Re: [xmca] Emotion at Work

Thank you all.

Luísa Aires
(Universidade Aberta, Portugal)

> Thanks Steve. We just learned that today and we are putting the info on
> the
> xmca website. I was in a meeting all morning and could not spread the
> word.
> mike
>
> On 7/26/07, Steve Gabosch <sgabosch@comcast.net> wrote:
>>
>> Looks like the article is now available at
>> http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10749030701307705?cookieSet=1
>>
>> - Steve
>>
>>
>>
>> At 09:06 AM 7/25/2007 -0700, you wrote:
>> >Right now you find it by asking me. I am asking Taylor and Francis to
>> make
>> >it available to all.
>> >mike
>> >
>> >On 7/24/07, Helena Harlow Worthen <hworthen@ad.uiuc.edu> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>Please remind me how to find the Emotion at Work paper by
>> Wolf-Michael.
>> >>
>> >>Thanks -- Helena
>> >>
>> >>Helena Worthen
>> >>NEW EMAIL: hworthen@uiuc.edu
>> >>Chicago Labor Education Program
>> >>Suite 110 The Rice Building
>> >>815 West Van Buren Street
>> >>Chicago, IL 60607
>> >>312-996-8733
>> >>
>> >>-----Original Message-----
>> >>From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> On
>> >>Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>> >>Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2007 1:42 AM
>> >>To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >>Subject: [xmca] Emotion at Work
>> >>
>> >>Here are some thoughts on your paper Wolf-Michael:
>> >>
>> >>Wolf-Michael's abstract is marvellous. If this project could be
>> fulfilled
>> >>it would indeed justify being seen as working towards a 'third
>> >>generation':
>> >>
>> >> Second-generation cultural-historical activity theory,
>> >> which drew its inspiration from Leont'ev's work, constituted
>> >> an advance over Vygotsky's first-generation theory by
>> >> explicitly articulating the dialectical relation between
>> >> individual and collective. As part of an effort to develop
>> >> third-generation-historical activity theory, I propose in this
>> >> article a way in which emotion, motivation, and identity can be
>> >> incorporated into the theory. ...
>> >>
>> >>I love the practical work that Wolf-Michael reports, too, as the local
>> >>union rep. at work for most of my life I know these characters and
>> >>situations all too well. It is great though that the epilogue seems to
>> >>show
>> >>a positive outcome.
>> >>
>> >>That said, I think there a number of serious problems with the general
>> >>propositions that Wolf-Michael puts forward.
>> >>
>> >>On page 44 Wolf-Michael claims:
>> >>
>> >> "Consciousness, motivation, and identity are subordinated to
>> >> orientation and emotional readiness because, from evolutionary
>> >> and cultural-historical perspectives, the latter predate the
>> >> former (Damasio, 1999)."
>> >>
>> >>I am really not sure what is entailed in being "subordinated," so my
>> >>response must be qualified in that respect. But it reeks of a dreadful
>> >>positivism. There is no logical basis for the general claim that the
>> >>historically or phylogenetically later is "subordinated" to the
>> earlier.
>> >>Does it mean that the aeroplane must be subordinated to the
>> horse-and-cart
>> >>and civilization subordinated to jungle life? Modern life arises on
>> the
>> >>basis of rational institutions unknown to animals. To claim that
>> >>civilisation is subordinated to animal life reeks of Konrad Lorenz,
>> >>Desmond
>> >>Morris and Robert Ardrey.
>> >>
>> >>Is it that identity (for example) "builds on" orientation and
>> emotional
>> >>readiness? Yes, but identity _transcends_ the animal functions of
>> >>orientation and emotional readiness, doesn't it? The aeroplane
>> utilises
>> >>the
>> >>laws of physics, but it also _flies_. So why do we say that the animal
>> >>functions "subordinate" the higher functions?
>> >>
>> >>In fact I have a problem I think with Wolf-Michael's conception of
>> >>identity. Wolf-Michael goes on:
>> >>
>> >> "Identity and motivation are _effects _of the psychic life
>> >> of human beings, which require consciousness and collectively
>> >> organized activity and became possible at the dawn of
>> >> anthropogenesis, when human subjects found themselves as
>> >> subjects, separate from other material things and fellow
>> >> human beings (Ricæur, 1990; Roth, 2006b)."
