Dear Gene,
A few comments on your last message:
You wrote:
1) Communist Vietnamese government systematically violated the Geneva
> convention about treatment of POWs (French and then American) but setting
> concentration camps. In some camps the death rate was 70% (see book by
Joel
> Kotek and Peirre Rigoulot, "Le siecle des camps"). Torture and ideological
> brainwash (communist and antiwar) was used. According to descriptions made
> by surviving prisoners, the Vietnamese concentration camps were something
> in-between Chinese and Soviet GULAGs.
All nations intern military prisoners in POW camps. The actual
physical conditions of the camps is expected to conform to that of the
military forces of the state responsible for the camp. In the case of
Vietnam, the physical conditions of the Viet troops was - according to
prisoner's reports as well as other relevant information - was roughly at a
parity with that of the prison camps. According to the convention military
prisoners are under the direct command of nco and officer prisoners. All
legitimate exercise of authority over prisoners by camp authorities must be
carried out through the hierarchy of command or the prisoners' military
organization. Military prisoners (excepting officers) may be employed at
non-military connected labour, etc. etc.
The essential violations of the Geneva convention were in fact the
policies of mandatory ideological (communist and antiwar) "reeducation" for
all prisoners. Just those pedagogical projects I suggested would have
considerably more value than the equally illegal and sometimes critically
important "softening up" of prisoners routinely practiced - in one form or
another - by the US and other armies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and well you name
it and you'll probably be right whether you know it or not. War has
undergone some serious changes since WW II.
I'm sure that torture and murder occurred in Viet prisoner of war
camps. Considering the general loss of valuation of human life and dignity
that characterized the Vietnam war as a whole, it's understandable that both
sides were fairly relaxed in their interpretation of the rules of war as
regarding prisoners. Considering the conditions of war for the
technologically disadvantaged Viets, the potential for creative treatment of
prisoners by isolated camp garrisons and their commanders would be far more
likely than would be the case for a technically well-equipt modern army.
While I'm sure that the policy of reeducation was military practice of the
NVA and VC, torture was most probably a result of the particular conditions
of that kind of war rather than of military policy.
> The lecture might be stupid CIA and DOD propaganda, but the phenomenon it
> focused on was not. When I was in college in mid 70s we had a lot of
> Vietnamese students. I made a few friends among them and they told me a
lot
> of stories that make no much difference between Vietnamese and Soviet
> totalitarian socialist systems. You can read Soviet and Czech dissidents
> describing and analyzing this phenomenon. I have first hand account of it
> because older generations raised under Stalin were very much like that.
I'm not sure I understand the relevance of this comment to what I wrote.
First, if anything the war-time VC organization of populations under their
authority was more strict and intense than that reported to me for the USSR,
and its satillites by Russian, Hungarian, Romanian and Polish emigres. But,
democracy is not the issue here. The CIA/DOD intellectual missed the
essential fact that polarized politically mobilized populations can view the
very same facts in diametrically opposite ways. What he missed was the
difference between the accumulated experience he and the Vietnamese access
to judge facts, and the role of different, political purposes in the
interpretation of events. This is dialectical contradiction at its most
intense! There are no right answers in these cases, they remain
contradictions until they are replaced emergent new conditions that subsume
the conflict and render it - at least in its original form -obsolete.
> I think we should be very careful avoiding demonizing one side and
> glorifying another side. The gold rule is that there are no gold rules.
> Local historical circumstances are very important and should be considered
> holistically.
My argument was not that the Vietnamese Communists were angels - far from
it. There were no angels in war, and there were certainly no angels in that
war in particular. Rather it was that the NVA and the VC cadres cool and
rational evaluation of war conditions, including the critical social issues
of the war produced a far more effective organization for seizing power than
the gook-commie hating culture that characterized the US army from the ranks
to the high command.
Highest regards,
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: "Eugene Matusov" <ematusov@udel.edu>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:48 PM
Subject: RE: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> Dear Victor and everybody--
>
> I want to make a few historical corrections that are important for our
> discussion:
>
> 1) Communist Vietnamese government systematically violated the Geneva
> convention about treatment of POWs (French and then American) but setting
> concentration camps. In some camps the death rate was 70% (see book by
Joel
> Kotek and Peirre Rigoulot, "Le siecle des camps"). Torture and ideological
> brainwash (communist and antiwar) was used. According to descriptions made
> by surviving prisoners, the Vietnamese concentration camps were something
> in-between Chinese and Soviet GULAGs.
>
> 2) Victor wrote,
> > In the mid '60s I attended a lecture on Vietnamese social psychology by
an
> > American Anthropologist working either for the DOD or the CIA. It was
> > pure
> > nonsense; something about how the people of VN were incapable of knowing
> > the
> > difference between Truth (what really happened) and their ideology.
>
> The lecture might be stupid CIA and DOD propaganda, but the phenomenon it
> focused on was not. When I was in college in mid 70s we had a lot of
> Vietnamese students. I made a few friends among them and they told me a
lot
> of stories that make no much difference between Vietnamese and Soviet
> totalitarian socialist systems. You can read Soviet and Czech dissidents
> describing and analyzing this phenomenon. I have first hand account of it
> because older generations raised under Stalin were very much like that.
>
> I think we should be very careful avoiding demonizing one side and
> glorifying another side. The gold rule is that there are no gold rules.
> Local historical circumstances are very important and should be considered
> holistically.
>
> What do you think?
