I just wanted to express my worries that the debate is turning to a
point where we blame Nations for misbehaving. I can easily think of
lots of nation besides the USA, the UK and Israel that has misbehaved.
Most of Europe, for instance, in Africa and Latin America. But also
Africans and Latin Americans. My own country, Chile, is based on the
control and domination of its native population for instance. And Irak
is not itself a paradigm of tolerance. I guess we could end up here in
an emotional guerrilla war supporting/defending countries and I would
not like that to happen. So, If we want to keep the debate on studying
torture, totalitarism and sadism from a CHAT perspective, I guess we
better focus on what can make of any culture and any people go into the
totalitarian path. There are not Nations that are more innocents than
others.
Quoting Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>:
> Apologies for jumping into this thread somewhat precipitously Victor
> and
> perhaps being a bit disruptive. I would like to ask you to help
> clarify a
> few things about war.
>
> I was born in October 1945. Has there been a declaration of war any
> time in
> my lifetime? I can't think of any.
>
> Nevertheless, people rightly still distinguish between war and
> not-war,
> despite attempt of the prosecutors to cast their actions as "police
>
> actions" or "intervention" or "support to the government" or
> whatever.
>
> It is a strange thing, isn't it, that war gives licence to do things
> that
> are otherwise illegal. So for example, the US administration felt no
>
> compunction about dropping bombs on a city during the "war," but
> beating
> and humiliating people after the enemy's army has been destroyed and
> the US
> is the administrator of the country are rightly not considered
> admissible.
>
> The British and the Israelis are very experienced at administering
> subject
> populations. The US has bombed countries, they've blockaded
> countries,
> they've subverted them and financed torture regimes, they've
> subjugated
> most of the world economically, but have they ever successfully
> subjugated
> a population by military means?
>
> I know I've gone way off the subject, Victor, sorry for that. I
> understand
> you were discussing the psychological facts of life of people
> involved in a
> war. My guess on that is that anyone who has been naive enough to
> *volunteer* for one of those jobs (softening up prisoners in Iraq,
> etc.) is
> going to behave like that. Anyone with the strength of character not
> to
> degenerate in that way would never have joined up.
>
> And as for the opposition from Iraq. What did anyone expect? Did
> anyone
> really believe that the US army was going to fly into the heart of
> Arab
> territory and set up anything better than something resembling
> Guantanamo Bay?
>
> sorry for the interruption
> Andy
>
> At 12:43 PM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> >Andy,
> >The focus of the discussion was - at least up to now - on the
> practice of
> >war. I think that rational analysis has a lot to say on this
> subject and
> >said so. You're raising a different, though no less important
> issue, the
> >wider economic and political questions involved in the decision to
> go to
> >war. Simple good-old repression, gunboat diplomacy and what have
> you are
> >practices of war; ask any Vietnamese vetran (as well as a good many
> American
> >and Russian vetrans for that matter), most Iraqi citizens, and... (I
> don't
> >think its necessary to list others, there are plenty). War is as
> Clauswitz
> >wrote is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to
> fulfil our
> >will." I can't think of a better definition than that for
> repression! War
> >can be undeclared, it can involve ngo's, and can even be declared
> against an
> >unarmed population.
> >
> >The fact that war is repression is like the fact that it is violent,
> not
> >really very useful for serious analysis. Machiavelli, V. Clauswitz,
> Marx
> >and Engels, as well as other more recent writers like Hobsbawm,
> Stadt and
> >Schelling have raised important and relevant questions about war;
> its
> >relation to economics and civil society, its role in
> cultural-historical
> >development, and so on. Considering the threat of war to human
> survival and
> >the natural difficulties of regarding it rationally, it is a major
> >challenge, if not the major challenge to cultural-historical
> analysis.
> >Highest regards,
> >Victor
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 11:01 AM
> >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> >
> >
> > > Sorry Victor. I think that was one of those reflex messages when
> I should
> > > hesitate before pressing "Send."