>> >>
>> >>I question here the idea of individuality (if I understand
>> Wolf-Michael
>> >>correctly) being placed "at the dawn of anthropogenesis," the
>> implication
>> >>that "subject" is more or less synonymous with individual, and the
>> >>omission
>> >>of material culture from the list of pre-requisites for identity and
>> >>motivation.
>> >>
>> >>Now, I would have thought that "identity" and subjectivity arise prior
>> to
>> >>individuality, at the beginning of anthropogenesis, only it would not
>> have
>> >>been _individual_ identity or individual subjectivity. Pre-modern
>> human
>> >>beings act on the basis of an identity tied up with their land, their
>> >>social position, threats to their kin, and so on, in other words, with
>> the
>> >>forms of activity by which people live. Isn't it more consistent with
>> CHAT
>> >>to suppose that individuality is a later construct of the
>> differentiation
>> >>of subjectivity?
>> >>
>> >>Material culture is of course something which is not found amongst the
>> >>animals, and I think it is fair to say that material culture is
>> central
>> to
>> >>the formation of identity and _all _aspects of the psychic life of
>> human
>> >>beings. And what does it mean in this context to describe identity and
>> >>motivation, which are surely psychic phenomena, as being "effects" of
>> >>psychic life? Wolf-Michael distinguishes between psychic life on the
>> one
>> >>hand and consciousness on the other. I can understand this in terms of
>> >>"psychic life" being simply the activity of the nervous system,
>> something
>> >>found in any organism with a nervous system. Is that right? And
>> >>"consciousness" being something that arises, I would have thought, in
>> >>connection with the use of material culture used in forms of activity.
>> >>
>> >>On history and philosophy:
>> >>
>> >> "Thus, as dialectical phenomenological philosophers point out,
>> >> any explication of human consciousness that posits the subject
>> >> to understand consciousness and knowledgeability - as
>> >> philosophers (Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, etc.) and
>> >> psychologists (all but critical psychologists) have done -
>> >> inherently is flawed because it does not take account of
>> >> history, that is, the emergence of the human psyche during
>> >> anthropogenesis (Derrida, 2005; Franck, 2001; Levinas, 1998)."
>> >>
>> >>I hope I can be forgiven for putting in a word for my favourite
>> >>philosopher. I think it is a big mistake to include Hegel in this
>> list.
>> >>They all have different concepts of the subject of course, but Husserl
>> and
>> >>Heidegger share with Kant an individual, subjective concept of the
>> subject
>> >>while for Hegel the subject is not at all an individual. I like to
>> >>describe
>> >>Hegel as "the first cultural-historical psychologist" and via Marx he
>> is
>> >>the direct progenitor, in my view, of CHAT. And to mention Hegel as
>> "not
>> >>taking account of history" is novel. It was Hegel who invented the
>> idea
>> of
>> >>importing history into a concept of subjectivity as constructed in
>> social
>> >>activity. True, of course, that Hegel knew nothing of
>> "anthropogenesis";
>> >>he
>> >>thought that the human species was created in a flash of lightning all
>> at
>> >>once biologically exactly as they are. He ascribed everything else to
>> >>_history and culture_ rather than biology. But then, he died in 1831.
>> >>Wolf-Michael continues:
>> >>
>> >> "This recent work shows how intersubjectivity and subjectivity
>> >> are the _results _of collective life and having a material
>> body,
>> >> which allows the dawning subject, mediated by its embodied and
>> >> bodily nature, to be conscious of itself as but one among a
>> >> plurality of subjects (Nancy, 2000)."
