Re: [xmca] Emotion at Work

>Are~'t you describing a kind of perspectivalism around a single unit of
>analysis? Is this what you (and you,michael) are gesturing toward, or am I
>misunderstanding?
>mike

This is an interesting question, Mike. If I am
grasping what you mean by perspectivalism, a term
associated with Nietsche, and some pragmatist
currents, I am probably not leaning in that
particular direction too much, at least not on
purpose. If I have the term's basic meaning
right, perspectivalism or perspectivism is a type
of relativist approach to seeking truth that
emphasizes that we are always constrained by our
perspectives. I agree that we are, but only up
to a point. In contrast to the somewhat
pessimistic stance of perspectivism, I am
attracted to the more optimistic, objectivist
stance of classical Marxism, which advocates
overcoming the limitations of individual
perspective and, as part of an ongoing historic
motion toward human progress, points toward
discovering the "objective" truth, an always
expanding and never fully attainable goal. One
could argue that there is a definite
perspectivism in that outlook, in that our
perspectives are always necessarily limited by
existing conditions, but this is a highly
qualified perspectivism. I am less inclined to
begrudge and lament the limitations of our
perspectives than I am to have a positive
perspective on overcoming our limitations.

My sketchy outline of a quest for a "unit of
analysis" and "model" of the *individual*
psychological process - a special study within
activity theory, and certainly not its only
"perspective" - aims at finding the mechanisms
and emergent processes within and individual by
which social conditions create subjective
conditions, which in turn develop, behave and act
on those social conditions and subjective
conditions. Boiling the process down to a
sequence defined in simple activity theory
categories - a) needs/motives, b)
emotions/thoughts, c) actions/operations - has
its risks and limitations, but I think it is
necessary to add this kind of abstract analysis
to our inquiry so we can identify and correct two
kinds of common errors we encounter in modern social theory.

The first kind of error, typically made by the
objectivists, is to offer explanations that skip
over the subjective conditions and processes,
over the middle stage "b" in my three step
sequence schema. The behaviorists do this as a
matter of principle, and various forms of
"skipping over" and "reductionism" are
introduced again and again from many
perspectives. Reductionism runs rampant in
social science. Social Darwinism, sociobiology,
evolutionary psychology are various examples of
popular reductionist outlooks over the
decades. Marxists can also be stalwart
objectivists and reductionists. They will often
speak of class interests and objective
conditions, and then skip right over the middle
area and begin speaking on how people behave and
act accordingly - "as a result". This
objectivist limitation of the Marxist movement
has been one of its downsides for many decades,
and has left it open to many criticisms. There
has been a largescale rebellion against
objectivism and reductionism in all its forms
throughout the social sciences and humanities
since the 1960's. The "postmodern" tradition has
been a leading form this rebellion against
objectivism and reductionism has taken.

The second error is made by subjectivists, who
often offer explanations that confuse the cause
and effect relationships between the objective
and subjective, between "being" and
"consciousness." In terms of the little schema I
have introduced, this means confusing the
sequence and relationship of processes in the
first and second "stages," finding ways to use
observations about the subjective conditions and
processes of an individual, stage "b" in my
schema, to explain the original social conditions
in "a". This approach is pervasive in modern
social theory. Social processes and conditions
are frequently explained through individual
behavior and subjective experiences. The social
is explained through the individual rather than
the cultural and historical. Although it is done
in a sophisticated way, this is essentially what
I see happening on the theoretical plane, to the
extent it is argued that emotional payoffs drive
motives. Instead of looking to the objective
**social** conditions for the origin and
development of motives, this perspective looks
instead to the internal **subjective** conditions
of an individual to explain their motives. The
objective cause and effect sequence, the real
direction of the emergent processes and
dialectical dynamics, gets reversed, and
subjectivist errors pop up left and right.

The objectivists, in skipping over and
downplaying the subjective stage, tend toward
reductionist errors. The subjectivists seek to
correct these errors by emphasizing the crucial
role of the middle stage, the subjective
processes, in human behavior and activity. But
they have problems solving the problem of how
objective conditions create subjective processes,
and the objectivists attack them for that - but
in doing so, often offer no clear solution of
their own to how the subjective processes
develop. The subjectivists then point these
severe weaknesses out in their counterattacks and
defenses. And so the debate has been raging in
nearly every area of human science and art for a long time.

In part, I think the challenge before CHAT is to
embrace the insights offered by both objectivism
and subjectivism, avoid the errors of both, and
over time, create a new, grand synthesis. In
some ways, this is what dialectical materialists
like Vygotsky attempted to do, and what I think
many of the leading writers in CHAT today,
including Wolff-Michael, each in their own way,
are trying very hard to do. Besides the
influences of dialectical materialism, we also
have pragmatism, dialectical phenomenology, and
other serious trends in social science that are
contributing to this international dialogue and
dialectic. All bring both successes and
limitations. I see CHAT as becoming a kind of
collecting ground for these cutting edge ideas to
try to combine into something new.