>
> Eugene
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Oudeyis [mailto:victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il]
> > Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 5:59 AM
> > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> >
> > Andy,
> > About Vietnamese demonization:
> > The objectivity (in the scientific rather than moral sense) of
Vietnamese
> > discourse on American participation in the War was one of the aspects of
> > their campaign for independence that convinced me that they would
> > ultimately
> > win over whatever the US threw at them. Relative to the so-called
> > professionalism of the American military and their academic advisors,
> > their
> > cool appraisal of the limitations of US strategy and, more importantly,
of
> > the attitude of American Civil and military authorities to war in
general
> > and to the VN war in particular made the DOD experts and advisors sound
> > like
> > children.
> >
> > In the mid '60s I attended a lecture on Vietnamese social psychology by
an
> > American Anthropologist working either for the DOD or the CIA. It was
> > pure
> > nonsense; something about how the people of VN were incapable of knowing
> > the
> > difference between Truth (what really happened) and their ideology.
Even
> > we
> > undergraduates could see from the data he cited that the real issue was
> > clever manipulation of agitprop and the irrelevanceof his theorizing
about
> > what is true and untrue. Of course we had been running public
> > demonstrations too so, and it's likely that we were better acquainted
with
> > the dynamics of mass actions than he was. From information coming from
> > Iraq, it appears that this profound ignorance of the social psychology
of
> > war still characterizes the American defence community. The Americans'
> > inordinate absorption in the machinery of war, the instruments of
> > repression
> > if you will, at the expense of attention to the relations of war is
> > clearly
> > evident in their policy or rather lack of it in their treatment of Iraqi
> > prisoners throughout the theatre. The VN and the Chinese would have
> > naturally taken the advantage of such a large captive audience as an
> > opportunity for changing hearts and minds rather than for gaining a few
> > driblets of doubtful and most likely, obsolete intelligence. While the
> > political bureau of the People's Army of NV and the Viet Cong was
regarded
> > as having no less importance than the strictly military agencies, the
DOD
> > and even the CIA, which should know better, regard the political effort
as
> > a
> > bit of frosting or cosmetics to prettify the "real" macinery of war.
> > Perhaps
> > the technicians and their advisors at the DOD aren't really very
convinced
> > about the democratic values they publically advocate.
> >
> > Highest regards,
> > Victor
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:33 AM
> > Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> >
> >
> > > Yes I was amazed and delighted when the Czechs and Slovaks just parted
> > > company in good spirit. I think Sweden/Norway is the only earlier
> > precedent
> > > for that, but hopefully there will be more!
> > >
> > > On Monday I watched an extended interview with Jose Ramos Horta, one
of
> > the
> > > leaders of the East Timor resistance movement FRETILIN, whose job it
was
> > > during the Indonesian occupation of their country, to tour the world
> > trying
> > > to get support for their cause. He pointed out that at no time did
> > FRETILIN
> > > "demonise" the Indonesians or Americans and Australians, because he
> > said,
> > > they would eventually have to live with these people, once they had
> > > attained their victory. It seems to me that the Vietnamese also never
> > > engaged in the demonisation tactic and their use of bombings of
civilian
> > > targets was also almost nil. It seems to me that brutality and
> > inhumanity
> > > does not always flow from war, just as (as you point out) nations do
not
> > > have to slaughter each other if they want to go their own way.
> > >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > At 07:42 PM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > >The only ones that I can think of are the UN police actions in Korea,
> > Congo,
> > > >Iraq 1, Bosnia and Kossovo, and so on . Most other late 20th century
> > wars
> > > >were either counter-insurgency operations or, like Topsy, they just
> > > >happened. Messy isn't it.
> > > >
> > > >The Brits have had only one real success in anti-insurgent action,
> > Malaya,
> > > >the Americans have gotten their way in Chile (or so they thought
until
> > they
> > > >learned how incompetent and expensive military dictatorships usually
> > are),
> > > >the Israelis have only managed a doubtful stalemate, the Russians
have
> > been
> > > >fighting the Chechens on and off ever since the mid 19th century, and
> > the
> > > >Vietnamese more or less succeeded in repressing the Pot Pol
> > abomination.
> > > >You're right there, pure repression does not have a particularly good
> > record
> > > >as an effective way of dealing with popular uprisings. You'd have
> > thought
> > > >that someone would have come up with a better solution by now. The
> > Czechs
> > > >might have started something new when they quickly agreed to
Slovakia's
> > > >demands for the status of an independent state. Smart people those
> > Czechs.
> > > >Regards
> > > >Victor
> > > >
> > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 1:15 PM
> > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > Apologies for jumping into this thread somewhat precipitously
Victor
> > and
> > > > > perhaps being a bit disruptive. I would like to ask you to help
> > clarify a
> > > > > few things about war.
> > > > >
> > > > > I was born in October 1945. Has there been a declaration of war
any
> > time
> > > >in
> > > > > my lifetime? I can't think of any.
> > > > >
> > > > > Nevertheless, people rightly still distinguish between war and
> > not-war,
> > > > > despite attempt of the prosecutors to cast their actions as
"police
> > > > > actions" or "intervention" or "support to the government" or
> > whatever.
> > > > >
> > > > > It is a strange thing, isn't it, that war gives licence to do
things
> > that
> > > > > are otherwise illegal. So for example, the US administration felt
no
> > > > > compunction about dropping bombs on a city during the "war," but
> > beating
> > > > > and humiliating people after the enemy's army has been destroyed
and
> > the
> > > >US
> > > > > is the administrator of the country are rightly not considered
> > admissible.
