Bill,
great list of names but is not easy to discuss. Dorothy Smith, for
example, shows how Durkheim bought causality by evacuating the
subject and how he objectified thinking and feeling; he transfers
agency to social phenomena. Causal thinking in social science always
leads you to deterministic models, and I am sure you do not feel
being determined in what you do by outside or inside forces. You can
always do otherwise, this is what is so nice about being human.
The nice thing about Lucy Suchman's work, the gap between plans and
situated actions shows that even our intentions (plans) are not
causally linked to our actions; and Jean Lave writes about the
dialectic of arithmetic precisely because of the dialectical relation
between the two planes at which Leont'ev describes the object to
consist on.
Agency is a problematic concept unless it is dialectically paired
with passivity, because experience, pain, is not something you intend
but passively receive. . . even though you might intend to have an
experience you need to open yourself because you cannot anticipate,
especially when you are learner, to what will touch you, impress upon
you, etc.
So no, causation is not a good concept, because if it was like this,
then you can evacuate the idea of free will. Perhaps you mean mediation.
Are you sure about Bateson? Bateson (1980, p. 106): "Of course,
difference, which is usually a ration between similars, has no
dimensions. It is QUALITATIVE not QUANTITATIVE.
He writes in "Every schoolboy knows", "Quantity does not determine
pattern
He writes, "Interaction between parts of mind is triggered by
difference
"There is a strong tendency in explanatory prose to invoke
quantities of tension, energy and whatnot to explain the genesis of
pattern. I believe that all such explanations are inappropriate or
wrong" (p.55)
I think we should discuss ideas not names; I think we should discuss
ideas even of the great ones as possibly being outdated and wrong in
the present day context. We are scholars not defenders of canons,
whoever wrote it.
:-)
Cheers,
Michael
On 20-Jan-06, at 4:55 PM, bb wrote:
Ok, well, Lemke discussed downward causation in his aarhus paper,
Albert Bandura discusses social causes in his work on depression,
Giidens discusses causation in several text, as does Durkheim in his
book on sociological method and Dorothy Holland discusses agency,
which I am finding closely related to causation, and Bateson
discusses circular causation in a couple of texts. These are all
heavy hitters, respectively in semiotics, psychology, sociology, and
anthropology, not folk scientists. Se we agree to disagree -- we
have very different senses of causation.
bb
-------------- Original message ----------------------
From: Wolff-Michael Roth <mroth@uvic.ca>
> Bill,
> Even in social science you got to get your relations right.
> Categories are inherently different. They can therefore not be used
> to establish a causal relation, which is framed generally in a form:
>
>
> E = kC
>
> where the equal sign already intimates that E and C are commensurable.
>
> or perhaps more generally, causation is expressed from a
> philosophical perspective as
>
>
>
> ∀x(Fx →Gx)
>
> where events of type F are followed by events of type G.
>
> Otherwise we get ourselves into a quagmire. It makes no sense to
> establish a causation between a teacher saying something and student
> killing her (like Columbine).
>
>
> Michael
>
>
>
>
> On 20-Jan-06, at 4:07 PM, bb wrote:
>
> We're doing social science, Michael, not physical science.
>
> bb
> -------------- Original message ----------------------
> From: Wolff-Michael Roth <mroth@uvic.ca>
>> Hi Bill,
>>
>> This doesn't stick. Look at any accepted use of cause and effect in
>> the science and scientific literature. It always establishes a
>> relationship between two or more factors, and this in quantitative
>> way.
>>
>> My ouch is not caused by your sticking, because there are lots of
>> stickings that do not lead to saying ouch. If you want to use this as
>> an example, then you relate the force of sticking or the depth of
>> penetration to the intensity of the pain. And then you have exactly
>> what I am talking about.
>>
>> The other is folk science.
>>
>> Michael
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 20-Jan-06, at 2:50 PM, bb wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Hi all,
>>> it is easy to slip into a discourse that separates tools and
>>> artifacts from other things, which happens here, too. We then think
>>> in terms of "effects" that one thing has on another--but effects
>>> imply causal relations, which are quantitative rather than
>>> qualitative, which they need to be if they mediate. . .
>>
>>
>> Oh, cause and effect are not strictly quantitative. Engage in this
>> thought experiment. Suppose I stick you with a pin and you say
>> "ouch". The action of sticking with a pin is arguably the cause of
>> the action of uttering "ouch", and there is no quantitative relation
>> necessary, unless perhaps I repeat with needles of increasing size.
>>
>> cheers,
>> bb
>>
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