Re: Form / deform RE: [xmca] Tools, thought, & signs (Bruner, Peirce, Newton)

Hi Mike,
Seth is right, Neubildung does not refer to the same semantic field
as Bildung. What is interesting about this word is that there is
another variation Einbildung---Imagination, but in a negative sense.
When you say that someone "bildet sich etwas ein" (note German
breaking of the verb einbilden), then it denotes that someone merely
imagines something. It also means that someone is thinking (too)
highly of him/herself, is a little too proud which is an associated
semantic field. But then, if someone has Einbildungskraft, a force/
power of imagination, then it is positive again.
:-)
Cheers,
Michael

On 9-Jul-07, at 11:44 AM, Mike Cole wrote:

This turns out to be an interesting topic for me because I have been
corresponding with
Seth Chaiklin and the Moscow grad seminar about the idea of
"neoformations"
in Russian.

The word has some of the connotations that Tony points to-- bildung, for
example.
One Russian word for education is obrazovanie image-making (literally)
neoformation
is novoobrazovani -- new- image-making one would think. But no, It is
used
to refer
to the formation of a tumor or a volcano. Seth says that the same is
true of
bildung.

About "deform." What I had in mind is, say, the act of reaching for
something, a piece of fruit, say. Long human phylogenesis of that
action.
But when a stick, or a snippers, is
included into the action, the "natural reaching" action is deformed
(transformed too) and
subordinated to the constraints of the incorporated new element, call it
what you will.

mike

On 7/8/07, David Williamson Shaffer <dws@education.wisc.edu> wrote:
>
>
> Tony--
>
> I reserve the right to think more about the distinction you raise,
> but at
> the momentI don't think I was intending a difference in these
> formulations
> (no pun intended). I would use them all as synonyms for "mediate".
> There
> are
> different connotations, of course. Deform in particular is nice for
> its
> connotations, particularly in the context of pedagogical questions, it
> seems
> to me.
>
> But Mike and Katie (and others) may see the matter differently. In
> fact,
> I'm
> sure others do.
>
> I'm OK with making distinctions in the sense that it would be
> interesting
> (and perhaps useful) to think about what the differences we
> perceive might
> be. But I guess I am suggesting (and we are suggesting in TfT) that
> the
> differences will be within type rather than between type. That is,
> different
> properties of ontologically similar entities.
>
> But what do others think?
>
> David
>
>
>
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-
> bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> >Behalf Of Tony Whitson
> >Sent: Sunday, July 08, 2007 10:05 PM
> >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >Subject: Form / deform RE: [xmca] Tools, thought, & signs (Bruner,
> Peirce,Newton)
> >
> >David, Katie, and Mike:
> >
> >Could you just add something brief about what you mean by
> "deform," vs.
> >e.g. "trans-form", "re-form," etc.?
> >
> >Since I've been thinking about it over the last year, I'm seeing
> "form"
> >and "formation" as more and more important (note Mike's
> "morphology" is
> >also about form). This includes recovery of what Aristotle meant
> by the
> >(badly translateed) idea of "formal cause" (somebody brought that
> up on
> >this list a few months ago, but I was too busy to respond then).
> >
> >In European languages the vocabulary on education retains the idea of
> >"formacion" "Bildung" etc., but I often see these words used in
> ways that
> >suggest that the sense of formation (as distinct from, say,
> production)
> >is no longer salient. And when these words are translated into
> Chinese or
> >Japanese, the distinctive sense of "formation" is also not
> evident, it
> >seems to me. I'm guessing that German-Korean dictionaries translate
> >"Bildung" as the same Korean word that's used as the translation
> for the
> >English word "education" (David?).
> >
> >On Sun, 8 Jul 2007, David Williamson Shaffer wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> FWIW, I think in some ways the issues Tony raises at the end of his
> post
> (or
> >> near the end) is central from a theoretical perspective:
> >>
> >>>> There seems no reason for trying to sort things into
> categories, as
> being
> >>>> either "tools" or "signs" — the question, rather, would be
> whether we
> are
> >>>> presently concerned with something as it participates in the
> activity
> of
> >>>> sign-relations, or as it functions within tool-relations.
