Andy,
I've not yet reannotated all my annotations. But, clearly EVI uses the
mirror metaphorically when he elevates the reciprocal representational
relation between the value-form (price) embodied in exchanged material
commodities to the status of a universal feature of ideality. As I see it
EVI never actually interprets 'the "ideal" is nothing more or less than the
value-form of the products of labour in general' in a literal sense, but the
value-form of the products of labour as example, as analogue and as metaphor
for ideality.
More later.
Regards,
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Sunday, May 16, 2004 2:24 AM
Subject: RE: EVI's Concept of the Ideal - mirrors
> You are abnsolutely right Eugene. This thread went off on a bit of a
tangent
> concerned with how *in*appropriate the mirror metaphor was, but that LSV
had
> actually used it. ... Andy
> Quoting Eugene Matusov <ematusov@udel.edu>:
> > Dear Andy and everybody-
> >
> > My understanding of EVI's notion of the ideal (and his notion of
> > reflection)
> > is NOT based on a "mirror" metaphor. For me, EVI argued that the
> > material
> > world is known to us (humans) always and only through our
> > socio-cultural-historical activities that are shaped by our various
> > social
> > relations. What is interesting is that, although the world we know is
> > always
> > "subjective" ("subjectivity" means here that we are acting on the world
> > through our socially constructed needs, goals, and values;
> > "subjective"="subject"="actor"="activity"), we actually do not need the
> > pure
> > "objectivity". The pure objectivity cannot be known and does not need to
> > be
> > known because of its indifference to a subject: only dead does not have
> > biases, subjectivity, needs, goals, and values. The only way to become
> > objective and lose all biases is to commit suicide.
> >
> > The world is "given" to us (as individuals) through socio-cultural
> > activities. For example, some stars are viewed to be formed in a
> > castellation that are/were USEFUL for navigation practices. However, for
> > an
> > (modern) astronomy practice the same stars might not be a castellation
> > because they may even belong to different galaxies (or at least to be
> > very
> > far away). Without a reference to a practice, it is meaningless to ask
> > "are
> > these stars really in a castellation?" because castellation itself is a
> > pattern relative to our, human, practice (i.e.,
> > socially-historically-culturally-economically-politically defined
> > goals).
> > "Objectively" speaking (i.e., outside of human practices with their
> > "subjective" goals and values) castellation does not exist. We have been
> > "patterning" (from the word "pattern")/"idealizing" the material world
> > in
> > our activities to make them successful for our goals. Notice that this
> > understanding of the ideal is nothing to do with mirror reflections
> > (like
> > Andy, I dislike Lenin's philosophical primitivism and vulgar
> > materialism).
> > Thus, actions are primary ideality. Mental representations of the world
> > that
> > achieved through a special activity of mental representing are secondary
> > ideality - patterning the already patterned world.
> >
> > As to "mirror reflections", I do not think that this metaphor is very
> > useful. What seems to me useful is a form of (secondary) ideality that
> > is
> > often called "models". Models are involved abstraction of certain
> > features
> > from the targeted material objects projected to other special material
> > objects (e.g., words, clay) that are very relevant for the targeted
> > activities. Models allow us acting in a specially constructed ideal plan
> > ("symbolic", "figured world") to test consequences of our actions.
> > Models
> > do not only provide a safe space for experimentation but also to test if
> > we
> > understand - i.e., whether we can abstract the most relevant relations
> > from
> > the objects that are important for our goals.
> >
> > What do you think?
> >
> > Eugene
> >
> > _____
> >
> > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
> > Sent: Saturday, May 15, 2004 9:36 AM
> > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > Subject: Re: EVI's Concept of the Ideal - mirrors
> >
> > I think that both Vygotsky and Ilyenkov really loved Lenin, and this
> > mirror
> > metaphor caused them some problem because Lenin had committed himself to
> > it
> > so decisively in 1908. Nevertheless, I think Vygotsky is not being true
> > to
> > himself in repeating it. Perhaps it was not politically possible to
> > criticise it, but surely he didn't have to repeat, don't you think?
> >
> > For me, it is the fact that the mirror is passive, whereas a human being
> > is
> > active. (see good old Theses on Feuerbach again). Lenin points out
> > (correctly I think) that reflection is a capacity of *all matter* (e.g.
> > a
> > footprint) and one can even impute an element of "interpretation" in
> > nature.
> > But what is lacking is the 3-sided process of human activity which
> > includes
> > an *ideal*.
> >
> > What do you think?
> > Andy
> >
> > At 06:27 AM 15/05/2004 -0700, you wrote:
> >
> >
> > I like this point Andy makes below about the subject-object problem:
> >
> > Andy said:
> > "If a number of different people say "We are all pursuing the same ideal
> > ..." what is it that they are pursuing? A phantom? A state of brain
> > matter?
> > Obviously what they are pursuing is something which exists independently
> > of
> > "the mind" (in Lenin's sense, ontologically), but not of course
> > independently of objective, willful, needy, human practice.