> > > > >
> > > > > The British and the Israelis are very experienced at administering
> > subject
> > > > > populations. The US has bombed countries, they've blockaded
> > countries,
> > > > > they've subverted them and financed torture regimes, they've
> > subjugated
> > > > > most of the world economically, but have they ever successfully
> > subjugated
> > > > > a population by military means?
> > > > >
> > > > > I know I've gone way off the subject, Victor, sorry for that. I
> > understand
> > > > > you were discussing the psychological facts of life of people
> > involved
> > in
> > > >a
> > > > > war. My guess on that is that anyone who has been naive enough to
> > > > > *volunteer* for one of those jobs (softening up prisoners in Iraq,
> > etc.)
> > > >is
> > > > > going to behave like that. Anyone with the strength of character
not
> > to
> > > > > degenerate in that way would never have joined up.
> > > > >
> > > > > And as for the opposition from Iraq. What did anyone expect? Did
> > anyone
> > > > > really believe that the US army was going to fly into the heart of
> > Arab
> > > > > territory and set up anything better than something resembling
> > Guantanamo
> > > >Bay?
> > > > >
> > > > > sorry for the interruption
> > > > > Andy
> > > > >
> > > > > At 12:43 PM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > > >Andy,
> > > > > >The focus of the discussion was - at least up to now - on the
> > practice of
> > > > > >war. I think that rational analysis has a lot to say on this
> > subject
> > and
> > > > > >said so. You're raising a different, though no less important
> > issue,
> > the
> > > > > >wider economic and political questions involved in the decision
to
> > go
> > to
> > > > > >war. Simple good-old repression, gunboat diplomacy and what
have
> > you
> > > >are
> > > > > >practices of war; ask any Vietnamese vetran (as well as a good
many
> > > >American
> > > > > >and Russian vetrans for that matter), most Iraqi citizens, and...
> > (I
> > > >don't
> > > > > >think its necessary to list others, there are plenty). War is as
> > > >Clauswitz
> > > > > >wrote is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to
> > fulfil
> > > >our
> > > > > >will." I can't think of a better definition than that for
> > repression!
> > War
> > > > > >can be undeclared, it can involve ngo's, and can even be declared
> > against
> > > >an
> > > > > >unarmed population.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >The fact that war is repression is like the fact that it is
> > violent,
> > not
> > > > > >really very useful for serious analysis. Machiavelli, V.
> > Clauswitz,
> > Marx
> > > > > >and Engels, as well as other more recent writers like Hobsbawm,
> > Stadt
> > and
> > > > > >Schelling have raised important and relevant questions about war;
> > its
> > > > > >relation to economics and civil society, its role in
> > cultural-historical
> > > > > >development, and so on. Considering the threat of war to human
> > survival
> > > >and
> > > > > >the natural difficulties of regarding it rationally, it is a
major
> > > > > >challenge, if not the major challenge to cultural-historical
> > analysis.
> > > > > >Highest regards,
> > > > > >Victor
> > > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 11:01 AM
> > > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Sorry Victor. I think that was one of those reflex messages
when
> > I
> > > >should
> > > > > > > hesitate before pressing "Send."
> > > > > > > I guess part of my reaction was because of radio talk here to
> > the
> > > >effect
> > > > > > > that "war is like this," i.e., it's justifiable. But of course
> > what
> > > >may be
> > > > > > > at a pinch justifiable in overcoming an opposing army can in
no
> > sense
> > > >at
> > > > > > > all be justified when occupying a country and suppressing the
> > > >resistance
> > > > > >of
> > > > > > > its populace. The war was justified before the event because
> > although
> > > >they
> > > > > > > were going to kill civilians with their "precision bombing" it
> > was
> > all
> > > > > > > worth it to get rid of the Saddam Hussein regime. I guess a
lot
> > of
> > > > > > > Americans and even some Iraqis were willing to go along with
> > that
> > > > > > > utilitarian argument. This is what they get. And it isn't war,
> > because
> > > > > > > there's no-one to declare war against. This is just simple,
good
> > old
> > > > > > > fashioned repression.
> > > > > > > Andy
> > > > > > > At 10:41 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > > > > >Andy,
> > > > > > > >Since when is war a matter of official prononciamentos? The
US
> > > >fought a
> > > > > >10
> > > > > > > >year undeclared war in Vietnam (one important reason why I
> > don't
> > live
> > > > > >there)
> > > > > > > >killed some 2 million Vietnamese and about 58,000 Americans,
> > > >effectively
> > > > > > > >destroyed the physical and economic infrastructure of Vietnam
> > and
> > > >lost
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > >war against international Communism to boot. The WAR in Iraq
> > > >promises us
> > > > > > > >another replay of Vietnam. It will probably go on
interminably
> > for
> > > >years,
> > > > > > > >kill lots of Americans and many many more Iraqis, destroy
> > whatever
> > > > > >remnants
> > > > > > > >of economic and civil organization are left in Iraq, and the
US
> > will
> > > >end
> > > > > >up
> > > > > > > >losing the war for Liberal Democracy to boot. Is it
relevant?
> > I
> > say
> > > >it's
> > > > > > > >relevant as h--l!
> > > > > > > >Highest regards,
> > > > > > > >Victor
> > > > > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > > > > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > > > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:36 AM
> > > > > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > But excuse me, the war was over months ago.