> >>
> >> Ontologically, Katie and I are arguing, as you suggest here,
> there is
> no
> >> difference between sign and tool--a position which we note
> contrasts
> with
> >> Vygotsky, but as you point our (and as we discuss in the paper)
> is not
> >> unique.
> >>
> >> I think this matters, in part, because of Mike's reply below. He
> writes:
> >>
> >>> Re 2: Tools may or may not amplify. But they certainly re-
> mediate--
> they
> >>> change the morphology of action, in a sense, they "deform"
> "natural"
> >>> action.
> >>
> >> I think the point Katie and I were trying to get at in
> toolforthoughts
> (both
> >> the term and the paper) is that there is no such thing as "natural"
> action.
> >> All action is deformed (to use Mike's term here).
> >>
> >> Actually, to be fair, we argue, although not in these terms,
> that we
> can
> >> *assume* such a thing as "natural" action, but that we have to
> recognize
> >> this is just an assumption--and of course a cultural-historically
> determined
> >> one at that.
> >>
> >> Mike is correct in saying (as he did in an earlier post) that this
> analysis
> >> applies equally to both non-computational tools and
> computational ones.
> But
> >> computational tools open up new possibilities for action--or to use
> Mike's
> >> terms again, new kinds of deformations. As Mcluhan suggests, we
> tend to
> see
> >> new deformations as unnatural--the old ones have already been
> naturalized,
> >> after all.
> >>
> >> Mike, I'd love to talk more about this last point over a bear, but
> wildlife
> >> being scarce at least for the moment and certainly as long as
> Bush is
> in
> >> office, let me say for the moment that I agree--and I think Donald
> would
> >> too--that the point of "cognitive cultures" is less to suggest
> that we
> can
> >> characterize thinking in one age or another by a particular
> cognitive
> form,
> >> than it is to identify when substantially new deformations appear.
> (Donald
> >> argues that the human mind is a palimpsest--he calls it a
> "hybrid"--where
> >> old forms are retained with the new.)
> >>
> >> That matters because in a time of rapid change in the nature of
> available
> >> deformations, we have to be especially careful about these
> >> assumptions--because assumptions about what is natural and what is
> deformed
> >> have pedagogical consequences.
> >>
> >> Thanks again for the thoughtful comments and perspectives....
> >>
> >> David
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-
> bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >On
> >>> Behalf Of Mike Cole
> >>> Sent: Sunday, July 08, 2007 7:24 PM
> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Tools, thought, & signs (Bruner, Peirce,
> Newton)
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for the synoptic discussion, Tony.
> >>>
> >>> I think Bruner is at least partially mistating things at the
> beginning
> of
> >>> your post:
> >>> "What is most characteristic of any kind of tool-using," he
> wrote, "is
> not
> >>> the tools themselves, but rather the program that guides their
> use. It
> is
> >> in
> >>> this broader sense that tools take on their proper meaning as
> amplifiers
> of
> >>> human capacities and implementers of human activity." ….
> >>>
> >>> What bothers me about this well known formulation, even though I
> initially
> >>> thought it just fine, is two things: 1) the strong boundary
> between
> >>> the "program that guides the action" and the tool; 2) the
> notion of
> >>> amplification.
> >>>
> >>> Re 1: See Bateson, (and, I believe, both Merleu-Ponty and
> Heidegger)
> using
> >>> the blind man and stick metaphor about "where the mind ends."
> >>> Suppose I am a blind man, and I use a stick. I go tap, tap,
> tap.
> Where
> >>> do I start? Is my mental system bounded at the hand of stick? Is
> >>> it bounded by my skin? Doe it start half way up the stick? Does it
> start
> at
> >>> the tip of the stick? ((Steps to an ecology of mind, p. 459).
> >>>
> >>> Bateson goes on to discuss how "the mind" slides up and down
> the stick
> and
> >>> out away from the stick, "depending."