>> >>
>> >>Again, while it seems too obvious to mention that you have to have a
>> >>material body before you have psychic activity, isn't it more
>> important
>> to
>> >>mention that a material culture is a precondition _characteristic_ of
>> >>human
>> >>life, whereas "having a material body" and "collective life" is
>> equally
>> >>true of plankton and grapevines. By the by, it is to Hegel of course
>> that
>> >>we owe the idea that self-consciousness arises on the basis of
>> becoming
>> >>aware of ones own people as one among a plurality. But Hegel never
>> used
>> >>the
>> >>term "intersubjectivity" because he knew the key role played by
>> material
>> >>culture which _mediates_ between subjects. And Hegel was not the last
>> >>person to think that material culture plays an important role in human
>> >>emotional life, from the patriot's flag to Linus's security blanket to
>> >>Donald Winnicott's mother's breast.
>> >>
>> >>But I agree with Wolf-Michael, that understanding human feelings is
>> tied
>> >>up
>> >>with practical social activity and practical reason.
>> >>
>> >> "Motivation and identity are not independent constructs but are
>> >> derivative, an integral aspect of an activity system in
>> general,
>> >> and emotion - which is centrally involved in the shape of
>> practical
>> >> actions and practical reasons - in particular." {p. 54)
>> >>
>> >>Wolf-Michael, I presume you are using "emotion" in the Damasian sense
>> of
>> >>somatic-nervous activity, as distinct from the "interpretation" of
>> >>emotions
>> >>in terms of human feelings, which is derived from the socialisation of
>> the
>> >>individual? You mean that only beings with nervous systems, and
>> therefore
>> >>emotions, can have motivations? But it is meaningless to mention
>> something
>> >>that is a general precondition; why not mention the sun or
>> hydrocarbons?
>> >>The question is: what precondition provides the specific character of
>> what
>> >>is built upon it? Isn't it the point that motivation is acquired _from
>> the
>> >>activity system_, and that it is the activity system which imparts the
>> >>specific character to the emotional response of individuals? So I
>> agree
>> >>with Wolf-Michael when he says: "Because emotions are an irreducible
>> >>aspect
>> >>of activity, they cannot be claimed to be the cause of other aspects
>> of
>> >>the
>> >>activity." (p. 58) The question really is: should we be regarding the
>> >>activity system "coldly"?
>> >>
>> >>On the question of identity, Wolf-Michael says:
>> >>
>> >> "In the context of cultural-historical activity theory,
>> identity
>> is
>> >> a derivative construct in the sense that it presupposes the
>> >> existence of the subject who, regulated by emotions, engages
>> >> with an object of motive-directed activity, and who becomes
>> aware
>> >> of itself as self. Identity presupposes the presence of memory
>> and
>> >> consciousness (Ricoeur, 2004). The construct of identity
>> pertains
>> >> to who someone is." (p. 56)
>> >>
>> >>I think Wolf-Michael uses the term "subject" here in the Kantian
>> sense,
>> as
>> >>the transcendental bearer of individual thoughts and actions. But even
>> in
>> >>this sense the claim is tautological, as identity is part of what a
>> >>subject
>> >>is, a subject without a sense of its own identity is unthinkable. With
>> the
>> >>Hegelian idea of "subject" being a self-conscious system of activity,
>> it
>> >>is
>> >>still the case that identity is entailed in subjectivity, as is the
>> fact
>> >>that the human beings involved have nervous systems. But a system of
>> >>activity is not self-conscious from the outset. According to Hegel,
>> >>identity is something that arises only at a certain point in the
>> >>development of an activity system. But human feelings also arise in
>> just
>> >>this way as does the specific character of individual identity, with a
>> >>specific character drawn from the system of activity and the forms of
>> >>material culture generated in the system of activity. Wolf-Michael
>> goes
>> >>on:
>> >>
>> >> "However, we do not know _who _a person is independent of the
>> >> actions of that person. ... attributions about _who _someone
>> _is
>> _
>> >> are made based on observable behavior (actions). Actions that
>> are
>> >> already means of expressing emotions and motivations also come
>> to
>> >> express identities." (p. 56)
>> >>
>> >>I think this is a mistake. Identity is in the first place
>> >>_self-_consciousness, that is, how a person sees themself. The whole
>> idea
>> >>of the notion of "subject" going back to Aristotle, is that the
>> subject
>> >>exists "behind" all its contingent attributes and persists through
>> >>movement
>> >>and change. To claim that identity is derived from attributes is to
>> undo
>> >>the very meaning of subject and self-consciousness. Attributes
>> (including
>> >>perceived actions) are attributes _of_ a subject, which cannot be
>> reduced
>> >>to our experience of it. How we get to know something is not the same
>> as
>> >>what it _is_, and a subject does not get to know itself by perceiving
>> it
>> >>own actions, rather than mediately through the reactions of _other_
>> >>subjects.
