It sounds like a similar idea, but for Bourdieu it is very much a "life
world" constructed by a class fraction, not an individual, who may
"acquire" a habitus.
Any
At 05:42 PM 2/06/2004 -0500, you wrote:
>A number of folks in semiotics also employ Jacob von Uexulls concept of
>Umwelt, defined as something like ones personal world or world as lived.
>The Umwelt of a dog is different from the Umwelt of a bird even though
>both live in the same environment. Closer still is probably the
>Lebenswelt, or human Umwelt, because it includes the cultural
>constructions made possible, in large part, by language and other semiotic
>systems.
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>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: IRAJ IMAM [mailto:iimam@cal-research.org]
>Sent: Wednesday, June 02, 2004 4:39 PM
>To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>Subject: RE: another view of Panofsky: what is "habitus"?
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>Steve asked: I am struggling with the concept of "habitus."
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>I do not know much about it either. But I found this link comparing
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>Bourdieu's 'habitus' with Peirce's 'habit.'
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>http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/gsandss/slavic/papers/habitus.html
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>
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>"Peirce defines 'habit' through linking the concepts of 'habit' and
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>'belief'. This is made explicit through Peirce's statement that "belief is
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>of the nature of a habit" 3. What Peirce means by this is that our beliefs
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>are based on the "habit[s] of mind" we adopt 4. Peirce points out that we do
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>not require proof, in any rigorous, philosophical sense, that our beliefs
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>are true. Instead, we are content to base our beliefs on our habits of mind,
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>provided these habits yield beliefs which we think are true 5"
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>"Bourdieu defines the 'habitus' in terms of structures, such as cognitive
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>and motivating principles and procedures to follow 6, which are internalised
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>by the subject 7 and which then come to generate and organise social
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>practices and representations 8. The subject's habitual patterns of thought
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>are determined by the 'habitus'. As on Peirce's model, these habitual
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>patterns of thought cannot claim the status of 'objective truths'. The
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>habitus is constituted through the past experiences, both individual and
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>collective, of subjects within the world. Therefore, the habitual modes of
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>thought licensed by the habitus are based upon experiences of social
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>practices and not upon an inquiry into what is true. Yet, it is these modes
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>of thought which give rise to belief."
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>"Peirce's model entails that habits of thought are based on some sort of
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>consensual reality and not upon truth in an objective sense. Similarly,
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>there is no fixed point or ground in Bourdieu's model. Habits of thought and
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>action are determined by the habitus. However, the habitus is formed through
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>nothing other than structures arising out of "the arbitrariness of a
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>culture" 15. The habitus resembles an infinite series of contexts which are
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>embedded in one another but are not anchored to any fixed point or absolute.
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>In this way, the 'habitus' is similar to Foucault's model of discursive
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>structures and disciplinary knowledges. Yet, although both Peirce and
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>Bourdieu's models are ungrounded, neither entirely abandons reference to an
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>external reality. Peirce defends the notion that there is "some external
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>permanency - something upon which our thinking has no effect" 16 and
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>Bourdieu's concept of 'the field' entails that human beings interact with
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>objective structures in the external world."
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>iraj imam
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>The Center for Applied Local Research
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>iimam@cal-research.org
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