> > > I guess part of my reaction was because of radio talk here to the
> effect
> > > that "war is like this," i.e., it's justifiable. But of course
> what may be
> > > at a pinch justifiable in overcoming an opposing army can in no
> sense at
> > > all be justified when occupying a country and suppressing the
> resistance
> >of
> > > its populace. The war was justified before the event because
> although they
> > > were going to kill civilians with their "precision bombing" it
> was all
> > > worth it to get rid of the Saddam Hussein regime. I guess a lot
> of
> > > Americans and even some Iraqis were willing to go along with
> that
> > > utilitarian argument. This is what they get. And it isn't war,
> because
> > > there's no-one to declare war against. This is just simple, good
> old
> > > fashioned repression.
> > > Andy
> > > At 10:41 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > >Andy,
> > > >Since when is war a matter of official prononciamentos? The US
> fought a
> >10
> > > >year undeclared war in Vietnam (one important reason why I don't
> live
> >there)
> > > >killed some 2 million Vietnamese and about 58,000 Americans,
> effectively
> > > >destroyed the physical and economic infrastructure of Vietnam
> and lost
> >the
> > > >war against international Communism to boot. The WAR in Iraq
> promises us
> > > >another replay of Vietnam. It will probably go on interminably
> for years,
> > > >kill lots of Americans and many many more Iraqis, destroy
> whatever
> >remnants
> > > >of economic and civil organization are left in Iraq, and the US
> will end
> >up
> > > >losing the war for Liberal Democracy to boot. Is it relevant? I
> say it's
> > > >relevant as h--l!
> > > >Highest regards,
> > > >Victor
> > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:36 AM
> > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > But excuse me, the war was over months ago.
> > > > > What is going on now is the imposition of democracy in Iraq
> by the
> > > > > occupying power.
> > > > > Andy
> > > > >
> > > > > At 07:34 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > > >Peter and David,
> > > > > >1. I sense here a certain degree of imbalance, easy
> judgements too
> > > >quickly
> > > > > >arrived at, and a measure of distance from the conditions
> experienced
> >by
> > > > > >soldiers and police officers, and civilians in war-time
> conditions.
> >The
> > > > > >Milgram experiments, Zimbardo's experiments at Stanford, and
> other
> >like
> > > > > >exercises for evoking interpersonal cruelty and terror have
> only the
> > > >barest
> > > > > >relevance to the practice of cruelty and of terror in
> war-time. The
> > > > > >discovery that humans are capable of collective violence,
> even
> >extreme
> > > > > >collective violence, is of little interest when applied to
> the study
> >and
> > > > > >evaluation of war and military policy. WE ALREADY KNOW
> THAT! Regard
> >the
> > > > > >elementary concept of war as presented by that most
> excellent
> >objective
> > > > > >idealist, v. Clauswitz:
> > > > > > "War ...
> is an
> >act of
> > > > > >violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our
> will."
> > > > > >This concept is elementary, and universal; it does not refer
> to
> >Americans
> > > >at
> > > > > >war, Iraquis at war, Muslim Jihadists at war, etc. etc. but
> to all
> > > > > >practicioners of war and to all practice of war. Thus, in
> the context
> >of
> > > >war
> > > > > >we can reasonably discuss the effectiveness of this or that
> policy of
> > > > > >violence, i.e. whether it is likely "to compel our opponent
> to
> >fulfill
> > > >our
> > > > > >will," not the practice of violence itself. Critical
> evaluation of
> >the
> > > > > >practice at war is most useful when addressed to the
> military
> >mission.
