I am tryiing to work out a 10 week course syllabus that includes these ideas
in the current
scence. I will be reading what I can and communicating again properly in
second week of
decemberf/
mike
On 11/17/05, Mary K. Bryson <mary.bryson@ubc.ca> wrote:
>
> Yes, Christopher Bollas -- I am chewing on "Becoming a Character -
> Psychoanalysis and Self Experience" at the moment - The Shadow of the
> object
> is also excellent. For decades I resisted reading object relations theory,
> but actually, there are very significant elements of self-other formations
> that are completely obscured by the rationalist foundations of say,
> paradigmatic CHAT theory -- as in -- how do we deal with the role of
> abjection in subjectification - the self as Other, sometimes to itself,
> and
> sometimes Othered hegemonically... This is where I find it helpful and
> important --- where it goes into the language of psychoanalytic,
> clinincally
> motivated diagnosis, I find it obnoxious, paternalistic, and
> pathologizing,
> and it reminds me why I resisted reading this stuff for so long...
>
> Mary
>
>
> On 11/16/05 3:10 PM, "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Mary-- By Bollas do you mean this book by Christopher Bollas-- looks
> right
> > but perhaps you have something else in mind: *The shadow of the object :
> > psychoanalysis of the unthought known .
> >
> > Peter-- There was a special issue of MCA a while back about
> > Scientific/Everyday concepts that Vera was guest editor of or had a
> paper
> > in.
> > mike
> >
> > *
> > On 11/15/05, Peter Moxhay <moxhap@portlandschools.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> Anna (& Victor & Vera & all):
> >>
> >> Yes, I would very much like to read your (Anna's) paper on concepts in
> >> mathematics.
> >>
> >> Also, does anyone have the reference to Gordon's paper or chapter?
> >>
> >> Though perhaps this is off the main line of interest for most on the
> list,
> >> I think that the current discussion of Anna's paper has helped me start
> to
> >> resolve some difficulties I have had in understanding and correlating:
> >>
> >> - everday concepts vs. scientific concepts (Vygotsky)
> >> - theoretical concepts vs. empirical concepts (Davydov)
> >> - Ilyenkov's knowledge of the object vs. verbally expressed conceptions
> >>
> >> I would be most grateful if anyone could send me (perhaps off the list)
> >> references to any recent literature on this topic of concept formation.
> >> (Perhaps Anna and Eduardo's paper has comprehesive references?)
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >>
> >> Peter
> >>
> >>>>> AStetsenko@gc.cuny.edu 11/15/05 10:41 AM >>>
> >> Peter,
> >>
> >> I find you points on concepts very much in tune with previous
> >> argumentation. Indeed, this can be seen as an important grounding for
> the
> >> more general points previously made (at the level of a worldview) in
> >> analysing conrete interactions of teaching-and-learning. Especially for
> the
> >> worldview level point about the centrality of contribution by each
> >> individual to the flow of social practice unfolding in history.
> >>
> >> Vygotsky's discussion of everyday and scientific concepts is very
> relevant
> >> here, I would think. Gordon Wells has an excellent paper (or was it
> >> chapter?) reflecting on this distinction.
> >>
> >> Knowing how important such grounding of general ideas in concrete
> concepts
> >> is, I have written a paper comparing various models of
> teaching-and-learning
> >> concepts in mathematics (Nunes and Cobb versus Davydov-Elkonin). With
> the
> >> notion of individual contribution to social practice at the center
> (also
> >> making an argument how worldview level ideas get chanelled into
> practice and
> >> vice versa). This paper was written together with Eduardo Vianna who is
> my
> >> doctoral student and of whom I am very proud -- he works precisely at
> the
> >> juncture of general ideas and practice -- in the context of a Group
> Home for
> >> boys (he presented in Seville). Could send you a paper, if you like -
> it's
> >> in press for Theory&Psychology.
