Andy,
Since when is war a matter of official prononciamentos? The US fought a 10
year undeclared war in Vietnam (one important reason why I don't live there)
killed some 2 million Vietnamese and about 58,000 Americans, effectively
destroyed the physical and economic infrastructure of Vietnam and lost the
war against international Communism to boot. The WAR in Iraq promises us
another replay of Vietnam. It will probably go on interminably for years,
kill lots of Americans and many many more Iraqis, destroy whatever remnants
of economic and civil organization are left in Iraq, and the US will end up
losing the war for Liberal Democracy to boot. Is it relevant? I say it's
relevant as h--l!
Highest regards,
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:36 AM
Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> But excuse me, the war was over months ago.
> What is going on now is the imposition of democracy in Iraq by the
> occupying power.
> Andy
>
> At 07:34 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> >Peter and David,
> >1. I sense here a certain degree of imbalance, easy judgements too
quickly
> >arrived at, and a measure of distance from the conditions experienced by
> >soldiers and police officers, and civilians in war-time conditions. The
> >Milgram experiments, Zimbardo's experiments at Stanford, and other like
> >exercises for evoking interpersonal cruelty and terror have only the
barest
> >relevance to the practice of cruelty and of terror in war-time. The
> >discovery that humans are capable of collective violence, even extreme
> >collective violence, is of little interest when applied to the study and
> >evaluation of war and military policy. WE ALREADY KNOW THAT! Regard the
> >elementary concept of war as presented by that most excellent objective
> >idealist, v. Clauswitz:
> > "War ... is an act of
> >violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."
> >This concept is elementary, and universal; it does not refer to Americans
at
> >war, Iraquis at war, Muslim Jihadists at war, etc. etc. but to all
> >practicioners of war and to all practice of war. Thus, in the context of
war
> >we can reasonably discuss the effectiveness of this or that policy of
> >violence, i.e. whether it is likely "to compel our opponent to fulfill
our
> >will," not the practice of violence itself. Critical evaluation of the
> >practice at war is most useful when addressed to the military mission.
> >Evaluation of the mission can and should be done at all levels: be it the
> >decision to invade Iraq, the decision to to so without full UN
> >participation, the decision to renovate the Al Ghraib prison, the
decision
> >to arrest and detain far more suspects of guerilla activity - now all
> >extra-military collect violence is indiscriminately called terror, how
> >silly! - than can be secured and investigated with due speed and
> >effectiveness, and so on and on
> >
> >2. So, how can we relate to the conditions at the Al Ghraib prison
within
> >the context of the war in Iraq? We can, of course, criticize the mission
as
> >a whole; the invasion into Iraq by a coalition of one, possibly two,
> >powerful states, with much to gain and little to lose in a war in Iraq
> >augmented by a collection of their client states. While there is a good
> >deal to be said about the explicit and hidden objectives of the mission
in
> >Iraq, it is not the focus of current discussion. Evaluation of the
> >treatment of a rebellious civilian population, prisoners of war and
> >prisoners in general is the issue here. I'll make this short: the
> >under-supervised exercise of "softening techniques" by personell with
only a
> >smattering acquaintance with the psychology and psychobiology of
coercion,
> >with even less knowledge of the historical, cultural and social contexts
of
> >their prisoners, and, worst of all (remember this is a discussion of
> >war-time practice), total ignorance of useful military practice has
produced
> >conditions that expose the coalition armies to the most difficult kind of
> >oppositional modes; that of angry contempt. Demonization of the enemy,
> >indisciplined expression of violence unrelated to the mission at hand,
and
> >the emergence of what I called in an earlier message the formation of
unit
> >practices irrelevant to the unit's mission are all sure signs of emergent
> >irrelevance of practice for the effective realization of military
> >objectives and the general collapse of morale.