> > > > > >Evaluation of the mission can and should be done at all
> levels: be it
> >the
> > > > > >decision to invade Iraq, the decision to to so without full
> UN
> > > > > >participation, the decision to renovate the Al Ghraib
> prison, the
> > > >decision
> > > > > >to arrest and detain far more suspects of guerilla activity
> - now all
> > > > > >extra-military collect violence is indiscriminately called
> terror,
> >how
> > > > > >silly! - than can be secured and investigated with due speed
> and
> > > > > >effectiveness, and so on and on
> > > > > >
> > > > > >2. So, how can we relate to the conditions at the Al Ghraib
> prison
> > > >within
> > > > > >the context of the war in Iraq? We can, of course,
> criticize the
> >mission
> > > >as
> > > > > >a whole; the invasion into Iraq by a coalition of one,
> possibly two,
> > > > > >powerful states, with much to gain and little to lose in a
> war in
> >Iraq
> > > > > >augmented by a collection of their client states. While
> there is a
> >good
> > > > > >deal to be said about the explicit and hidden objectives of
> the
> >mission
> > > >in
> > > > > >Iraq, it is not the focus of current discussion. Evaluation
> of the
> > > > > >treatment of a rebellious civilian population, prisoners of
> war and
> > > > > >prisoners in general is the issue here. I'll make this
> short: the
> > > > > >under-supervised exercise of "softening techniques" by
> personell with
> > > >only a
> > > > > >smattering acquaintance with the psychology and
> psychobiology of
> > > >coercion,
> > > > > >with even less knowledge of the historical, cultural and
> social
> >contexts
> > > >of
> > > > > >their prisoners, and, worst of all (remember this is a
> discussion of
> > > > > >war-time practice), total ignorance of useful military
> practice has
> > > >produced
> > > > > >conditions that expose the coalition armies to the most
> difficult
> >kind of
> > > > > >oppositional modes; that of angry contempt. Demonization of
> the
> >enemy,
> > > > > >indisciplined expression of violence unrelated to the
> mission at
> >hand,
> > > >and
> > > > > >the emergence of what I called in an earlier message the
> formation of
> > > >unit
> > > > > >practices irrelevant to the unit's mission are all sure
> signs of
> >emergent
> > > > > >irrelevance of practice for the effective realization of
> military
> > > > > >objectives and the general collapse of morale.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >3. A military unit whose members fail to recognize that
> their
> >opponents
> > > >are
> > > > > >as human as they are has already gone a long way in becoming
> a
> >military
> > > > > >liability and is in severe danger of permanent, irrevocable
> and final
> > > > > >closure. Demonization is, in a military context, simply
> the
> >replacement
> > > >of
> > > > > >that most basic principle of the art of war; "know thine
> opponent at
> > > >least
> > > > > >as well as you know thyself," with a comforting but false
> image of
> >the
> > > > > >opponent as subhuman, unworthy, and contemptible. . When
> >administration
> > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi
> dissidents,
> >and
> > > > > >liken Iraqis to vermin they encourage the very uprising
> they
> >ostensibly
> > > >hope
> > > > > >to repress. Relevant too is the example from the Rwandan
> genocide.
> >The
> > > > > >reference by Hutu extremists to Tutsi's as "cockroaches"
> may have
> >given
> > > >the
> > > > > >Hutu the confidence to murder some 800,000 unarmed Tutsi's,
> but it
> > > >resulted
> > > > > >in a bloody civil war in which the armed Tutsi "cockroaches"
> managed
> >to
> > > > > >expell a respectable portion of the Hutu into permanent
> exile in
> >refugee
> > > > > >camps outside Rwanda.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >4. Extreme violence can be effective policy in the practice
> of war,
> >but
> > > >it
> > > > > >alone never guarantees the political aims of war. Of the
> most often
> > > >cited
> > > > > >examples of the cruelest of conquest states; Gengis Khan,
> the Romans
> >and,
> > > >of
> > > > > >course, the Axis powers, only the Romans managed to
> stabilize
> >somewhat
> > > >their
> > > > > >victories, and this they did mainly by conscientious
> incorporation of
> > > > > >conquered states into the very fabric of their empire.
> Certainly,
> >the
> > > > > >indisciplined practice of violence irrelevant to military
> goals is as
> > > > > >ineffective as are policies of extreme violence and even
> > > >counter-productive
> > > > > >to the aim of forcing the opponent's compliance.
> Indisciplined
> >violence
> > > >on
> > > > > >the part of a military organization signals its opponents
> that there
> >is
> > > > > >really no basis for reasonable relations (these can exist in
> war as
> >in
> > > >any
> > > > > >other circumstance) and that even compliance is not a real
> option.