> >>
> >> AStetsenko
> >>
> >> ________________________________
> >>
> >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Peter Moxhay
> >> Sent: Mon 11/14/2005 2:36 PM
> >> To: Activity eXtended Mind Culture
> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] concept as gambit
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Anna -- thanks for your comments on my query; I've finding it very
> >> useful in understanding your article to think in terms of concept
> >> formation .
> >>
> >> And Victor -- thanks so much for the references, especially for
> >> sending me to reread Chapter VI of Andy's "The Meaning of Hegel's
> >> Logic":
> >>
> >> http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/mean06.htm
> >>
> >> where I found this, in particular:
> >>
> >>> Even (or rather especially) when what we see sharply contradicts
> >>> what we know it to be, truth lies neither in abandoning our former
> >>> opinion nor in ignoring the evidence of the senses but in forming a
> >>> unity of the two: modifying our former opinion and seeing it in a
> >>> new light, finding in immediate perception what was formerly so but
> >>> now is not so.
> >>
> >> Andy gives the example of one's immediate perception of "the Moon"
> >> taken together with the accumulated human knowledge of the Moon:
> >>
> >>> When we look at "the Moon", we do not question the immediacy of
> >>> this perception. A murky cloud-covered view we would unhesitatingly
> >>> refer to as "the Moon" equally as the Moon on a clear night. The
> >>> Moon itself is inseparable from our concept of it, and has
> >>> reflected sunlight on to countless generations of people. And in
> >>> apprehending the Moon, we apprehend that which is referred to in
> >>> the word "lunacy" and the words "romantic moonlit night" and which
> >>> causes the tides.
> >>
> >> Now what this puts me in mind of is a conversation I had a few years
> >> ago with Sergei Gorbov, who is one of Davydov's co-authors of the
> >> Elkonin-Davydov mathematics curriculum for elementary schools. He
> >> told me that one of the most important moments of the teaching-
> >> learning process is when the children come forward and express their
> >> _subjective_ reactions to a given mathematical problem situation.
> >> That is, the children may have in common certain ways of acting when
> >> faced with a mathematical problem, but then they are confronted with
> >> some new problem situation where what they know so far doesn't work.
> >> A particular child will then tell what he or she thinks is the action
> >> to be performed to solve the problem. In some cases, the child's
> >> suggested action will not solve the problem, but even this "mistake"
> >> gets folded back into and enriches the socially-shared mathematical
> >> ways of acting. In other cases, the child's suggested action does
> >> solve the problem, and so is successful in pushing forward the
> >> collective knowledge of the classroom of children. The child takes a
> >> risk (gambit?) of suggesting some new action, and the class as a
> >> whole evaluates whether this new action solves the mathematical
> >> problem or not.
> >>
> >> So, it is an individual's "subjective image" of "how to act in the
> >> new situation" that drives forward the socially-shared body of
> >> knowledge. If we think of the "concept" not as the existing body of
> >> knowledge but as a kind of vector along which that knowledge
> >> increases, then the concept is intimately tied to individuals'
> >> subjective ways of acting. But it's a subjective suggestion for
> >> action that is socially (intersubjectively?) evaluated.
> >>
> >> Anna, Victor -- does this example make any sense? Is this the kind of
> >> subjectivity we've been talking about in the discussion of Anna's
> >> article?
> >>
> >> Peter
> >>
> >>> [Anna wrote]: Yes, Peter, you are right, this is critical indeed
> >>> and I was going to elaborate on this too as this agrees with my
> >>> position very much (and the readings Victor suggested are also
> >>> critical - but let me try to make some points already here).