> >
> >3. A military unit whose members fail to recognize that their opponents
are
> >as human as they are has already gone a long way in becoming a military
> >liability and is in severe danger of permanent, irrevocable and final
> >closure. Demonization is, in a military context, simply the replacement
of
> >that most basic principle of the art of war; "know thine opponent at
least
> >as well as you know thyself," with a comforting but false image of the
> >opponent as subhuman, unworthy, and contemptible. . When administration
> >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi dissidents, and
> >liken Iraqis to vermin they encourage the very uprising they ostensibly
hope
> >to repress. Relevant too is the example from the Rwandan genocide. The
> >reference by Hutu extremists to Tutsi's as "cockroaches" may have given
the
> >Hutu the confidence to murder some 800,000 unarmed Tutsi's, but it
resulted
> >in a bloody civil war in which the armed Tutsi "cockroaches" managed to
> >expell a respectable portion of the Hutu into permanent exile in refugee
> >camps outside Rwanda.
> >
> >4. Extreme violence can be effective policy in the practice of war, but
it
> >alone never guarantees the political aims of war. Of the most often
cited
> >examples of the cruelest of conquest states; Gengis Khan, the Romans and,
of
> >course, the Axis powers, only the Romans managed to stabilize somewhat
their
> >victories, and this they did mainly by conscientious incorporation of
> >conquered states into the very fabric of their empire. Certainly, the
> >indisciplined practice of violence irrelevant to military goals is as
> >ineffective as are policies of extreme violence and even
counter-productive
> >to the aim of forcing the opponent's compliance. Indisciplined violence
on
> >the part of a military organization signals its opponents that there is
> >really no basis for reasonable relations (these can exist in war as in
any
> >other circumstance) and that even compliance is not a real option. In
the
> >absence of any possibility to communicate with the enemy, the only
> >possibility is war ā outrance (war to the bitter end), something that no
> >reasonable policy of war can accept.
> >
> >5. As written above we've already discussed the problems of the
emergence
> >of internal practices irrelevant to the unit's mission. In those
> >presentations we also indicated that the authoritarian military hierarchy
> >has evolved from the integral difficulties of critical self-evaluation
for
> >the isolated military unit under pressure. We agree entirely with
Stephen
> >Reicher and Alex Haslam that the existance of responsible and intelligent
> >military leadership is integral to an effective military organization.
It
> >is, again, Clauswitz who raises some pretty pointed questions concerning
the
> >nature and conditions of leadership in democratic, mass society.
National
> >leadership and it's subsidiary military specialists are subject to
political
> >pressures of both special interests and of public opinion that is neither
> >subject to the discipline of rational practice of war nor even familiar
with
> >war-time conditions. Think of the tremendous appeal of expressions such
as
> >"The Axis of Evil," "the Yellow Horde," and "Police Pigs" to a frightened
> >and impressionable population that votes, often without a clear idea of
what
> >they're voting for. How easy it is to mobilize public support for
extreme
> >politics by contrived lies such as MacNamara's Tonkin Bay incident, the
WMD
> >foolishness, and the suggestion that making "the n word + piles" of naked
> >Iraqi prisoners is high military policy of the coalition forces in Iraq.
The
> >emergence of national states, mass democracy, and the possibilities for
> >concentrating tremendous resources for the prosecution of war and
oppression
> >has made the last century the bloodiest in human history, and it appears
> >that we haven't really even begun to address the problem in this century
> >
> >
> >
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "Peter Smagorinsky" <smago@coe.uga.edu>
> >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 9:22 PM
> >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> >
> >
> > > Oz is an HBO program set in a prison with lots of hard core criminals
and
> > > hard core guards.
> > > At 01:02 PM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > >
> > > >Peter,
> > > >
> > > >What Oz is?