> >In
> > > >the
> > > > > >absence of any possibility to communicate with the enemy,
> the only
> > > > > >possibility is war ā outrance (war to the bitter end),
> something that
> >no
> > > > > >reasonable policy of war can accept.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >5. As written above we've already discussed the problems of
> the
> > > >emergence
> > > > > >of internal practices irrelevant to the unit's mission. In
> those
> > > > > >presentations we also indicated that the authoritarian
> military
> >hierarchy
> > > > > >has evolved from the integral difficulties of critical
> >self-evaluation
> > > >for
> > > > > >the isolated military unit under pressure. We agree
> entirely with
> > > >Stephen
> > > > > >Reicher and Alex Haslam that the existance of responsible
> and
> >intelligent
> > > > > >military leadership is integral to an effective military
> >organization.
> > > >It
> > > > > >is, again, Clauswitz who raises some pretty pointed
> questions
> >concerning
> > > >the
> > > > > >nature and conditions of leadership in democratic, mass
> society.
> > > >National
> > > > > >leadership and it's subsidiary military specialists are
> subject to
> > > >political
> > > > > >pressures of both special interests and of public opinion
> that is
> >neither
> > > > > >subject to the discipline of rational practice of war nor
> even
> >familiar
> > > >with
> > > > > >war-time conditions. Think of the tremendous appeal of
> expressions
> >such
> > > >as
> > > > > >"The Axis of Evil," "the Yellow Horde," and "Police Pigs" to
> a
> >frightened
> > > > > >and impressionable population that votes, often without a
> clear idea
> >of
> > > >what
> > > > > >they're voting for. How easy it is to mobilize public
> support for
> > > >extreme
> > > > > >politics by contrived lies such as MacNamara's Tonkin Bay
> incident,
> >the
> > > >WMD
> > > > > >foolishness, and the suggestion that making "the n word +
> piles" of
> >naked
> > > > > >Iraqi prisoners is high military policy of the coalition
> forces in
> >Iraq.
> > > >The
> > > > > >emergence of national states, mass democracy, and the
> possibilities
> >for
> > > > > >concentrating tremendous resources for the prosecution of
> war and
> > > >oppression
> > > > > >has made the last century the bloodiest in human history,
> and it
> >appears
> > > > > >that we haven't really even begun to address the problem in
> this
> >century
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > > >From: "Peter Smagorinsky" <smago@coe.uga.edu>
> > > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > >Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 9:22 PM
> > > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Oz is an HBO program set in a prison with lots of hard
> core
> >criminals
> > > >and
> > > > > > > hard core guards.
> > > > > > > At 01:02 PM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Peter,
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >What Oz is?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Re the torture imagery in American life, the few times I
> saw NYPD
> > > >blue,
> > > > > > > >it seemed to me that it was in the verge of legitimizing
> the use
> >of
> > > > > > > >torture as a way to collect criminal info. Of course, in
> a
> >"softened"
> > > > > > > >way, but the underlying message was quite violent and,
> of
> >course,the
> > > > > > > >naive viewer couldnīt help but identifying with the good
> cops. As
> > > >9/11
> > > > > > > >directed viewers to see with New eyes American movies,
> the Iraq
> > > >Torture
> > > > > > > >case should do the same thing. There is plenty of cases
> where
> > > >physical
> > > > > > > >abuse is done by the "good" guys, but always in a
> threshold that
> >an
> > > > > > > >average viewer can tolerate (and enjoy...)
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >David
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Quoting Peter Smagorinsky <smago@coe.uga.edu>:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > 3ce7295.jpg
> > > > > > > > > At 10:52 AM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Why everyone's not a torturer
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >By Stephen Reicher and Alex Haslam
> > > > > > > > > >Psychologists
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Guards and prisoners, taking part in The Experiment
> for the
> >BBC
> > > >in
> > > > > > > > > 2002
> > > > > > > > > >So groups of people in positions of unaccountable
> power
> >naturally
> > > > > > > > > >resort to violence, do they? Not according to
> research
> >conducted
> > > >in
> > > > > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > > >BBC experiment.
> > > > > > > > > >The photographs from Abu Ghraib prison showing
> Americans
> >abusing
> > > > > > > > > Iraqi
> > > > > > > > > >prisoners make us recoil and lead us to distance
> ourselves
> >from
> > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > >horror and brutality. Surely those who commit such
> acts are
> >not
> > > > > > > > > like
> > > > > > > > > >us? Surely the perpetrators must be twisted or
> disturbed in
> >some
> > > > > > > > > way?