Anyway, back to your question, Mike. I may have
gone off on a tangent here, misunderstanding how
you mean perspectivalism, a term I don't normally
use. Did I get close to what you meant, or am I missing something?

- Steve

At 10:03 PM 7/30/2007 -0300, you wrote:
>Steve, with respect to the following I have a question:
> It must be able to a)
>describe the relevant surrounding activity
>systems, and the person's needs and motives
>within those systems (note that these needs and
>motives may be contradictory), b) describe that
>person's internal physical, emotional and
>cognitive processes (also potentially highly
>contradictory), and c) describe the external
>operations, actions and behaviors they carry out
>(which we know by observing ourselves and others
>can also be highly contradictory and not necessarily "on purpose").
>Are~'t you describing a kind of perspectivalism around a single unit of
>analysis? Is this what you (and you,michael) are gesturing toward, or am I
>misunderstanding?
>mike
>
>
>
>
>
>
>On 7/30/07, Steve Gabosch <sgabosch@comcast.net> wrote:
> >
> > I see CHAT as being on an historic quest to find
> > a model and a unit of analysis that can outline
> > the essential psychological functions and
> > processes, both internal as well as the more
> > familiar external, of an individual engaged in
> > everyday activities such as work. As
> > Wolff-Michael points out, emotion has generally
> > been left out of previous efforts in CHAT.
> >
> > I think that this coveted model and its
> > accompanying unit of analysis needs to be able to
> > simultaneously describe the essential dynamics of
> > at least three levels of human social and
> > psychological reality. It must be able to a)
> > describe the relevant surrounding activity
> > systems, and the person's needs and motives
> > within those systems (note that these needs and
> > motives may be contradictory), b) describe that
> > person's internal physical, emotional and
> > cognitive processes (also potentially highly
> > contradictory), and c) describe the external
> > operations, actions and behaviors they carry out
> > (which we know by observing ourselves and others
> > can also be highly contradictory and not necessarily "on purpose").
> >
> > With a model and a unit of analysis that can
> > generate coherent simultaneous descriptions of
> > these "levels" of reality, CHAT (a future CHAT,
> > whatever that will look like) could then continue
> > on to provide explanations of human behavior and
> > activity that include an individual's
> > motivations, emotions, thoughts, and actions. (I
> > am leaving out the category "identity" that
> > Michael emphasizes - that is a side discussion in
> > the scheme I am outlining here). Achieving a
> > model and unit of analysis that can provide such
> > an integrated, simultaneous description of the
> > social context, the internal psychological
> > processes, and the external behaviors of an
> > individual in action is a tall order. The
> > ability to do this is an historic quest which all
> > of us that related to the CHAT community are part of, in one way or
> > another.
> >
> > A feature of the model that Michael proposes and
> > begins to outline in his article that bothers me
> > is his suggestion that emotional payoffs drive
> > motivation. This is certainly the common sense
> > view of individual psychology held by most
> > thinking people, that humans are driven by the
> > desire to increase their "emotional valence" and
> > therefore organize their choices of activities to
> > participate in, and the actions they carry out, accordingly.
> >
> > A way to address this difference of perspective
> > is to ask these simple questions: Do we have
> > needs and motives because we are emotional (and
> > cognitive)? Or are we emotional (and cognitive)
> > because we have needs and motives?
> >
> > Michael seems to be answering the first question
> > affirmatively - we have needs and motives because
> > we have emotions, which we strive to increase the
> > valence of. "Motivation arises from the
> > difference between the emotional valence of any
> > present moment and the higher emotional valence
> > at a later moment, to be attained as a
> > consequence of practical action." (pg 60).
> >
> > My inclination is to answer the second question
> > affirmatively - we have emotions, and in fact
> > have the specific emotions that we do at any
> > given time, because we have needs and
> > motives. We have needs and motives because must
> > cope with our contradictory surrounding social
> > environment. This perspective takes the view
> > that the surrounding social environment and its
> > contradictions compel us to have specific but
> > often contradictory needs and motives, which
> > generate conflicting emotions and thoughts within
> > us, which emerge externally as contradictory
> > behaviors, operations, and actions, some of which
> > we are conscious of, some of which we are not.
> >
> > Many of Michael's excellent points and insights
> > are still incorporated in my revision. This is
> > not a matter of one perspective being totally
> > wrong, the other, totally right. Both models can
> > generate important insights and take into account
> > many features of CHAT and many aspects of human
> > psychology, in the workplace and any everyday situation.
> >
> > Methodologically, I would consider this
> > discussion an investigation of the