> > > > > > > > > What is going on now is the imposition of democracy in
> > Iraq
> > by
> > > >the
> > > > > > > > > occupying power.
> > > > > > > > > Andy
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > At 07:34 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > > > > > > >Peter and David,
> > > > > > > > > >1. I sense here a certain degree of imbalance, easy
> > judgements
> > > >too
> > > > > > > >quickly
> > > > > > > > > >arrived at, and a measure of distance from the conditions
> > > >experienced
> > > > > >by
> > > > > > > > > >soldiers and police officers, and civilians in war-time
> > > >conditions.
> > > > > >The
> > > > > > > > > >Milgram experiments, Zimbardo's experiments at Stanford,
> > and
> > > >other
> > > > > >like
> > > > > > > > > >exercises for evoking interpersonal cruelty and terror
have
> > only
> > > >the
> > > > > > > >barest
> > > > > > > > > >relevance to the practice of cruelty and of terror in
> > war-time.
> > > >The
> > > > > > > > > >discovery that humans are capable of collective violence,
> > even
> > > > > >extreme
> > > > > > > > > >collective violence, is of little interest when applied
to
> > the
> > > >study
> > > > > >and
> > > > > > > > > >evaluation of war and military policy. WE ALREADY KNOW
> > THAT!
> > > >Regard
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > >elementary concept of war as presented by that most
> > excellent
> > > > > >objective
> > > > > > > > > >idealist, v. Clauswitz:
> > > > > > > > > > "War
> > ...
> > is
> > > >an
> > > > > >act of
> > > > > > > > > >violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our
> > will."
> > > > > > > > > >This concept is elementary, and universal; it does not
> > refer
> > to
> > > > > >Americans
> > > > > > > >at
> > > > > > > > > >war, Iraquis at war, Muslim Jihadists at war, etc. etc.
but
> > to
> > > >all
> > > > > > > > > >practicioners of war and to all practice of war. Thus, in
> > the
> > > >context
> > > > > >of
> > > > > > > >war
> > > > > > > > > >we can reasonably discuss the effectiveness of this or
that
> > > >policy of
> > > > > > > > > >violence, i.e. whether it is likely "to compel our
opponent
> > to
> > > > > >fulfill
> > > > > > > >our
> > > > > > > > > >will," not the practice of violence itself. Critical
> > evaluation
> > > >of
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > >practice at war is most useful when addressed to the
> > military
> > > > > >mission.
> > > > > > > > > >Evaluation of the mission can and should be done at all
> > levels:
> > > >be it
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > >decision to invade Iraq, the decision to to so without
full
> > UN
> > > > > > > > > >participation, the decision to renovate the Al Ghraib
> > prison,
> > the
> > > > > > > >decision
> > > > > > > > > >to arrest and detain far more suspects of guerilla
activity
> > -
> > now
> > > >all
> > > > > > > > > >extra-military collect violence is indiscriminately
called
> > > >terror,
> > > > > >how
> > > > > > > > > >silly! - than can be secured and investigated with due
> > speed
> > and
> > > > > > > > > >effectiveness, and so on and on
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >2. So, how can we relate to the conditions at the Al
> > Ghraib
> > > >prison
> > > > > > > >within
> > > > > > > > > >the context of the war in Iraq? We can, of course,
> > criticize
> > the
> > > > > >mission
> > > > > > > >as
> > > > > > > > > >a whole; the invasion into Iraq by a coalition of one,
> > possibly
> > > >two,
> > > > > > > > > >powerful states, with much to gain and little to lose in
a
> > war in
> > > > > >Iraq
> > > > > > > > > >augmented by a collection of their client states. While
> > there
> > > >is a
> > > > > >good
> > > > > > > > > >deal to be said about the explicit and hidden objectives
of
> > the
> > > > > >mission
> > > > > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > >Iraq, it is not the focus of current discussion.
> > Evaluation
> > of
> > > >the
> > > > > > > > > >treatment of a rebellious civilian population, prisoners
of
> > war
> > > >and
> > > > > > > > > >prisoners in general is the issue here. I'll make this
> > short:
> > > >the
> > > > > > > > > >under-supervised exercise of "softening techniques" by
> > personell
> > > >with
> > > > > > > >only a
> > > > > > > > > >smattering acquaintance with the psychology and
> > psychobiology
> > of
> > > > > > > >coercion,
> > > > > > > > > >with even less knowledge of the historical, cultural and
> > social
> > > > > >contexts
> > > > > > > >of
> > > > > > > > > >their prisoners, and, worst of all (remember this is a
> > discussion
> > > >of
> > > > > > > > > >war-time practice), total ignorance of useful military
> > practice
> > > >has
> > > > > > > >produced
> > > > > > > > > >conditions that expose the coalition armies to the most
> > difficult
> > > > > >kind of
> > > > > > > > > >oppositional modes; that of angry contempt. Demonization
> > of
> > the
> > > > > >enemy,
> > > > > > > > > >indisciplined expression of violence unrelated to the
> > mission
> > at
> > > > > >hand,
> > > > > > > >and
> > > > > > > > > >the emergence of what I called in an earlier message the
> > > >formation of
> > > > > > > >unit
> > > > > > > > > >practices irrelevant to the unit's mission are all sure
> > signs
> > of
> > > > > >emergent
> > > > > > > > > >irrelevance of practice for the effective realization of
> > > >military
> > > > > > > > > >objectives and the general collapse of morale.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >3. A military unit whose members fail to recognize that
> > their
> > > > > >opponents
> > > > > > > >are
> > > > > > > > > >as human as they are has already gone a long way in
> > becoming
> > a
> > > > > >military
> > > > > > > > > >liability and is in severe danger of permanent,
irrevocable
> > and
> > > >final
> > > > > > > > > >closure. Demonization is, in a military context, simply
> > the
> > > > > >replacement
> > > > > > > >of
> > > > > > > > > >that most basic principle of the art of war; "know thine
> > opponent
> > > >at
> > > > > > > >least
> > > > > > > > > >as well as you know thyself," with a comforting but false
> > image
> > > >of
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > >opponent as subhuman, unworthy, and contemptible. . When
> > > > > >administration
> > > > > > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi
> > > >dissidents,
> > > > > >and
> > > > > > > > > >liken Iraqis to vermin they encourage the very uprising
> > they
> > > > > >ostensibly
> > > > > > > >hope
> > > > > > > > > >to repress. Relevant too is the example from the Rwandan
> > > >genocide.
