On Mon, 27 Dec 2004 09:48:21 -0500, Bill Barowy <email@example.com> wrote:
> Mike wrote:
> "I am on weak ground to interpret semiotic theories, Bill. Wouldn't
> semiosis depend on the history of the interpretant and the signs too? "
> I think I quoted Uslucan on just that at the bottom of my message, so it seems
> we agree to agree, and at last I can relate to someone on weak ground as is
> my own. Perhaps I can make it even weaker.
> Your sense of Uslucan's paper is similar to what I've read about semiotic
> studies being eclectic. But then, if a semiotician observes the human
> cognition fundamentally to be the coordination of signs, why would some, say
> Piaget's notions of stage development, be less preferable than others? Can
> not one draw as one needs, and finds appropriate, from the vast semiotic bank
> of the milieu?
> I won't go into an analysis of woodworking and its tools for a illustration,
> because these are more aimed toward the material end of the spectrum, but how
> about this scenario? I once was an experimental physicist and built
> instruments to make observations of the light emitted by excited atoms and
> molecules. This required mastering and using electromagnetic theory, atomic
> and molecular quantum theories, special relativity theory, solid state
> theory, as well as optics, digital and analog electronics, mechanical design,
> machining, computer programming, and whatever else. Seems eclectic, no? But
> compared to the human condition, atoms and molecules in their interaction
> with each other and with light are very, very simple. Still I needed many
> diverse conceptual frameworks to make observations. Why should the human
> condition require less?
> How are we not contemplating a foolish consistency?
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Sat Jan 01 2005 - 01:00:04 PST