> > > >
> > > >Re the torture imagery in American life, the few times I saw NYPD
blue,
> > > >it seemed to me that it was in the verge of legitimizing the use of
> > > >torture as a way to collect criminal info. Of course, in a "softened"
> > > >way, but the underlying message was quite violent and, of course,the
> > > >naive viewer couldnīt help but identifying with the good cops. As
9/11
> > > >directed viewers to see with New eyes American movies, the Iraq
Torture
> > > >case should do the same thing. There is plenty of cases where
physical
> > > >abuse is done by the "good" guys, but always in a threshold that an
> > > >average viewer can tolerate (and enjoy...)
> > > >
> > > >David
> > > >
> > > >Quoting Peter Smagorinsky <smago@coe.uga.edu>:
> > > >
> > > > > 3ce7295.jpg
> > > > > At 10:52 AM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > >Why everyone's not a torturer
> > > > > >
> > > > > >By Stephen Reicher and Alex Haslam
> > > > > >Psychologists
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Guards and prisoners, taking part in The Experiment for the BBC
in
> > > > > 2002
> > > > > >So groups of people in positions of unaccountable power naturally
> > > > > >resort to violence, do they? Not according to research conducted
in
> > > > > a
> > > > > >BBC experiment.
> > > > > >The photographs from Abu Ghraib prison showing Americans abusing
> > > > > Iraqi
> > > > > >prisoners make us recoil and lead us to distance ourselves from
> > > > > their
> > > > > >horror and brutality. Surely those who commit such acts are not
> > > > > like
> > > > > >us? Surely the perpetrators must be twisted or disturbed in some
> > > > > way?
> > > > > >They must be monsters. We ourselves would never condone or
> > > > > contribute
> > > > > >to such events.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Sadly, 50 years of social psychological research indicates that
> > > > > such
> > > > > >comforting thoughts are deluded. A series of major studies have
> > > > > shown
> > > > > >that even well-adjusted people, when divided into groups and
placed
> > > > > in
> > > > > >competition against each other, can become abusive and violent.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > OTHER RESEARCH
> > > > > >Stanley Milgram at Yale instructed experimenters to give electric
> > > > > >shocks to another
> > > > > >They did so, despite person's cries of pain
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >In depth: After Saddam
> > > > > >Most notoriously, the 1971 Stanford prison experiment, conducted
> > > > > by
> > > > > >Philip Zimbardo and colleagues, seemingly showed that young
> > > > > students
> > > > > >who were assigned to the role of guard quickly became
sadistically
> > > > > >abusive to the students assigned to the role of prisoners.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Combined with lessons from history, the disturbing implication of
> > > > > such
> > > > > >research is that evil is not the preserve of a small minority of
> > > > > >exceptional individuals. We all have the capacity to behave in
> > > > > evil
> > > > > >ways. This idea was famously developed by Hannah Arendt whose
> > > > > >observations of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, led her to
> > > > > remark
> > > > > >that what was most frightening was just how mild and ordinary he
> > > > > >looked. His evil was disarmingly banal.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >The latest pictures show detainees being threatened with dogs (AP
> > > > > >Photo/Courtesy of The New Yorker)
> > > > > >In order to explain events in Iraq, one might go further and
> > > > > conclude
> > > > > >that the torturers were victims of circumstances, that they lost
> > > > > their
> > > > > >moral compass in the group and did things they would normally
> > > > > abhor.
> > > > > >Indeed, using Zimbardo's findings as evidence, this is precisely
> > > > > what
> > > > > >some people do conclude. But this is bad psychology and it is bad
> > > > > >ethics.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >It is bad psychology because it suggests we can explain human
> > > > > behaviour
> > > > > >without needing to scrutinize the wider culture in which it is
> > > > > located.