> > > > > > > > > >They must be monsters. We ourselves would never
> condone or
> > > > > > > > > contribute
> > > > > > > > > >to such events.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Sadly, 50 years of social psychological research
> indicates
> >that
> > > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > >comforting thoughts are deluded. A series of major
> studies
> >have
> > > > > > > > > shown
> > > > > > > > > >that even well-adjusted people, when divided into
> groups and
> > > >placed
> > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > >competition against each other, can become abusive
> and
> >violent.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > OTHER RESEARCH
> > > > > > > > > >Stanley Milgram at Yale instructed experimenters to
> give
> >electric
> > > > > > > > > >shocks to another
> > > > > > > > > >They did so, despite person's cries of pain
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >In depth: After Saddam
> > > > > > > > > >Most notoriously, the 1971 Stanford prison
> experiment,
> >conducted
> > > > > > > > > by
> > > > > > > > > >Philip Zimbardo and colleagues, seemingly showed
> that young
> > > > > > > > > students
> > > > > > > > > >who were assigned to the role of guard quickly
> became
> > > >sadistically
> > > > > > > > > >abusive to the students assigned to the role of
> prisoners.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Combined with lessons from history, the disturbing
> >implication of
> > > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > >research is that evil is not the preserve of a small
> minority
> >of
> > > > > > > > > >exceptional individuals. We all have the capacity to
> behave
> >in
> > > > > > > > > evil
> > > > > > > > > >ways. This idea was famously developed by Hannah
> Arendt whose
> > > > > > > > > >observations of the Nazi war criminal Adolf
> Eichmann, led her
> >to
> > > > > > > > > remark
> > > > > > > > > >that what was most frightening was just how mild and
> ordinary
> >he
> > > > > > > > > >looked. His evil was disarmingly banal.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >The latest pictures show detainees being threatened
> with dogs
> >(AP
> > > > > > > > > >Photo/Courtesy of The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > >In order to explain events in Iraq, one might go
> further and
> > > > > > > > > conclude
> > > > > > > > > >that the torturers were victims of circumstances,
> that they
> >lost
> > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > >moral compass in the group and did things they would
> normally
> > > > > > > > > abhor.
> > > > > > > > > >Indeed, using Zimbardo's findings as evidence, this
> is
> >precisely
> > > > > > > > > what
> > > > > > > > > >some people do conclude. But this is bad psychology
> and it is
> >bad
> > > > > > > > > >ethics.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >It is bad psychology because it suggests we can
> explain human
> > > > > > > > > behaviour
> > > > > > > > > >without needing to scrutinize the wider culture in
> which it
> >is
> > > > > > > > > located.
> > > > > > > > > >It is bad ethics because it absolves everyone from
> any
> > > > > > > > > responsibility
> > > > > > > > > >for events - the perpetrators, ourselves as
> constituents of
> >the
> > > > > > > > > wider
> > > > > > > > > >society, and the leaders of that society.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >In the situation of Abu Ghraib, some reports have
> indicated
> >that
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > >guards were following orders from intelligence
> officers and
> > > > > > > > > >interrogators in order to soften up the prisoners
> for
> > > > > > > > > interrogation.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >If that is true, then clearly the culture in which
> these
> >soldiers
> > > > > > > > > were
> > > > > > > > > >immersed was one in which they were encouraged to
> see and
> >treat
> > > > > > > > > Iraqis
> > > > > > > > > >as subhuman. Other army units almost certainly had a
> very
> > > > > > > > > different
> > > > > > > > > >culture and this provides a second explanation of
> why some
> >people
> > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > >some units may have tortured, but others did not.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Grotesque fun
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Perhaps the best evidence that such factors were at
> play is
> >the
> > > > > > > > > fact
> > > > > > > > > >that the pictures were taken at all. Reminiscent of
> the
> >postcards
> > > > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > > >lynch mobs circulated to advertise their activities,
> the
> >torture
> > > > > > > > > was
> > > > > > > > > >done proudly and with a grotesque sense of fun.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >'Those in the photos wanted others to know what they
> had
> >done'
> > > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > >Those in the photos wanted others to know what they
> had done,
> > > > > > > > > >presumably believing that the audience would
> approve. This
> >sense
> > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > >approval is very important, since there is ample
> evidence
> >that
> > > > > > > > > people
> > > > > > > > > >are more likely to act on any inclinations to behave
> in
> >obnoxious
> > > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > > >when they sense - correctly or incorrectly - that
> they have
> > > > > > > > > broader
> > > > > > > > > >support.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >So where did the soldiers in Iraq get that sense
> from? This
> >takes
> > > >us
> > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > >a critical influence on group behaviour: leadership.