> >>> Wertsch, in Mind as Action spends a lot of time discussing about a
> unit
> of
> >>> analysis he calls "person acting with mediational means in
> cultural
> >>> context." The short form of JSB's idea here belies that unit of
> analysis
> >>> and the fusions it points to.
> >>>
> >>> Re 2: Tools may or may not amplify. But they certainly re-
> mediate--
> they
> >>> change the morphology of action, in a sense, they "deform"
> "natural"
> >>> action. Peg Griffin and I wrote about this in an article called
> "Cultural
> >>> amplifiers reconsidered" which is not in electronic form. Anyone
> interested
> >>> we can get it into such form. The basic idea is to think of
> amplication
> as
> >>> increased amplitude of a signal without change in its form;
> that is
> >>> not human, artifact-mediated, activity.
> >>>
> >>> Very interesting about Newton. It gives one pause to think when
> one
> hears
> >>> discussions of human progress. Now uneducated farmers can
> >>> kill hundreds, and soon thousands, with some simple
> apprenticeship in
> >>> killing, but they stand on the shoulders of giants of course.
> >>>
> >>> Thanks Tony, thought provoking once again.
> >>> mike
> >>>
> >>> On 7/8/07, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> Before we move on to the next article, there are things I've said
> about
> >>>> tools, thought, and signs that were offered more or less as
> assertions,
> >>>> without the explanation needed to make sense of them. This
> longish
> post
> >>>> attempts to remedy that.
> >>>>
> >>>> A much more readable version (layout, formatting, live links, and
> even
> a
> >>>> photo of the inscription that was minted on the edge of Newton's
> coins)
> >> is
> >>>> posted at
> >>>> http://postcog.net/2007/06/16/tools-thoughts-signs/
> >>>> I would suggest that anybody who wants to read this post
> should read
> it
> >>>> there, and come back here if you would want to discuss
> anything from
> it
> >> on
> >>>> this email list.
> >>>> ------------
> >>>>
> >>>> This post relates to a discussion of Shaffer and Clinton
> (2007) on
> the
> >>>> eXtended Mind, Culture and Activity discussion list (XMCA) in
> June
> and
> >>>> July
> >>>> of 2007.
> >>>>
> >>>> 1. Bruner and tools for thought
> >>>>
> >>>> In the toolforthoughts article, computer technology is the
> focus of
> >>>> discussion about tools in relation to thought. Noting Levi-
> Strauss'
> >>>> observation "that totems (e.g., animals and other natural
> objects)
> were
> >>>> not
> >>>> chosen because they were good to eat, but because they were
> good to
> think
> >>>> with," Paul Dillon implicitly raised a question of tools for
> thought
> as
> >>>> something more general than computers in the world we live in.
> >>>>
> >>>> Other examples are suggested in Peter Dow's account of a
> curriculum
> >>>> development project headed by Jerome Bruner (circa 1965):
> >>>>
> >>>> Concern with teaching about technology had been a
> persistent [p.
> 87]
> >>>> theme from the beginning at ESI Social Studies. …. Bruner linked
> >>>> technology
> >>>> to the development of man's conceptual powers. "What is most
> >>>> characteristic
> >>>> of any kind of tool-using," he wrote, "is not the tools
> themselves,
> but
> >>>> rather the program that guides their use. It is in this
> broader sense
> >> that
> >>>> tools take on their proper meaning as amplifiers of human
> capacities
> and
> >>>> implementers of human activity." ….
> >>>>
> >>>> Early efforts to define the technology unit and translate
> these
> >>>> general
> >>>> notions into effective classroom materials bogged down in debates
> over
> >> how
> >>>> broadly to define the term tool. Should the discussion of
> tools be
> >>>> restricted to physical objects, or is a logarithm a tool? Is the
> Magna
> >>>> Carta
> >>>> a tool? Is E = mc2 a tool? Should the technology materials
> include
> >>>> perspectives from disciplines as diverse as mathematics and
> history?