>> >>
>> >>The problem of the construct of "cold cognition" is a very real and
>> urgent
>> >>problem, but I think Wolf-Michael's treatment of emotion is coming
>> from
>> >>the
>> >>wrong direction. Knowing is also embodied in biology, just as much as
>> >>feeling, and feeling is tied up with material culture, thought and
>> social
>> >>activity, just as much as knowing.
>> >>
>> >> "The choices available in, and to, practical reasoning are
>> >> always oriented toward higher emotional valence." (p. 59)
>> >>
>> >>This claim reminds me of Alasdair MacIntyre's discussion of
>> "emotivism"
>> in
>> >>ethics, in his book "Beyond Virtue." People do not, like sea urchins,
>> move
>> >>up a gradient of gratification, short- or long-term. Why do people go
>> to
>> >>war? Because when they die, at least they won't be unhappy? I can't
>> really
>> >>see any way that this claim can be distanced from utilitarianism
>> and the
>> >>myth of rational economic agents maximising utility. People do things
>> that
>> >>they are unhappy about doing, but they do it nonetheless, and citing
>> >>deferred gratification just defers the problem.
>> >>
>> >> "Identity, too, is an integral part of human activity and an
>> effect
>> >> of emotion. Who I am with respect to others and myself is
>> >> fundamentally related to my participation in collective
>> activity
>> >> and to individual and collective emotional valences arising
>> from
>> >> (orientations to) face-to-face interaction with others." (p.
>> 60)
>> >>
>> >>I think this formulation is a little mixed up. The second sentence is
>> >>correct, but to claim that identity is an _effect_ of emotion is a
>> kind
>> of
>> >>positivism. Emotion is somatic nervous activity and to describe
>> identity
>> >>as
>> >>an effect of this nervous activity begs the question of whether bed
>> bugs
>> >>and jelly fish have an identity. If they do, then the whole discussion
>> is
>> >>at cross purposes. Systems of self-conscious activity arise only
>> amongst
>> >>sentient beings who _have constructed a material culture_, and the
>> >>specific
>> >>character of self-consciousness, feeling and identity arises from the
>> >>nature of the activity system and the material culture, utilising
>> _all_
>> >>aspects of human biology, inclusive of emotional readiness but also,
>> the
>> >>capacities for nutrition, motility, sensation as well.
>> >>
>> >>However, I think Wolf-Michael's observation is very attractive when he
>> >>says:
>> >>
>> >> "Third-generation cultural-historical activity theory
>> constitutes
>> >> a suitable framework for understanding the phenomenon of
>> >> collective emotion and its relationship to individual emotion.
>> >> My examples hint at a dialectical relation linking individual
>> >> and collective emotion. The tacit aspects of emotion shape
>> actions,
>> >> which are observed by, and available as resources to, others.
>> >> These others find themselves in emotional states, and
>> >> interpret the actions of others in terms of the emotions
>> >> they express; this interpretation is mediated by the activity
>> >> system that frames the actions. In their own actions, these
>> >> others may express the same emotions, which then gives rise
>> >> to a sense of solidarity, which sustains and fuels individual
>> >> short- and long-term emotional states." (p. 60)
>> >>
>> >>I would suggest that we need to insert material culture into our
>> >>conception
>> >>of how individuals generate emotion in activity systems, and trace how
>> the
>> >>participants identify themselves and the system of activity, "buy
>> into"
>> >>the
>> >>emotion, and jointly construct emotional valences meaningful in that
>> >>system
>> >>of activity.
>> >>
>> >>comradely,
>> >>Andy
>> >>
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Received on Thu Jul 26 15:14 PDT 2007