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> In my take on this issue, and in more Vygotskian terms, concepts
> >>> are TOOLS that are embedded within (in the sense of them coming out
> >>> and returning to) the reality they are meant to serve. Concepts are
> >>> saturated with this reality they serve and never break away from it
> >>> ((Of course, if twe are dealing with meaningful concepts)). The
> >>> reverse dependency is also true - this is as an upshot of the
> >>> argument in my paper.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> This reality often, and more immediately for many of those who do
> >>> theorizing, is the reality of theoretical debates, approaches and
> >>> so on. In this sense, concepts are inextricably dependent on the
> >>> whole theoretical system under consideration (hence the point about
> >>> each and every idea or principle making sense only within the whole
> >>> system) - and this is something readily acknowledged by many
> >>> (though certainly not all) who come to think about and work with
> >>> concepts. As, for example, reflected in the argument we all like
> >>> very much - about the importance of context. But then, as also
> >>> argued in my paper, behind this seemingly abstract theoretical
> >>> reality there are always practical engagements with some issues out
> >>> in the world, beyond the ivory tower of science - hence the
> >>> practical and ideological saturation of concepts and theories.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> This embedded nature of concepts comes through very clearly in
> >>> works on science as a social construction (the best in psychology
> >>> being by Danziger, I think, who was referred to before), and in
> >>> works by Sandra Harding on positionality and standpoint
> >>> epistemology, and in Morwaski and other feminist scholars (Mary has
> >>> mentioned some too in a different context).
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> There are many renditions of this position - varying from extreme
> >>> views of social constructionism a la Gergen for whom constructs are
> >>> only instruments of social discourse (and are ephemeral, leading to
> >>> extreme relativism - in my view), to more dialectical views in
> >>> which concepts do reflect real practical contingences, at the same
> >>> time as they serve as tools within discourses (many in philosophy
> >>> of science, e.g. Young and in psychology - e.g., Ian Paker make
> >>> similar arguments). In history of science, it was Russian
> >>> philosopher Hessen who argued for this quite passionately in the
> >>> 1940s, shocking members of the then established positivistically
> >>> oriented community of historians of science. Young gives a
> >>> fascinating account of the storm Hessen caused at some
> >>> international congress on history of science with his presentation
> >>> on Newton. This is my very brief selection, but there are many many
> >>> more - as Victor points to readings in this direction. For me
> >>> personally, this social-practical and history-context embedded
> >>> nature of concepts was one of the first stark realizations that
> >>> helped me throughout all my subsequent work (being really one of
> >>> the threads of all my works, starting from early 1980s, I apologize
> >>> for making this allusions to earlier works - this is meant as
> >>> adding to context).
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> My take on all of this, again, is about the importance of seeing -
> >>> and using - concepts as embedded within the flow of practical
> >>> activity/ engagements with the reality out in the world and its
> >>> challenges, as well as the reverse movements between concepts-
> >>> practice (the two being in unity but not in equivalence).
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> I don't know if this agrees with what Victor meant (will read his
> >>> posting more closely now).
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Incidentally, this is the way to answer also Mike's question - why
> >>> subjectivity? Because the explanation has to do with the context. I
> >>> will refer to this in the next message.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Thanks to all who are still following the discussion (if there are
> >>> some such people),
> >>>
> >>> A Stetsenko
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> ________________________________
> >>>
> >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Peter Moxhay
> >>> Sent: Thu 11/10/2005 12:25 PM
> >>> To: Activity eXtended Mind Culture
> >>> Subject: [xmca] concept as gambit
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Victor,
> >>>
> >>> You wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> the concept, is a gambit that is in fact a subjective challenge to
> >>>> objective social practice (the idea is Hegelian though Hegel as an
> >>>> idealist had a much more restricted concept of the negating effect
> >>>> of the concept than that implicit in Marxian dialectics).
> >>>
> >>> I find this comment extremely clarifying (with respect to the ongoing
> >>> discussion) and exciting. Could you perhaps provide references for
> >>> further reading on this? In what works/sections would you say Hegel
> >>> touches on this? Do you have any papers that expand on this comment?
> >>>
> >>> Also, I'm wondering whether this idea was really refused by _all_
> >>> Soviet dialecticians...
> >>>
> >>> Peter
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
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> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> <winmail.dat>
> >>> _______________________________________________
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> >>>
> >>>
> >>
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> >>
> >>
> >>
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