> > > > > >The
> > > > > > > > > >reference by Hutu extremists to Tutsi's as "cockroaches"
> > may
> > > >have
> > > > > >given
> > > > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > >Hutu the confidence to murder some 800,000 unarmed
Tutsi's,
> > but
> > > >it
> > > > > > > >resulted
> > > > > > > > > >in a bloody civil war in which the armed Tutsi
> > "cockroaches"
> > > >managed
> > > > > >to
> > > > > > > > > >expell a respectable portion of the Hutu into permanent
> > exile
> > in
> > > > > >refugee
> > > > > > > > > >camps outside Rwanda.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >4. Extreme violence can be effective policy in the
> > practice
> > of
> > > >war,
> > > > > >but
> > > > > > > >it
> > > > > > > > > >alone never guarantees the political aims of war. Of the
> > most
> > > >often
> > > > > > > >cited
> > > > > > > > > >examples of the cruelest of conquest states; Gengis Khan,
> > the
> > > >Romans
> > > > > >and,
> > > > > > > >of
> > > > > > > > > >course, the Axis powers, only the Romans managed to
> > stabilize
> > > > > >somewhat
> > > > > > > >their
> > > > > > > > > >victories, and this they did mainly by conscientious
> > > >incorporation of
> > > > > > > > > >conquered states into the very fabric of their empire.
> > > >Certainly,
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > >indisciplined practice of violence irrelevant to military
> > goals
> > > >is as
> > > > > > > > > >ineffective as are policies of extreme violence and even
> > > > > > > >counter-productive
> > > > > > > > > >to the aim of forcing the opponent's compliance.
> > Indisciplined
> > > > > >violence
> > > > > > > >on
> > > > > > > > > >the part of a military organization signals its opponents
> > that
> > > >there
> > > > > >is
> > > > > > > > > >really no basis for reasonable relations (these can exist
> > in
> > war
> > > >as
> > > > > >in
> > > > > > > >any
> > > > > > > > > >other circumstance) and that even compliance is not a
real
> > > >option.
> > > > > >In
> > > > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > >absence of any possibility to communicate with the enemy,
> > the
> > > >only
> > > > > > > > > >possibility is war ā outrance (war to the bitter end),
> > something
> > > >that
> > > > > >no
> > > > > > > > > >reasonable policy of war can accept.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >5. As written above we've already discussed the problems
> > of
> > the
> > > > > > > >emergence
> > > > > > > > > >of internal practices irrelevant to the unit's mission.
In
> > those
> > > > > > > > > >presentations we also indicated that the authoritarian
> > military
> > > > > >hierarchy
> > > > > > > > > >has evolved from the integral difficulties of critical
> > > > > >self-evaluation
> > > > > > > >for
> > > > > > > > > >the isolated military unit under pressure. We agree
> > entirely
> > > >with
> > > > > > > >Stephen
> > > > > > > > > >Reicher and Alex Haslam that the existance of responsible
> > and
> > > > > >intelligent
> > > > > > > > > >military leadership is integral to an effective military
> > > > > >organization.
> > > > > > > >It
> > > > > > > > > >is, again, Clauswitz who raises some pretty pointed
> > questions
> > > > > >concerning
> > > > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > >nature and conditions of leadership in democratic, mass
> > society.
> > > > > > > >National
> > > > > > > > > >leadership and it's subsidiary military specialists are
> > subject
> > > >to
> > > > > > > >political
> > > > > > > > > >pressures of both special interests and of public opinion
> > that is
> > > > > >neither
> > > > > > > > > >subject to the discipline of rational practice of war nor
> > even
> > > > > >familiar
> > > > > > > >with
> > > > > > > > > >war-time conditions. Think of the tremendous appeal of
> > > >expressions
> > > > > >such
> > > > > > > >as
> > > > > > > > > >"The Axis of Evil," "the Yellow Horde," and "Police Pigs"
> > to
> > a
> > > > > >frightened
> > > > > > > > > >and impressionable population that votes, often without a
> > clear
> > > >idea
> > > > > >of
> > > > > > > >what
> > > > > > > > > >they're voting for. How easy it is to mobilize public
> > support
> > > >for
> > > > > > > >extreme
> > > > > > > > > >politics by contrived lies such as MacNamara's Tonkin Bay
> > > >incident,
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > >WMD
> > > > > > > > > >foolishness, and the suggestion that making "the n word +
> > piles"
> > > >of
> > > > > >naked
> > > > > > > > > >Iraqi prisoners is high military policy of the coalition
> > forces
> > > >in
> > > > > >Iraq.