> One
> >>>> of
> >>>> the difficulties in trying to construct a unit on this topic
> was the
> lack
> >>>> of
> >>>> a clear conceptual structure for defining what technology is
> and for
> >>>> considering its social implications. Here, as with the other
> topics,
> some
> >>>> of
> >>>> the most interesting issues and questions fell outside of the
> framework
> >> of
> >>>> established academic categories. … (Dow, 1991, pp. 86-7)
> >>>>
> >>>> 2. Peirce, thought, & signs
> >>>>
> >>>> Schaffer and Clinton draw from Latour's strategy for
> correcting what
> >>>> Latour
> >>>> sees as the problem of treating the human and the non-human
> >>>> asymmetrically.
> >>>> It seems to me, though, that what Latour sees as a problem arises
> from
> an
> >>>> assumed Cartesian dualism. The problem does not arise, in the
> first
> >> place,
> >>>> within a Peircean perspective that does not presume that kind of
> dualism
> >>>> between the human and the natural, or the human and the
> artificial.
> >>>>
> >>>> Peirce recognized the world as constituted semiosically, with
> humans
> >>>> ourselves emerging within our participation in the semiosis
> that was
> well
> >>>> underway before we got here. Peirce understood the entire
> universe as
> >>>> "perfused with signs":
> >>>>
> >>>> It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over
> it, that
> a
> >>>> sign
> >>>> should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning;
> but the
> >>>> explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire
> universe
> —
> >>>> not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider
> universe,
> >>>> embracing
> >>>> the universe of existents as a part, … that all this universe is
> perfused
> >>>> with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs
> (Peirce, CP
> 5.448;
> >>>> cf. Whitson, 2007, p. 322 ).
> >>>>
> >>>> Peirce says "all thought is in signs," understanding "thought"
> as as
> an
> >>>> activity of the world (not just humans), and "signs" also in a
> sense
> >>>> that's
> >>>> not limited to human communication. From Whitson (2007, pp.
> 296-7):
> >>>>
> >>>> As distinguished from semiology [i.e., in the tradition of
> Saussure
> —
> >>>> including Greimas and Latour], as well as earlier historic
> forms of
> >>>> semiotics [e.g., with the Stoics], semiotics following the
> work of C.
> S.
> >>>> Peirce is today, first and foremost, the study of semiosis, or
> the
> >>>> activity
> >>>> of triadic sign-relations, recognizing that
> >>>>
> >>>> the whole of nature, not just our experience of it,
> but the
> whole
> >>>> of
> >>>> nature considered in itself and on the side of its own and proper
> being
> >> is
> >>>> the subject of semiosis — the process and product, that is, of an
> action
> >>>> of
> >>>> signs coextensive with and constructive of the actual world as
> well
> as
> >> the
> >>>> world of experience and imagination. (Deely 1994: 187-188)
> >>>>
> >>>> As Peirce observed, 'To say … that thought cannot happen
> in an
> >>>> instant,
> >>>> but requires a time, is but another way of saying that every
> thought
> must
> >>>> be
> >>>> interpreted in another, or that all thought is in signs' (CP
> 5.253).
> Once
> >>>> the semiosic character of thought is recognized, thought
> itself is
> >>>> understood in a more general sense, such that
> >>>>
> >>>> Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
> appears
> in
> >>>> the
> >>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
> world;
> and
> >>>> one
> >>>> can no more deny that it is really there, than that the
> colors, the
> >>>> shapes,
> >>>> etc., of objects are really there. … Not only is thought in the
> organic
> >>>> world, but it develops there. (CP 4.551)
> >>>>
> >>>> What exactly is it that Peirce says is 'really there' in the
> physical
> >>>> world, as undeniably as the colors and the shapes of objects?
> What
> Peirce
> >>>> is
> >>>> referring to is the semiosic action of triadic sign-relations:
> >>>>
> >>>> It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis.
> All
> >>>> dynamical
> >>>> action, or action of brute force … either takes place between two
> >> subjects
> >>>> …
> >>>> or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs.
