Martin, but it is "anti-" Heideggerian because it does not begin with
an ontic "Being", but rather, Levinas grounds Being in something that
is beyond essence and prior to Being. And one day, when the first
human being opened his/her mouth to say something to another, he or
she already presupposed intersubjectivity. How is this possible?
Without this presupposition, however, we cannot even begin speaking
let alone philosophizing, theorizing, constructing Selves, etc.
Heidegger essentializes Being, and Levinas works against it, and so
many others that follow in his footsteps or next to them. Read the
fascinating discussion Derrida devotes to Levinas and, incidentally,
Nancy Michael
Derrida, J. (1997). Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press:
Derrida, J. (2005). On touching—Jean-Luc Nancy. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
On 28-Jun-07, at 9:27 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
Michael,
I will confess that I struggle to grasp Levinas. This is a request for
clarification: what you've said [below] sounds very similar to
Heidegger's
notion that the being of an entity is always constituted on the basis
of a
background of cultural practices, which he called (rather
confusingly) 'the
meaning of being,' or (better in my view) 'the upon-which of being.'
The
'difference that makes a difference,' then, is the difference between a
being (an entity: that it is) and the being of that entity (what it is:
constituted culturally/historically).
Martin
On 6/28/07 10:59 AM, "Wolff-Michael Roth" <mroth@uvic.ca> wrote:
> think Being as being grounded, historically, in
> something that is "Otherwise than Being."
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
Received on Thu Jun 28 09:38 PDT 2007
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Sun Jul 01 2007 - 00:30:04 PDT