Responses on a couple of issues Mike.
Firstly, my views on "the subject" are skewed because I believe it to
be the central issue of the day, and I am in the midst of writing a
book called "The Subject," so I am somewhat over-sensitive about views
I might differ with when it is about "subjectivity."
Secondly, the word has an interesting and very complex genealogy. It
originates from Aristotle's 'hyperkeimenon', which translates into
Latin as 'subjectum', and entered the English language as 'subject' in
the 14th century. For Aristotle, it meant (sort of) the essential
entity which has predicates attached to it (i.e., properties,
qualities, attributes), while it nonetheless remains what it is, and
not something else - the "material substratum of a thing" as opposed
to its contingent "properties". From this is derived the idea of
subject in the grammatical sense and as "topic", something about which
things get said, as well as subject of an experiment, or a murder plot
or a poem.
In this same sense, when "subject" entered the English language it
came to mean the people who constituted the material substratum of
God's most important creations, his kingdoms and church. From there
"subject" meant falling under the power of others, of being
"subjected" to others.
However, Descartes brought about the linguistic turn by designating
the "cogito" as a distinct substance (L. substantia), as opposed to
the material substance of the outside world. From Descartes it became
customary in philosophy to refer to the individual knower as a
"subject" and thanks to Kant, "subject" became fixed in philosophical
usage as the individual, knowing *moral* agent. With Hegel however,
"subject" became not necessarily individual, but rather individual,
particular and universal simultaneously, and this was in line with
current usage in terms of the "subject of international law".
Thirdly, the interesting question of how one individual can know the
state of another individual's consciousness. The experimental
techniques you describe have always struck me as being exemplars of
the solution of this problem, honestly. But it is one of those
unanswerable problems of life. I think it is coextensive with the
history of psychology, isn't it? To know what someone is thinking, the
first and best requirement is to be another human being. All I would
say though, Mike, is that this problem by no means exhausts or defines
the problem of subjectivity.
Andy
At 06:18 PM 4/11/2005 -0800, you wrote:
A very helpful intervention, Viktor. For me, too, the
interpretation of
Ilynekov in the paper was a point where, as I commented to Anna in
another
regard,
I diverged from her presentation. Here I would like to raise two
points,
noting that others are implicated by the later discussion involving
you,
andy, and
martin, and hoping that Anna and others will contribute here as
well.
First, I always thought it very important that Ilyenkov was so
involved with
the Blind Deaf. I met him only once, when I was in Moscow with my
daughter,
and we participated in an excursion of Zagorsk with him, Davydov,
Zinchenko,
and their friends. (I can't recall if Felix Mikhailov, who is
ailing in
Moscow,
was there, but Felix's close connection both to Evald and Suvarov
and the
blind-deaf community is, I think, relevantly symptomatic). This was
a
utopian
project in the truest sense of the word: If, one is not born a
personality,
but becomes one owing to the joint activity with others in the
recreation of
human life,
then a project to enable children experience blind-deafness to
become phds
and live independently in Moscow is both a utopian project and an
acid test
of
theory. At first this project was celebrated in the USSR-- it was
features,
for example, in their glossy self promotion magazine. But by the
1980's
these
same people were considered dissedents and clearly felt themselves
in
opposition. The authorities wanted to close down the project and
teach the
blind
deaf to make pencils in sheltered workshops. This, and the
involvement of
other late vygotskians in preschool education, "defectology,"
rehabilitation
research, etc always reminds me of the idea I associate with Marx
(ref?)
that progress is made in the garbage heap of history. Yet Ilyenkov
was
distrusted by
many as a Stalinist. What a razor thin line to tread and no wonder
that
alcohol was used to dull the pain of the cuts the razors caused.
Second, and on a very different tack. I would really appreciate
help
understanding warrants for claims about another person or group's
"subjectivity."
I am a member of modern academic culture, so of course I have a
general idea
of what the term means from its uses, as in Anna's paper, but in
cultural
studies more broadly. But, perhaps because of my training as a
behaviorist,
or perhaps because of my training as a student of Alexander
Luria's, many
uses
of the term make me nervous, and that extends to Anna's paper and
your
discussion with Martin (for whom the term is more comfortable, I
believe --
Please, Martin, Anna, Andy, Mary, and others join in here).