> > > > > > > >The
> > > > > > > > > >emergence of national states, mass democracy, and the
> > > >possibilities
> > > > > >for
> > > > > > > > > >concentrating tremendous resources for the prosecution of
> > war
> > and
> > > > > > > >oppression
> > > > > > > > > >has made the last century the bloodiest in human history,
> > and
> > it
> > > > > >appears
> > > > > > > > > >that we haven't really even begun to address the problem
in
> > this
> > > > > >century
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > > > > > > >From: "Peter Smagorinsky" <smago@coe.uga.edu>
> > > > > > > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > > > > > >Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 9:22 PM
> > > > > > > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Oz is an HBO program set in a prison with lots of hard
> > core
> > > > > >criminals
> > > > > > > >and
> > > > > > > > > > > hard core guards.
> > > > > > > > > > > At 01:02 PM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Peter,
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >What Oz is?
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Re the torture imagery in American life, the few
times
> > I
> > saw
> > > >NYPD
> > > > > > > >blue,
> > > > > > > > > > > >it seemed to me that it was in the verge of
> > legitimizing
> > the
> > > >use
> > > > > >of
> > > > > > > > > > > >torture as a way to collect criminal info. Of course,
> > in
> > a
> > > > > >"softened"
> > > > > > > > > > > >way, but the underlying message was quite violent
and,
> > of
> > > > > >course,the
> > > > > > > > > > > >naive viewer couldnīt help but identifying with the
> > good
> > > >cops. As
> > > > > > > >9/11
> > > > > > > > > > > >directed viewers to see with New eyes American
movies,
> > the
> > > >Iraq
> > > > > > > >Torture
> > > > > > > > > > > >case should do the same thing. There is plenty of
cases
> > where
> > > > > > > >physical
> > > > > > > > > > > >abuse is done by the "good" guys, but always in a
> > threshold
> > > >that
> > > > > >an
> > > > > > > > > > > >average viewer can tolerate (and enjoy...)
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >David
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Quoting Peter Smagorinsky <smago@coe.uga.edu>:
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > 3ce7295.jpg
> > > > > > > > > > > > > At 10:52 AM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Why everyone's not a torturer
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >By Stephen Reicher and Alex Haslam
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Psychologists
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Guards and prisoners, taking part in The
Experiment
> > for
> > > >the
> > > > > >BBC
> > > > > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > > > 2002
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >So groups of people in positions of unaccountable
> > power
> > > > > >naturally
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >resort to violence, do they? Not according to
> > research
> > > > > >conducted
> > > > > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >BBC experiment.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >The photographs from Abu Ghraib prison showing
> > Americans
> > > > > >abusing
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Iraqi
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >prisoners make us recoil and lead us to distance
> > > >ourselves
> > > > > >from
> > > > > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >horror and brutality. Surely those who commit
such
> > acts
> > > >are
> > > > > >not
> > > > > > > > > > > > > like
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >us? Surely the perpetrators must be twisted or
> > disturbed
> > > >in
> > > > > >some
> > > > > > > > > > > > > way?
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >They must be monsters. We ourselves would never
> > condone
> > > >or
> > > > > > > > > > > > > contribute
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >to such events.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Sadly, 50 years of social psychological research
> > > >indicates
> > > > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >comforting thoughts are deluded. A series of
major
> > > >studies
> > > > > >have
> > > > > > > > > > > > > shown
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >that even well-adjusted people, when divided into
> > groups
> > > >and
> > > > > > > >placed
> > > > > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >competition against each other, can become
abusive
> > and
> > > > > >violent.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > OTHER RESEARCH
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Stanley Milgram at Yale instructed experimenters
to
> > give
> > > > > >electric
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >shocks to another
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >They did so, despite person's cries of pain
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >In depth: After Saddam
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Most notoriously, the 1971 Stanford prison
> > experiment,
> > > > > >conducted
> > > > > > > > > > > > > by
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Philip Zimbardo and colleagues, seemingly showed
> > that
> > > >young
> > > > > > > > > > > > > students
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >who were assigned to the role of guard quickly
> > became
> > > > > > > >sadistically
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >abusive to the students assigned to the role of
> > > >prisoners.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Combined with lessons from history, the
disturbing
> > > > > >implication of
> > > > > > > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >research is that evil is not the preserve of a
> > small
> > > >minority
> > > > > >of
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >exceptional individuals. We all have the capacity
> > to
> > > >behave
> > > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > > > evil
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >ways. This idea was famously developed by Hannah
> > Arendt
> > > >whose
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >observations of the Nazi war criminal Adolf
> > Eichmann,
> > led
> > > >her
> > > > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > remark
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >that what was most frightening was just how mild
> > and
> > > >ordinary
> > > > > >he
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >looked. His evil was disarmingly banal.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >The latest pictures show detainees being
threatened
> > with
> > > >dogs
> > > > > >(AP
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Photo/Courtesy of The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >In order to explain events in Iraq, one might go
> > further
> > > >and
> > > > > > > > > > > > > conclude
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >that the torturers were victims of circumstances,
> > that
> > > >they
> > > > > >lost
> > > > > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >moral compass in the group and did things they
> > would
> > > >normally
> > > > > > > > > > > > > abhor.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Indeed, using Zimbardo's findings as evidence,
this
> > is
> > > > > >precisely
> > > > > > > > > > > > > what
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >some people do conclude. But this is bad
psychology
> > and
> > > >it is
> > > > > >bad
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >ethics.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >It is bad psychology because it suggests we can
> > explain
> > > >human
> > > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >without needing to scrutinize the wider culture
in
> > which
> > > >it
> > > > > >is