> > > > > >It is bad ethics because it absolves everyone from any
> > > > > responsibility
> > > > > >for events - the perpetrators, ourselves as constituents of the
> > > > > wider
> > > > > >society, and the leaders of that society.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >In the situation of Abu Ghraib, some reports have indicated that
> > > > > the
> > > > > >guards were following orders from intelligence officers and
> > > > > >interrogators in order to soften up the prisoners for
> > > > > interrogation.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >If that is true, then clearly the culture in which these soldiers
> > > > > were
> > > > > >immersed was one in which they were encouraged to see and treat
> > > > > Iraqis
> > > > > >as subhuman. Other army units almost certainly had a very
> > > > > different
> > > > > >culture and this provides a second explanation of why some people
> > > > > in
> > > > > >some units may have tortured, but others did not.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Grotesque fun
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Perhaps the best evidence that such factors were at play is the
> > > > > fact
> > > > > >that the pictures were taken at all. Reminiscent of the postcards
> > > > > that
> > > > > >lynch mobs circulated to advertise their activities, the torture
> > > > > was
> > > > > >done proudly and with a grotesque sense of fun.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >'Those in the photos wanted others to know what they had done'
> > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > >Those in the photos wanted others to know what they had done,
> > > > > >presumably believing that the audience would approve. This sense
> > > > > of
> > > > > >approval is very important, since there is ample evidence that
> > > > > people
> > > > > >are more likely to act on any inclinations to behave in obnoxious
> > > > > ways
> > > > > >when they sense - correctly or incorrectly - that they have
> > > > > broader
> > > > > >support.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >So where did the soldiers in Iraq get that sense from? This takes
us
> > > > > to
> > > > > >a critical influence on group behaviour: leadership. In the
> > > > > studies,
> > > > > >leadership - the way in which experimenters either overtly or
> > > > > tacitly
> > > > > >endorsed particular forms of action - was crucial to the way
> > > > > >participants behaved.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Many guards in our experiment did not wish to act - or be seen
> > > > > to
> > > > > >act - as bullies or oppressors
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Thus one reason why the guards in our own research for the BBC
did
> > > > > not
> > > > > >behave as brutally as those in the Stanford study, was that we
did
> > > > > not
> > > > > >instruct them to behave in this way.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Zimbardo, in contrast, told his participants: "You can create in
> > > > > the
> > > > > >prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of fear to some degree,
you
> > > > > can
> > > > > >create a notion of arbitrariness that their life is totally
> > > > > controlled
> > > > > >by us, by the system, you, me - and they'll have no privacy....
In
> > > > > >general what all this leads to is a sense of powerlessness".
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Officers' messages
> > > > > >
> > > > > >In light of this point it is interesting to ask what messages
were
> > > > > >being provided by fellow and, more critically, senior officers in
> > > > > the
> > > > > >units where torture took place? Did those who didn't approve fail
> > > > > to
> > > > > >speak out for fear of being seen as weak or disloyal? Did senior
> > > > > >officers who knew what was going on turn a blind eye or else
> > > > > simply
> > > > > >file away reports of misbehaviour?
> > > > > >
> > > > > >All these things happened after the My Lai massacre, and in many
> > > > > ways
> > > > > >the responses to an atrocity tell us most about how it can happen
> > > > > in
> > > > > >the first place. They tell us how murderers and torturers can
begin
> > > > > to
> > > > > >believe that they will not be held to account for what they do,
or
> > > > > even
> > > > > >that their actions are something praiseworthy. The more they
> > > > > perceive
> > > > > >that torture has the thumbs up, the more they will give it a
thumbs
> > > > > up
> > > > > >themselves.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >So how do we prevent these kinds of episodes? One answer is to
> > > > > ensure
> > > > > >that people are always made aware of their other moral
commitments
> > > > > and
> > > > > >their accountability to others. Whatever the pressures within
> > > > > their
> > > > > >military group, their ties to others must never be broken. Total
> > > > > and
> > > > > >secret institutions, where people are isolated from contact with
> > > > > all
> > > > > >others are breeding grounds for atrocity. Similarly, there are
> > > > > great
> > > > > >dangers in contracting out security functions to private
> > > > > contractors
> > > > > >which lack fully developed structures of public accountability.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Power vacuum
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Another answer is to look at the culture of our institutions and
> > > > > the
> > > > > >role of leaders in framing that culture. Bad leadership can
permit
> > > > > >torture in two ways. Sometimes leaders can actively promote
> > > > > oppressive
> > > > > >values. This is akin to what happened in Zimbardo's study and may
> > > > > be
> > > > > >the case in certain military intelligence units. But sometimes
> > > > > leaders
> > > > > >can simply fail to promote anything and hence create a vacuum of
> > > > > power.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >'Inmates' in The Experiment in their cells
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Is it in anyone to abuse a captive?