> > "genetic-historic" relationship of emotion and
> > motive within an activity system. Michael seems
> > to place emotion in the genetic-historic sequence
> > as prior to motive. I place motive as prior to emotion.
> >
> > What would a unit of analysis of either model
> > look like? We like to point to the water
> > molecule as a unit of analysis of that chemical
> > compound. Among other things, this unit clearly
> > expresses itself in all the states of H2O - ice,
> > water, steam. The molecule retains its
> > conceptual cohesiveness in all conditions, in all
> > its transformations. But what unit of analysis
> > can be developed that can remain cohesive through
> > these three socio-psychological levels of reality
> > I am attempting to sketch? What unit of analysis
> > can remain cohesive while it is a set of
> > contradictory needs and motives in one state, a
> > collection of rapidly changing and interacting
> > body processes, emotions and thoughts in another,
> > and then a collection of conscious and
> > unconscious behaviors, actions and operations in a third?
> >
> > Clearly, we need a unit of analysis much more
> > complex than a molecule. In fact, we need what
> > will have to be the most complex unit of analysis
> > ever developed. As I say, this is an historic
> > quest, a long-term challenge. We have quite a
> > distance to go and much to learn.
> >
> > In the meantime, it seems to me we can focus on
> > developing the model, which includes getting the
> > basic components of the model in the right
> > genetic-historic sequence. My inclination is to
> > reverse the order of motive and emotion from that proposed by Michael.
> >
> > Best,
> > - Steve
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > At 09:54 PM 7/29/2007 -0700, you wrote:
> > >Dear Wolff-Michael:
> > >
> > > Yes, I immediately recognized (and
> > > appreciated) the double-entendre in the title.
> > > I also appreciate (now that I think about it)
> > > your remarks about how individual activity
> > > realizes a potential that exists on the
> > > collective level (though I think that is not
> > > ALL it does, else individual creativity would not be possible).
> > >
> > > Once more on Damasio. I found this today in:
> > >
> > > Volosinov, V.N. (1976) ¡°A Critique of
> > > Marxist Apologias of Freudianism¡± In.
> > > Freudianism: A critical sketch. Bloomington and
> > > Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
> > >
> > > Volosinov takes on a number of Marxist
> > > writers who have defended psychoanalysis. He
> > > dismisses with a wave of the hand Trotsky's
> > > remarks in Literature and Revolution (where
> > > Trotsky speculates on the compatibility of
> > > Marxism and psychoanalysis) and he is
> > > particularly hard on Luria's youthful enthusiasm for Freud. On p. 125 he
> > says:
> > >
> > > ¡°It is an outright falsehood to represent
> > > the doctorine of erogenous zones as an
> > > objective physiological theory. According to
> > > this theory, the body is drawn into the
> > > personality¡¯s mental system, not vice versa.
> > > It is drawn, of course, not as an objective,
> > > external body, but as an experience of things
> > > corporeal, as an aggregate of internal
> > > instincts, desires, and notions. It is, so to
> > > speak, the body seen form the inside out.¡±
> > >
> > > Volosinov continues (pardon my triple quote marks):
> > >
> > > 'The attempt to ascribe an objective
> > > character to the psychoanalytical concept of
> > > "drives" is also completely incorrect. Luria
> > > writes "¡¦for psychoanalysis, drives are not a
> > > purely psychological concept, but have a much
> > > broader sense "¡(r)acting as a bridge between the
> > > mental and the somatic,¡¯ and are more of a
> > > biological nature."' No biologist would agree,
> > > of course, with such an odd definition of the
> > > biological as being a bridge between the soma
> > > and the psyche (¡¦). Thus the psychoanalytic
> > > concept of the whole personality contains not
> > > one objective quantity that would make it
> > > possible for that personality to be
> > > incorporated into the surrounding material
> > > reality fo the natural world. It is no easier
> > > to incorporate it into the objective
> > > socioeconomic process of history. We already
> > > know, after all, that Freud derives all
> > > objective, historical formations (the family,
> > > the tribe, the state, the church and so forth)
> > > from those same subjectively mental roots and that their
> > > existence begins and ends with that same
> > > interplay among internal subjective forces
> > > (power as the ego-ideal; societal solidarity as
> > > mutual identification, given the common nature
> > > of the ego-ideal; capitalism as the sublimation of anal eroticism, and
> > so on.)'
> > >
> > > Thus speaks Volosinov. But it seems to me
> > > that the SAME problem exists with Damasio's
> > > version of the James-Lange theory: it merely
> > > takes the objective world and turns it into
> > > psychological object. Not only is there no
> > > place for the social, there is no place for
> > > material culture as the product of sensuous human activity.
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Seoul National University of Education
> > >
> > >
> > >---------------------------------
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Received on Tue Jul 31 12:56 PDT 2007