Danzinger recounts how it came about that a researcher in a German
laboratory in the 1880's-1990's came to be called "the subject,"
the person
whose
psychological states/perceptions/elements of consciousness/.......
his (it
was all hims at the time) research-partner was, in collaboration
with the
subject,
trying to obtain "scientific evidence" about. In simple terms, it
was the
problem of how you could know what someone else was
thinking/feeling.
Luria writes about his disillusion with various attempts to solve
this
problem. He specifed, in The Nature of Human Conflicts, and again
in his
autobiography,
a method in which the researcher created a situation where s/he and
the
"subject" were coordinated in a cultural medium. The behavior of
both was
voluntary, not reflexive. Once they achieve highly coordinated
joint
actions, the researcher introduces a highly selected change into
the
situation and
determines if this change results in a change in the coordinated
actions of
the "subject." ONLY when there is selective, predictable,
DIS-coordination
of the coordinated joint activity is there a warrant for a claim
about the
other person's thought/feeling.
Peg Griffin and I sought to extend this idea into the diagnosis and
remediation of reading difficulties of children with, I believe,
reasonable
success. Bruner and
others used it, without acknowledgement or recognition of its
general
importance so far as I know, in studies where, for example, infants
are
first habituated
to a series of stimuli while their "signature" rhythmic sucking is
recorded
and then a small change of interest (phoeme, visual
configuration...) is
introduced
to see if the suckig is disrupted.
I can give other examples from rare, but naturally occuring events
I have
participated in.
But in general, what are the warrants for claims about another
person's or
another people's subjectivity? Last night on National Public Radio
I heard a
Palastinian and other people writing "in diaspora" speak of the
fence as
huge influence on his feeling of being walled out of his own
country. The
people from various parts
of Africa rioting in Paris are clearly outraged over their
treatment by the
French and I see their anger in their actions. But what can I claim
to know
about their
subjectivity (their anger is objectively visible to me)? What can
my
daughter, who has lived in Eastern Madagascar at various periods in
her
life, gotten
extraordinarily ill from helping grow rice in swamps, participated
in cattle
sacrifice, grieved at the death of her Malagasy ancestors, know
about
Malagasy
subjectivity? Behind my back,the BBC is showing anyone who will
watch the
subjectivity of Latin Americans outraged at American policies. What
can I
know about their subjectivity other than its external
manifestations?
This is not a known answer question. I would appreciate help in
coming to
terms with the use of this term. I believe it must be used with
great care
and the
possibility of claims being incorrect. Luria wanted to be able to
distinguish what people said from what they "felt." In Anna's
paper, the
terms subjectivity
and intersubjectivity are central. What is being meant by what is
being
written?
Thanks if you have read this far.
mike
On 11/3/05, Victor <victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il> wrote:
>
> Anna,
>
>
>
> On the issue of object relatedness in CHAT:
>
> It has been for some time now that the CHAT model has appeared to
me to be
> to be so strongly objectivist in approach that it was difficult
to
> impossible to utilize it for the analysis of conflicts inherent
within all
> forms of social organization.
>
> My area of interest is mostly in organizational systems in which
conflict
> is not only inherent but so salient a feature of social
interaction that is
> impossible to ignore subjectivity as a active force in the
formation and
> development of the system, e.g. in economics and politics. As
long-time
> student a sometimes teacher, my impression of the classroom
situation and of
> educational systems in general (subjects more often discussed
here in this
> forum than economic and political relations) has ever been one of
conflict
> and precarious compromise where the unifying socio-cultural
system is often
> more evident by its weaknesses rather than by its strengths. In
general my
> impression of CHAT theories of the educational system have been
notably
> lacking in the determination of the unity of the system as a
function of the
> concatenation of the operation of many conflicting wills. I would
surely
> welcome a CHAT that addresses more attention to the operation of
> subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the accounting of the
outcomes of
> social interaction.
>
>
>
> On your paper:
>
> Most of your paper concerns the works of Leont'ev and Vygotsky.
Leont'ev's
> works I've read only a few times and so I'll have to accept your
commentary
> on his works as is. I agree with your comments on Vygotsky with a
few
> reservations that are not important to your main thesis so no
discussion on
> his work is called for here. However, your description of
Ilyenkov's ideas
> concerning the relation of object to subject and on the
significance of
> subjectivity in the development of social life appear to me to be
seriously
> in need of correction.