> > > > > >Our own findings indicated that where such a vacuum exists,
people
> > > > > are
> > > > > >more likely to accept any clear line of action which is
vigorously
> > > > > >proposed. Often, then, tyranny follows from powerlessness rather
> > > > > than
> > > > > >power. In either case, the failure of leaders to champion clear
> > > > > humane
> > > > > >and democratic values is part of the problem.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >But it is not enough to consider leadership in the military. One
> > > > > must
> > > > > >look more widely at the messages and the values provided in the
> > > > > >community at large. That means that we must address the anti-Arab
> > > > > and
> > > > > >anti-Muslim sentiment in our society. A culture where we have got
> > > > > used
> > > > > >to pictures of Iraqi prisoners semi-naked, chained and humiliated
> > > > > can
> > > > > >create a climate in which torturers see themselves as heroes
> > > > > rather
> > > > > >than villains.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Again, for such a culture to thrive it is not necessary for
everyone
> > > > > to
> > > > > >embrace such sentiments, it is sufficient simply for those who
> > > > > would
> > > > > >oppose them to feel muted and out-of-step with societal norms.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Leaders' language
> > > > > >
> > > > > >And we must also look at political leadership. When
administration
> > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi
dissidents,
> > > > > it
> > > > > >likens Iraqis to vermin. Note, for example, that just before the
> > > > > >Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists started referring to Tutsi's
> > > > > >as "cockroaches".
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >The US is trying to limit the damage after an abuse scandal
> > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > >Such use of language again creates a climate in which
perpetrators
> > > > > of
> > > > > >atrocity can maintain the illusion that they are nobly doing what
> > > > > >others know must be done. The torturers in Iraq may or may not
> > > > > have
> > > > > >been following direct orders from their leaders, but they were
> > > > > almost
> > > > > >certainly allowed to feel that they were behaving as good
> > > > > followers.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >So if we want to understand why torture occurs, it is important
to
> > > > > >consider the psychology of individuals, of groups, and of
society.
> > > > > >Groups do indeed affect the behaviour of individuals and can lead
> > > > > them
> > > > > >to do things they never anticipated. But how any given group
> > > > > affects
> > > > > >our behaviour depends upon the norms and values of that specific
> > > > > group.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Evil can become banal, but so can humanism. The choice is not
denied
> > > > > to
> > > > > >us by human nature but rests in our own hands. Hence, we need a
> > > > > >psychological analysis that addresses the values and beliefs that
> > > > > we,
> > > > > >our institutions, and our leaders promote. These create the
> > > > > conditions
> > > > > >in which would-be torturers feel either emboldened or unable to
> > > > > act.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >We need an analysis that makes us accept rather than avoid our
> > > > > >responsibilities. Above all, we need a psychology which does not
> > > > > >distance us from torture but which requires us to look closely at
> > > > > the
> > > > > >ways in which we and those who lead us are implicated in a
society
> > > > > >which makes barbarity possible.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Alex Haslam is a professor of psychology at University of Exeter
> > > > > and
> > > > > >editor of the European Journal of Social Psychology. Stephen
Reicher
> > > > > is
> > > > > >a professor of psychology at University of St Andrews, past
editor
> > > > > of
> > > > > >the British Journal of Social Psychology and a fellow of the
Royal
> > > > > >Society of Edinburgh.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> > >
>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 12:05:48 PST