> In the
> > > > > > > > > studies,
> > > > > > > > > >leadership - the way in which experimenters either
> overtly or
> > > > > > > > > tacitly
> > > > > > > > > >endorsed particular forms of action - was crucial to
> the way
> > > > > > > > > >participants behaved.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Many guards in our experiment did not wish to act
> - or be
> >seen
> > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > >act - as bullies or oppressors
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Thus one reason why the guards in our own research
> for the
> >BBC
> > > >did
> > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > >behave as brutally as those in the Stanford study,
> was that
> >we
> > > >did
> > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > >instruct them to behave in this way.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Zimbardo, in contrast, told his participants: "You
> can create
> >in
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > >prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of fear to
> some
> >degree,
> > > >you
> > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > >create a notion of arbitrariness that their life is
> totally
> > > > > > > > > controlled
> > > > > > > > > >by us, by the system, you, me - and they'll have
> no
> >privacy....
> > > >In
> > > > > > > > > >general what all this leads to is a sense of
> powerlessness".
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Officers' messages
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >In light of this point it is interesting to ask what
> messages
> > > >were
> > > > > > > > > >being provided by fellow and, more critically,
> senior
> >officers in
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > >units where torture took place? Did those who didn't
> approve
> >fail
> > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > >speak out for fear of being seen as weak or
> disloyal? Did
> >senior
> > > > > > > > > >officers who knew what was going on turn a blind eye
> or else
> > > > > > > > > simply
> > > > > > > > > >file away reports of misbehaviour?
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >All these things happened after the My Lai massacre,
> and in
> >many
> > > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > > >the responses to an atrocity tell us most about how
> it can
> >happen
> > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > >the first place. They tell us how murderers and
> torturers can
> > > >begin
> > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > >believe that they will not be held to account for
> what they
> >do,
> > > >or
> > > > > > > > > even
> > > > > > > > > >that their actions are something praiseworthy. The
> more they
> > > > > > > > > perceive
> > > > > > > > > >that torture has the thumbs up, the more they will
> give it a
> > > >thumbs
> > > > > > > > > up
> > > > > > > > > >themselves.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >So how do we prevent these kinds of episodes? One
> answer is
> >to
> > > > > > > > > ensure
> > > > > > > > > >that people are always made aware of their other
> moral
> > > >commitments
> > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > >their accountability to others. Whatever the
> pressures within
> > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > >military group, their ties to others must never be
> broken.
> >Total
> > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > >secret institutions, where people are isolated from
> contact
> >with
> > > > > > > > > all
> > > > > > > > > >others are breeding grounds for atrocity. Similarly,
> there
> >are
> > > > > > > > > great
> > > > > > > > > >dangers in contracting out security functions to
> private
> > > > > > > > > contractors
> > > > > > > > > >which lack fully developed structures of public
> >accountability.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Power vacuum
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Another answer is to look at the culture of our
> institutions
> >and
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > >role of leaders in framing that culture. Bad
> leadership can
> > > >permit
> > > > > > > > > >torture in two ways. Sometimes leaders can actively
> promote
> > > > > > > > > oppressive
> > > > > > > > > >values. This is akin to what happened in Zimbardo's
> study and
> >may
> > > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > > >the case in certain military intelligence units.
> But
> >sometimes
> > > > > > > > > leaders
> > > > > > > > > >can simply fail to promote anything and hence create
> a vacuum
> >of
> > > > > > > > > power.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >'Inmates' in The Experiment in their cells
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Is it in anyone to abuse a captive?