>
>
>
> Ilyenkov's discussion on the relation between subject and object
though
> widely distributed throughout his works, is the especial focus of
his "The
> Concept of the Ideal" (1977) and of Chapter8, "The Materialist
Conception of
> Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic", of Dialectical Logic
(1974).
> Ilyenkov is certainly not an easy writer to understand; his logic
though
> very good is often unsystematic, he peppers his works with
unexplained
> allusions to material that he does not cite, and his treatment of
critical
> concepts is often diffident and even hidden. Another difficulty
of
> Ilyenkov's works is that much of his writing is in a
Marxist-Leninist mode
> that's special to the language of revolutionary communist
literature, and is
> quite different from the language of academic philosophy. The
result has
> been in my view an array of egregious misinterpretations of
Ilyenkov's
> works, especially by Anglo-Saxon academic philosophers without
much
> grounding in dialectical analysis. The idea that Ilyenkov's works
tend
> towards objectivism and towards a neutral contemplationist
concept of
> scientific endeavor are precisely among the errors disseminated
by these
> recent interpretations of Ilyenkov's works.
>
>
>
> Ilyenkov's concrete formulation of the meaning of the ideal in
"The
> Concept of the Ideal" does refer repeatedly to one of the
properties of the
> ideal as being "significant objects". However in this very same
article
> Ilyenkov also reiterates in a number of passages that the
comprehensive
> meaning of the term, ideal, is the necessary dialectical unity of
the
> significant object and of subjectivity. The ideal object is
described as
> only the embodiment of conscious, willed activity, i.e.
subjectivity, and
> that subjectivity is no less an essential component of the ideal
than the
> object that represents it. But this is not all.
>
>
>
> When, in his 1977 article, Ilyenkov finally gets around to
describing the
> difference between the Marxian and Hegelian concept of the ideal
(paragraph
> 93, 103, and here and there in between), he finds it in their
respective
> theories of the genesis of the ideal relative to subjectivity.
His argument
> in brief runs as follows:
>
> For Hegel subjectivity, the notion, i.e. subjective cognition,
and
> objectification are the prerequisite conditions for the emergence
of the
> ideal, the ideal being the consequences of the development of
categories of
> knowledge.
>
> For Marx (and Ilyenkov), subjectivity, the object, and the ideal
develop
> simultaneously as the outcome of the special conditions of human
sociality;
> the voluntary (in the sense here of non-instinctive)
collaboration of mostly
> if not entirely socialized individuals for the purpose of
producing the
> means for satisfaction of collective and individual needs.
>
> Ilyenkov infers from this that while for Hegel objectification is
an
> embodiment of pure activity in the ideal object, Marx regards the
embodied
> activity as labour or productive activity. The importance of this
difference
> is not very evident in the 1977 article, but examination of
Ilyenkov's
> interpretation of labour activity in paragraphs 44 to 51 (sorry I
do not
> have a paginated version of the book) of chapter 8 of Dialectical
Logic is
> very instructive in this regard. Here he makes the point that
labour, i.e.
> the creative interaction of the agent with natural conditions, is
never be
> entirely encompassed by the objectification of the activity (in
paragraph
> 51). In effect Ilyenkov is saying here that subjectivity can
never be
> entirely subsumed by the object and as such remains a significant
element in
> the prosecution of human sociality whatever the concrete
conditions of that
> sociality.
>
>
>
> What didn't Ilyenkov write: That which he could have and perhaps
should
> have written?
>
>
>
> For Hegel the objectification of subjective activity, i.e. the
notion,
> does not in itself produce the ideal. The ideal only is realized
when the
> objectified notion or acquired concept, first negates Life, i.e.
the
> actual extant conditions which are the prerequisites of the
formulation of
> the objective concept, and then joins it in the realization of
desirable
> (good) outcomes. For Hegel the acquired concept cannot be one
with life,
> because formulation and employment of the objective concept is
implicitly
> informed by the yet unsatisfied subjective goals of the agents of
the
> concept.
