ontologically and epistemologically,
> and how
> > > >we can use, as Engels began to, the discoveries of natural science (laws
> > > >of mechanics, chemistry in his time, quantum electrodynamics, complexity
> > > >theory, etc. in our time) to understand how the even more complex
> > > >activities of human society and the still even more complex and chaotic
> > > >actions and operations of the human individual, emerge. In that way, I
> > > >think complexity theory is very much a powerful tool in trying to
> link the
> > > >explanatory laws of nature and society, although by no means is it
> > > >sufficient. That will require a new level of integrated science and
> > > >general psychology along the lines that Vygotsky envisioned.
> > > >
> > > >- Steve
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >At 04:18 PM 9/7/2007 +1000, you wrote:
> > > >>Welcome aboard Steve.
> > > >>
> > > >>I have always thought that the proposition that thinking is like
> > > >>computation is so barren, so stupid and so obviously an reflected
> > > >>projection, that to argue against it is to enter into the
> stupidity, and
> > > >>I would rather not. It's similar to people finding proof of neo-liberal
> > > >>economics in Darwinian biology, overlooking the fact that Darwin
> imported
> > > >>liberal economic ideas into his view of Nature in the first place.
> > > >>Computers are the latest thing, and information scientists develop
> tools
> > > >>for humans to use by emulating human activity, and then other people
> > > >>discover that people think like computers. Upside-down. Generates
> lots of
> > > >>academic salaries and popular book sales anyway.
> > > >>
> > > >>Although I think complexity theory and the concept of chaos are
> very rich
> > > >>and interesting ideas, I think they are out of place in describing the
> > > >>working of such a "well-oiled machine" (he, he) as the human mind. One
> > > >>thing about the application of this theory to the mind, and this is
> > > >>David's issue I believe, is that it is a radically unfree concept
> of the
> > > >>human condition. Allied with the concept of emergence, it is a fig leaf
> > > >>to cover a lacuna in positivist knowledge of the mind. We cannot
> explain
> > > >>how a few bits of flesh can be so creative and so clever, so its
> must be
> > > >>emergence, complexity, chaos, etc., etc.,
> > > >>
> > > >>I am intrigued also by David's question as to why learners should be so
> > > >>in favour of learning theories which give them no power. Perhaps it is
> > > >>because those learning theories also give them no responsibility?
> > > >>
> > > >>Andy
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>At 09:41 PM 6/09/2007 -0700, you wrote:
> > > >>>First time poster here and this may be from out of
> > > >>>left field, I'm not sure. I am not active in the
> > > >>>field so forgive me if but:
> > > >>>
> > > >>>Roger Penrose, a prominent asttrophysicist, (among
> > > >>>others) has advanced the case that human
> > > >>>thinking/consciousness/cognition is not
> > > >>>"computational". Here he follows Kurt Goedel in the
> > > >>>use of the term computational. He wrote a book that
> > > >>>started with this premise and then further wrote a
> > > >>>response to a chorus of influential academics, all of
> > > >>>whom issued polemics against his book and especially
> > > >>>the "non-computational" thesis.
> > > >>>
> > > >>>The contents of his reply somewhat step into the
> > > >>>middle of the debate but should be perfectly
> > > >>>understandable even to someone who hasn't read the
> > > >>>book or the scathing reviews. The Contents are
> > > >>>numbered and I recommend especiallyr reading #s 3 and
> > > >>>4 and then some of the later items at your own
> > > >>>discretion, evocatively titled "Free Will", "What Is
> > > >>>Consciousness?" and so on.
> > > >>>
> > > >>>Penrose is not really trying to answer those
> > > >>>questions, by the way, only remove them from a
> > > >>>reductive, emergent from matter, reducible to physical
> > > >>>properties and laws, perspective.
> > > >>>
> > > >>>Might at least help center your search for how and
> > > >>>where volition fits into the puzzle.
> > > >>>
> > > >>>This is a wonderful list by the way, thanks guys
> > > >>>
> > > >>> > It's a good read too, but it wasn't what I was
> > > >>>looking for. I need
> > > >>> some
> > > >>> > > way of integrating complexity theory and VOLITION
> > > >>>(or
> > > >>> CONSCIOUSNESS). In
> > > >>> > > language teaching (which is what I do)
> > > >>>volition-free approaches are
> > > >>> very
> > > >>> > > popular (nativism, subconscious acquisition, and
> > > >>>now
> > > >>> chaos-complexity
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>_____________________________________________________________________
> > _______________
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> > > >>>xmca mailing list
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> > > >>
> > > >> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
> 9435, AIM
> > > >> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> > > >>
> > > >>_______________________________________________
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> > > >_______________________________________________
> > > >xmca mailing list
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> > >
> > > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
> > > identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
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> > >
> > >
> > >
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> >
> >
> >--
> >Geoffrey Binder
> >BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> >PhD Candidate
> >Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> >Ph B. 9925 9951
> >M. 0422 968 567
> >_______________________________________________
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>
>Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
>identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>
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Received on Sat Sep 8 00:57 PDT 2007
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