> > > > > > > > > > > > > located.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >It is bad ethics because it absolves everyone
from
> > any
> > > > > > > > > > > > > responsibility
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >for events - the perpetrators, ourselves as
> > constituents
> > > >of
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > wider
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >society, and the leaders of that society.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >In the situation of Abu Ghraib, some reports have
> > > >indicated
> > > > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >guards were following orders from intelligence
> > officers
> > > >and
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >interrogators in order to soften up the prisoners
> > for
> > > > > > > > > > > > > interrogation.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >If that is true, then clearly the culture in
which
> > these
> > > > > >soldiers
> > > > > > > > > > > > > were
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >immersed was one in which they were encouraged to
> > see
> > and
> > > > > >treat
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Iraqis
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >as subhuman. Other army units almost certainly
had
> > a
> > very
> > > > > > > > > > > > > different
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >culture and this provides a second explanation of
> > why
> > > >some
> > > > > >people
> > > > > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >some units may have tortured, but others did not.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Grotesque fun
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Perhaps the best evidence that such factors were
at
> > play
> > > >is
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > fact
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >that the pictures were taken at all. Reminiscent
of
> > the
> > > > > >postcards
> > > > > > > > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >lynch mobs circulated to advertise their
> > activities,
> > the
> > > > > >torture
> > > > > > > > > > > > > was
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >done proudly and with a grotesque sense of fun.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >'Those in the photos wanted others to know what
> > they
> > had
> > > > > >done'
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Those in the photos wanted others to know what
they
> > had
> > > >done,
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >presumably believing that the audience would
> > approve.
> > > >This
> > > > > >sense
> > > > > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >approval is very important, since there is ample
> > evidence
> > > > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > > > people
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >are more likely to act on any inclinations to
> > behave
> > in
> > > > > >obnoxious
> > > > > > > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >when they sense - correctly or incorrectly - that
> > they
> > > >have
> > > > > > > > > > > > > broader
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >support.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >So where did the soldiers in Iraq get that sense
> > from?
> > > >This
> > > > > >takes
> > > > > > > >us
> > > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >a critical influence on group behaviour:
> > leadership.
> > In
> > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > studies,
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >leadership - the way in which experimenters
either
> > > >overtly or
> > > > > > > > > > > > > tacitly
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >endorsed particular forms of action - was crucial
> > to
> > the
> > > >way
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >participants behaved.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > Many guards in our experiment did not wish to
> > act - or
> > > >be
> > > > > >seen
> > > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >act - as bullies or oppressors
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Thus one reason why the guards in our own
research
> > for
> > > >the
> > > > > >BBC
> > > > > > > >did
> > > > > > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >behave as brutally as those in the Stanford
study,
> > was
> > > >that
> > > > > >we
> > > > > > > >did
> > > > > > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >instruct them to behave in this way.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Zimbardo, in contrast, told his participants:
"You
> > can
> > > >create
> > > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of fear to
> > some
> > > > > >degree,
> > > > > > > >you
> > > > > > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >create a notion of arbitrariness that their life
is
> > > >totally
> > > > > > > > > > > > > controlled
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >by us, by the system, you, me - and they'll have
no
> > > > > >privacy....
> > > > > > > >In
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >general what all this leads to is a sense of
> > > >powerlessness".
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Officers' messages
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >In light of this point it is interesting to ask
> > what
> > > >messages
> > > > > > > >were
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >being provided by fellow and, more critically,
> > senior
> > > > > >officers in
> > > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >units where torture took place? Did those who
> > didn't
> > > >approve
> > > > > >fail
> > > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >speak out for fear of being seen as weak or
> > disloyal?
> > Did
> > > > > >senior
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >officers who knew what was going on turn a blind
> > eye
> > or
> > > >else
> > > > > > > > > > > > > simply
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >file away reports of misbehaviour?
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >All these things happened after the My Lai
> > massacre,
> > and
> > > >in
> > > > > >many
> > > > > > > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >the responses to an atrocity tell us most about
how
> > it
> > > >can
> > > > > >happen
> > > > > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >the first place. They tell us how murderers and
> > torturers
> > > >can
> > > > > > > >begin
> > > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >believe that they will not be held to account for
> > what
> > > >they
> > > > > >do,
> > > > > > > >or
> > > > > > > > > > > > > even
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >that their actions are something praiseworthy.
The
> > more
> > > >they
> > > > > > > > > > > > > perceive
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >that torture has the thumbs up, the more they
will
> > give
> > > >it a
> > > > > > > >thumbs
> > > > > > > > > > > > > up
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >themselves.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >So how do we prevent these kinds of episodes? One
> > answer
> > > >is
> > > > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > ensure
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >that people are always made aware of their other
> > moral
> > > > > > > >commitments
> > > > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >their accountability to others. Whatever the
> > pressures
> > > >within
> > > > > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >military group, their ties to others must never
be
> > > >broken.
> > > > > >Total
> > > > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >secret institutions, where people are isolated
from
> > > >contact
> > > > > >with
> > > > > > > > > > > > > all
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >others are breeding grounds for atrocity.