> But by
> >>>> 'semiosis' I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence,
> which
> is,
> or
> >>>> involves, a coöperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its
> object,
> >> and
> >>>> its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any
> way
> >>>> resolvable into actions between pairs. (CP 5.484; original
> emphasis)
> >>>>
> >>>> What, then, are tools, or toolforthoughts? Are they different
> from
> signs,
> >>>> species of signs, or what?
> >>>>
> >>>> 3. Newton, signs, and tools
> >>>>
> >>>> rough coinageAmong the problems tackled by Isaac Newton, over the
> course
> >>>> of
> >>>> his varied career, was the problem of preserving England's
> currency
> >>>> against
> >>>> counterfeiting and "clipping" (filing off precious metal from the
> edges
> >> of
> >>>> coins). As head of the Royal Mint, Newton oversaw torture to
> induce
> >>>> confessions, capital punishment, and even having offenders
> drawn and
> >>>> quartered to protect the value of the royal coinage.
> >>>>
> >>>> Newton's mint began the practice of making coins with ridges
> around
> the
> >>>> edge
> >>>> so that clipping could be easily detected; and also, at that
> time,
> >>>> actually
> >>>> engraving the edge with the words "DECUS ET TUTAMEN" — a
> phrase that
> >> might
> >>>> be literally translated as "an ornament and a safeguard," but
> which
> we
> >>>> might
> >>>> also recognize as an engraving that is announcing itself as
> "both a
> sign
> >>>> and
> >>>> a tool."
> >>>>
> >>>> 4. Of tools and signs (umbrella example)
> >>>>
> >>>> Let's try this example: Suppose I know that you always check the
> weather
> >>>> on
> >>>> your computer before you go out for lunch. Today I notice you
> picked
> up
> >>>> your
> >>>> umbrella on your way out the door. Without checking the
> weather for
> >>>> myself,
> >>>> I take my own umbrella with me when I go out. From a Peircean
> >> perspective,
> >>>> my action of taking my umbrella is one of the three terms in a
> triadic
> >>>> sign-relation: My action is an interpretant determined by your
> action
> >> (the
> >>>> representamen), interpreted as a sign of possible rain (the
> object-term
> >> in
> >>>> this triad). Here the umbrella participates in the activity of
> triadic
> >>>> sign-relations.
> >>>>
> >>>> When we get outside, either of us might be preoccupied with
> holding
> our
> >>>> umbrella in the right position so it doesn't get blown inside-
> out by
> the
> >>>> wind. Now our concern is with the umbrella in its tool-
> relations — or
> >>>> simply
> >>>> its instrumental use as a tool for keeping dry.
> >>>>
> >>>> There seems no reason for trying to sort things into
> categories, as
> being
> >>>> either "tools" or "signs" — the question, rather, would be
> whether we
> are
> >>>> presently concerned with something as it participates in the
> activity
> of
> >>>> sign-relations, or as it functions within tool-relations.
> >>>>
> >>>> What do you think?
> >>>>
> >>>> Dow, Peter B. Schoolhouse Politics: Lessons from the Sputnik Era.
> >>>> Cambridge,
> >>>> Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.
> >>>>
> >>>> Peirce, Charles S. Collected Papers. Cambridge: Belknap Press of
> Harvard
> >>>> University Press, 1866-1913/1931-1958.
> >>>>
> >>>> Shaffer, David Williamson, and Katherine A. Clinton.
> "Toolforthoughts:
> >>>> Reexamining Thinking in the Digital Age." Mind, Culture, And
> Activity
> 13,
> >>>> no. 4 (2007): 283-300.
> >>>>
> >>>> Whitson, James Anthony. "Education à la Silhouette: The Need for
> >>>> Semiotically-Informed Curriculum Consciousness." Semiotica
> 164, no.
> 1/4
> >>>> (2007): 235-329.
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >
> >Tony Whitson
> >UD School of Education
> >NEWARK DE 19716
> >
> >twhitson@udel.edu
> >_______________________________
> >
> >"those who fail to reread
> > are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> > -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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Received on Tue Jul 10 07:17 PDT 2007