> >
> > "The whole issue is the posing of the issue as a mind-matter problem,
> > when
> > it can be understood only as a subject-object problem."
> >
> >
> > As for Vygotsky's mirror image quote, I am with Andy on this, too.
> >
> > Andy said:
> > "I really didn't like the way Vygotsky used the "mirror" metaphor so
> > beloved
> > by Lenin."
> >
> > Andy's quote is from Chapter 13 of The Historical Meaning of the Crisis
> > in
> > Psychology: A Methodological Investigation (1927). It is part of
> > several
> > paragraphs where Vygotsky rambles around, trying to liken a mirror image
> > to
> > consciousness. I believe he fails. He even comments on this series of
> > paragraphs as being a "protracted argumentation" and seems relieved to
> > end
> > it. I believe these paragraphs about an object "A" and its mirror image
> > "a"
> > can be happily skipped over with no loss in an otherwise brilliant work.
> >
> > The problem with Vygotsky's analogy is that light beams bouncing off a
> > mirror do not form an image unless a reasonably intelligent being
> > (perhaps a
> > bird, a dog, a human) is seeing it and interpreting it. This is the
> > fatal
> > flaw in LSV's line of reasoning in creating this mirror analogy for
> > consciousness. Without a conscious being involved, mirrors cannot
> > produce
> > "images." They can just reflect light beams. A mirror is not a form of
> > consciousness just because it reflects light. It has no mind or brain
> > or
> > nervous system or other organic system that responds to stimuli.
> > Mirrors
> > cannot be a successful analogy for how organisms "reflect" in Marx's or
> > Lenin's sense because mirrors have no consciousness. Mirrors do not
> > **process** images - only organisms do. It does not help when Vygotsky
> > begins to talk of the reflections in mirrors as phantoms - for mirrors
> > cannot reflect phantoms at all - because the light beams they can
> > reflect
> > are certainly never phantoms because they do not exist.
> > Anthropomorphizing
> > mirrors in order to explain consciousness could only work if we imagine
> > the
> > mirror as a living being with its own agenda. But then, if we performed
> > such a thought experiment, a mirror's capacity to "reflect" in the way
> > we
> > want to understand would be due to its being a living entity, and not
> > due to
> > its ability to reflect light beams. It would "reflect" because it was
> > responsive. Leontiev as a comparative psychologist (comparing the
> > psychologies of different animals) considerably developed this idea by
> > analyzing the different levels of responsiveness among different kinds
> > of
> > animals, and how these levels evolved. Mirrors were not likely among
> > the
> > objects of his investigation, but spiders were.
> >
> > Some of the other points LSV makes in that chapter 13 about ontology and
> > epistemology - and about the object/subject relationship - are, however,
> > very useful to the materiality/ideality discussion we have been having.
> > Perhaps we can return to LSV's thinking on these issues.
> >
> > - Steve
> >
> >
> >
> > At 02:24 PM 5/15/2004 +1000, you wrote:
> >
> >
> > Sorry, I accidentally omitted the first line of that quote. I've added
> > it in
> > below.
> >
> >
> > At 08:32 PM 14/05/2004 -0700, you wrote:
> >
> >
> > Andy, can you give the full citation to LSV's use of the mirrror
> > metaphor?
> > This goes to the question of the use of the term, reflection, in this
> > literature.
> > mike
> > Mike, this is copied from an article Dot Robbins showed me. The source
> > is
> > shown:
> > Let us compare consciousness, as is often done, with a mirror image. Let
> > the
> > object A be reflected in the mirror as a. Naturally, it would be false
> > to
> > say that a in itself is as real as A. It is real in another way. A table
> > and
> > its reflection in the mirror are not equally real, but real in a
> > different
> > way. The reflection as reflection, as an image of the table, as a second
> > table in the mirror is not real, it is a phantom. But the reflection of
> > the
> > table as the refraction of light beams on the mirror surface - isnt
> > that a
> > thing which is equally material and real as the table? Everything else
> > would
> > be a miracle. Then we might say: there exist things (a table) and their
> > phantoms (the reflection). But only things exist(the table) and the
> > reflection of light upon the surface. The phantoms are just apparent
> > relations between the things. That is why no science of mirror phantoms
> > is
> > possible. But this does not mean that we will never be able to explain
> > the
> > reflection, the phantom. When we know the thing and the laws of
> > reflection
> > of light, we can always explain, predict, elicit, and change the
> > phantom.
> > And this is what persons with mirrors do. They study not mirror
> > reflections
> > but the movement of light beams, and explain the reflection. A science
> > about
> > mirror phantoms is impossible, but the theory of light and the things
> > which
> > cast and reflect it fully explain these phantoms. (Vygotsky, 1997, p.
> > 327)
> > Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky. Vol. 3.
> > Problems of the theory and history of psychology. In R. W. Rieber and
> > J.
> > Wollock (Eds.). New York: Plenum Press.
> >
>
>
>
> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>
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