> > Similarly,
> > > >there
> > > > > >are
> > > > > > > > > > > > > great
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >dangers in contracting out security functions to
> > private
> > > > > > > > > > > > > contractors
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >which lack fully developed structures of public
> > > > > >accountability.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Power vacuum
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Another answer is to look at the culture of our
> > > >institutions
> > > > > >and
> > > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >role of leaders in framing that culture. Bad
> > leadership
> > > >can
> > > > > > > >permit
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >torture in two ways. Sometimes leaders can
actively
> > > >promote
> > > > > > > > > > > > > oppressive
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >values. This is akin to what happened in
Zimbardo's
> > study
> > > >and
> > > > > >may
> > > > > > > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >the case in certain military intelligence units.
> > But
> > > > > >sometimes
> > > > > > > > > > > > > leaders
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >can simply fail to promote anything and hence
> > create
> > a
> > > >vacuum
> > > > > >of
> > > > > > > > > > > > > power.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >'Inmates' in The Experiment in their cells
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Is it in anyone to abuse a captive?
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Our own findings indicated that where such a
vacuum
> > > >exists,
> > > > > > > >people
> > > > > > > > > > > > > are
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >more likely to accept any clear line of action
> > which
> > is
> > > > > > > >vigorously
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >proposed. Often, then, tyranny follows from
> > powerlessness
> > > > > >rather
> > > > > > > > > > > > > than
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >power. In either case, the failure of leaders to
> > champion
> > > > > >clear
> > > > > > > > > > > > > humane
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >and democratic values is part of the problem.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >But it is not enough to consider leadership in
the
> > > >military.
> > > > > >One
> > > > > > > > > > > > > must
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >look more widely at the messages and the values
> > provided
> > > >in
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >community at large. That means that we must
address
> > the
> > > > > >anti-Arab
> > > > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >anti-Muslim sentiment in our society. A culture
> > where
> > we
> > > >have
> > > > > >got
> > > > > > > > > > > > > used
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >to pictures of Iraqi prisoners semi-naked,
chained
> > and
> > > > > >humiliated
> > > > > > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >create a climate in which torturers see
themselves
> > as
> > > >heroes
> > > > > > > > > > > > > rather
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >than villains.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Again, for such a culture to thrive it is not
> > necessary
> > > >for
> > > > > > > >everyone
> > > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >embrace such sentiments, it is sufficient simply
> > for
> > > >those
> > > > > >who
> > > > > > > > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >oppose them to feel muted and out-of-step with
> > societal
> > > > > >norms.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Leaders' language
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >And we must also look at political leadership.
When
> > > > > > > >administration
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests"
of
> > Iraqi
> > > > > > > >dissidents,
> > > > > > > > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >likens Iraqis to vermin. Note, for example, that
> > just
> > > >before
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists started
referring
> > to
> > > > > >Tutsi's
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >as "cockroaches".
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >The US is trying to limit the damage after an
abuse
> > > >scandal
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Such use of language again creates a climate in
> > which
> > > > > > > >perpetrators
> > > > > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >atrocity can maintain the illusion that they are
> > nobly
> > > >doing
> > > > > >what
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >others know must be done. The torturers in Iraq
may
> > or
> > > >may
> > > > > >not
> > > > > > > > > > > > > have
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >been following direct orders from their leaders,
> > but
> > they
> > > > > >were
> > > > > > > > > > > > > almost
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >certainly allowed to feel that they were behaving
> > as
> > good
> > > > > > > > > > > > > followers.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >So if we want to understand why torture occurs,
it
> > is
> > > > > >important
> > > > > > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >consider the psychology of individuals, of
groups,
> > and of
> > > > > > > >society.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Groups do indeed affect the behaviour of
> > individuals
> > and
> > > >can
> > > > > >lead
> > > > > > > > > > > > > them
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >to do things they never anticipated. But how any
> > given
> > > >group
> > > > > > > > > > > > > affects
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >our behaviour depends upon the norms and values
of
> > that
> > > > > >specific
> > > > > > > > > > > > > group.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Evil can become banal, but so can humanism. The
> > choice is
> > > >not
> > > > > > > >denied
> > > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >us by human nature but rests in our own hands.
> > Hence,
> > we
> > > >need
> > > > > >a
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >psychological analysis that addresses the values
> > and
> > > >beliefs
> > > > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > > > we,
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >our institutions, and our leaders promote. These
> > create
> > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > conditions
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >in which would-be torturers feel either
emboldened
> > or
> > > >unable
> > > > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > act.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >We need an analysis that makes us accept rather
> > than
> > > >avoid
> > > > > >our
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >responsibilities. Above all, we need a psychology
> > which
> > > >does
> > > > > >not
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >distance us from torture but which requires us to
> > look
> > > > > >closely at
> > > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >ways in which we and those who lead us are
> > implicated
> > in
> > > >a
> > > > > > > >society
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >which makes barbarity possible.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Alex Haslam is a professor of psychology at
> > University of
> > > > > >Exeter
> > > > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >editor of the European Journal of Social
> > Psychology.
> > > >Stephen
> > > > > > > >Reicher
> > > > > > > > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >a professor of psychology at University of St
> > Andrews,
> > > >past
> > > > > > > >editor
> > > > > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >the British Journal of Social Psychology and a
> > fellow
> > of
> > > >the
> > > > > > > >Royal
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >Society of Edinburgh.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
>
>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 12:05:48 PST