>
>
>
> The Marxian concept of the ideal (as interpreted by Ilyenkov) has
no real
> need for the counterpoising of the objective concept to Life, it
has a much
> more material target, namely the social practices from which it
emerges and
> of which it is a representation. This need not be understood to
mean that
> the formulation of an ideal is necessarily a broad rejection of
current
> communal practice, it can be quite a modest affair such as the
> representation of the "legitimate" rules of a game, the right
price for a
> dozen eggs, and the proper way to eat peas with a fork. The ideal
is invoked
> when an agent, individual or collective, mobilizes an objectified
concept to
> change the extant practices of others to realize a social or
material goal
> that she wants satisfied. The outcome of her employment of ideas
will be
> dependent on complexes of material factors, of production, of
organization
> and the co-existence of other invoked ideals, but this is a
different
> problem altogether.
>
>
>
> Why didn't Ilyenkov write this?
>
>
>
> 1.. The "idealist" bogeyman: The presentation of a fully
practical theory
> of the ideal must posit that the ideal is not only a consequent
of social
> practice, but at more concrete levels of analysis must be
regarded as a
> prerequisite of social practice (see chapter 2, section 3 of
Dialectics of
> the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's Capital (1960) for more
details). An
> explicit presentation of the reciprocal effect of the ideal on
social
> relations would have provided his intellectual and political
opponents with
> powerful arguments for labeling him as an "idealist".
>
>
> 2.. Border conditions and focus of analysis: Ilyenkov was very
fastidious
> of the "border conditions" of his work. Most of his efforts were
devoted to
> the elucidation of the later works of Marx and of Lenin's
theoretical works.
> The focus of these works is nearly entirely on political economy,
and on
> political economy writ large. Subjectivity finds a place in these
works
> either as descriptions of the rational activity of generic
members of
> classes or as descriptions of the social activity of groups. When
Ilyenkov
> approaches the "borders" of the system of the relations of
production, the
> issue of the historical development of the forces of production
in see
> chapter 2, section 3 of Dialectics of the Abstract and the
Concrete in
> Marx's Capital, or the "borders" of the abstract theory of the
ideal, the
> relation of the individual to social organization in "The Concept
of the
> Ideal" he draws back and "hands over the subject" to others.
Ilyenkov is
> surely aware that borders between subjects of analysis are
relative, in
> dialectical theory the relations of all concepts are essentially
conditional
> and relative rather than causal and absolute, so his
fastidiousness is
> unlikely to be a matter of research domains consecrated by
professional
> custom. It is more likely that this fastidiousness reflects
Ilyenkov's
> regard for theory as a function of practical goals, and that his
decision to
> limit his theorizing to the social interactions of collectivities
and to the
> theory of political economic states is the outcome of his
practical research
> aims rather than a universal law of theory.
>
>
> 3.. The political limitations on conflict theory in the USSR:
From the
> point of view of all established elites, including the academic
elite,
> Marxist theory has all the endearing features of atomic weaponry.
The unity
> of subjectivity and objectivity implicit in the dialectical
approach to
> culture and history has produced a theory of society that is
inherently
> dynamic. It presents society as fundamentally unstable and
changeable
> without respite. Stalinist theoreticians, and not only Stalinist
Marxist
> theoreticians, worked very hard to modify Marxist theory
(including
> effecting changes in the population of Marxist theorists) so as
to "stop"
> the dialectical process with the formation of the Soviet Social
Republic.
> The critical implications of Ilyenkov's theory of the ideal (as
well as his
> studies in dialectics in general) for the official ideology that
social
> development ends with the establishment of the Soviet State were
not lost on
> the political authorities of his day, and he hardly was permitted
to go as
> far as he did.
>
>
> As I see it Ilyenkov was hardly an "objectivist" theoretician. A
reading
> of his two major works; Dialectical Logic (1974) and Dialectics
of the
> Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's Capital (1960) show Ilyenkov
as severely
> critical of "contemplationist" theory and a firm, consistent
partisan of
> theory as a function of practice and of practice as the test of
theory.
> Ilyenkov is hardly reticent in declaring his own objectives;
paragraphs in
> Chapter 8 of Dialectical Logic and his articles "Activity and
Knowledge"
> (1974) and "From the Marxist Point of View" (1967) clearly
indicate of what
> he thought the current task of theory should be; the critical
review of the
> failures of the Soviet bureaucracy in realizing the aims of
socialism and
> the development of means to correct them.
>
>
>
> Thanks for the article,
>
>
>
> Victor Friedlander-Rakocz
> victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il
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