> > > > > > > > > >Our own findings indicated that where such a vacuum
> exists,
> > > >people
> > > > > > > > > are
> > > > > > > > > >more likely to accept any clear line of action which
> is
> > > >vigorously
> > > > > > > > > >proposed. Often, then, tyranny follows from
> powerlessness
> >rather
> > > > > > > > > than
> > > > > > > > > >power. In either case, the failure of leaders to
> champion
> >clear
> > > > > > > > > humane
> > > > > > > > > >and democratic values is part of the problem.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >But it is not enough to consider leadership in the
> military.
> >One
> > > > > > > > > must
> > > > > > > > > >look more widely at the messages and the values
> provided in
> >the
> > > > > > > > > >community at large. That means that we must address
> the
> >anti-Arab
> > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > >anti-Muslim sentiment in our society. A culture
> where we have
> >got
> > > > > > > > > used
> > > > > > > > > >to pictures of Iraqi prisoners semi-naked, chained
> and
> >humiliated
> > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > >create a climate in which torturers see themselves
> as heroes
> > > > > > > > > rather
> > > > > > > > > >than villains.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Again, for such a culture to thrive it is not
> necessary for
> > > >everyone
> > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > >embrace such sentiments, it is sufficient simply for
> those
> >who
> > > > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > > > >oppose them to feel muted and out-of-step with
> societal
> >norms.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Leaders' language
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >And we must also look at political leadership.
> When
> > > >administration
> > > > > > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of
> Iraqi
> > > >dissidents,
> > > > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > > > >likens Iraqis to vermin. Note, for example, that
> just before
> >the
> > > > > > > > > >Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists started referring
> to
> >Tutsi's
> > > > > > > > > >as "cockroaches".
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >The US is trying to limit the damage after an abuse
> scandal
> > > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > >Such use of language again creates a climate in
> which
> > > >perpetrators
> > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > >atrocity can maintain the illusion that they are
> nobly doing
> >what
> > > > > > > > > >others know must be done. The torturers in Iraq may
> or may
> >not
> > > > > > > > > have
> > > > > > > > > >been following direct orders from their leaders, but
> they
> >were
> > > > > > > > > almost
> > > > > > > > > >certainly allowed to feel that they were behaving as
> good
> > > > > > > > > followers.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >So if we want to understand why torture occurs, it
> is
> >important
> > > >to
> > > > > > > > > >consider the psychology of individuals, of groups,
> and of
> > > >society.
> > > > > > > > > >Groups do indeed affect the behaviour of individuals
> and can
> >lead
> > > > > > > > > them
> > > > > > > > > >to do things they never anticipated. But how any
> given group
> > > > > > > > > affects
> > > > > > > > > >our behaviour depends upon the norms and values of
> that
> >specific
> > > > > > > > > group.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Evil can become banal, but so can humanism. The
> choice is not
> > > >denied
> > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > >us by human nature but rests in our own hands.
> Hence, we need
> >a
> > > > > > > > > >psychological analysis that addresses the values and
> beliefs
> >that
> > > > > > > > > we,
> > > > > > > > > >our institutions, and our leaders promote. These
> create the
> > > > > > > > > conditions
> > > > > > > > > >in which would-be torturers feel either emboldened
> or unable
> >to
> > > > > > > > > act.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >We need an analysis that makes us accept rather than
> avoid
> >our
> > > > > > > > > >responsibilities. Above all, we need a psychology
> which does
> >not
> > > >
> > > > > > > > > >distance us from torture but which requires us to
> look
> >closely at
> > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > >ways in which we and those who lead us are
> implicated in a
> > > >society
> > > > > > > > > >which makes barbarity possible.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Alex Haslam is a professor of psychology at
> University of
> >Exeter
> > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > >editor of the European Journal of Social Psychology.
> Stephen
> > > >Reicher
> > > > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > >a professor of psychology at University of St
> Andrews, past
> > > >editor
> > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > >the British Journal of Social Psychology and a
> fellow of the
> > > >Royal
> > > > > > > > > >Society of Edinburgh.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 12:05:48 PST