Re: Does no one read [between] Vygotsky's words?: reposting Victor's post

From: Oudeyis (victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il)
Date: Sun May 02 2004 - 13:47:11 PDT

Gene,
This was taken directly from the translation of the article in MIA:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm

Problems of Dialectical Materialism, 1977
Evald Ilyenkov

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

----

The Concept of the Ideal
Written: 1977;
Source: Problems of Dialectical Materialism;
Publisher: Progress Publishers, 1977;
Transcribed: Andy Blunden;
HTML Markup: Andy Blunden.

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: "Eugene Matusov" <ematusov@udel.edu>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2004 10:14 PM
Subject: RE: Does no one read [between] Vygotsky's words?: reposting
Victor's post

> Dear everybody-
>
> As far as I know, the article "The Concept of the Ideal" was written by
> El'enkov in the early 60s or even the late 50s for the Philosophical
> Encyclopedia that was published in the early 60s (1964?). I'm not aware of
> 1977 (re?)publication of this paper. Does anybody know anything about 1977
> publication? Is it the same article?
>
>  Also,
> > Ilyenkov in "The Concept of the Ideal." describe the
> > object as representing the ideational "image of the object" presumably
in
> > the mind of the observer.
>
> This does not fit my memory of Il'enkov's argument about object. Does
> anybody have a direct quote?
>
> Eugene
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Steve Gabosch [mailto:bebop101@comcast.net]
> > Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2004 12:32 PM
> > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > Subject: Re: Does no one read [between] Vygotsky's words?: reposting
> Victor's post
> >
> > I happen to have it handy, here is Victor's post again.
> > - Steve
> >
> >
> >   Mike,
> > These ideas are still in a somewhat formative state, but I'll give it a
> try.
> >
> >
> -----------------------------------Background-----------------------------
--
> > Just a bit of background: about three months ago, P. Jones asked if I
had
> > written something on Ilyenkov's concepts of Ideality, i.e. those he
> > presented in his 1977 article "The Concept of the Ideal."  After reading
> the
> > article about 8-9 times and finding it no less clear at the 8th reading
> than
> > it was at the first reading I went through the corpus of Ilyenkov's
works
> > (those translated into English that is) and reviewed all available
> > interpretations of EVI's works by D. Bakhurst's and of P. Jones.  My
> general
> > impression was that the subjective idealist implications of the article
of
> > 1977 (I basically agree with Bakhurst here) were a striking anomaly when
> > compared to the rest of EVI's writings, both those preceding and
following
> > the publication of the 1977 article (here I take exception to Bakhurst's
> > efforts to regard "The Concepts..." as an integral part of Ilyenkov's
life
> > work).  This raised the interesting question; how did EVI - one of the
> > sharpest critics of Logical Positivism of the last century - come to
write
> > up what is in essence a subjective idealist theory of the ideal?!  "The
> > Concept of the Ideal" was part of a collection of articles including
> Leont'
> > ev's important "Activity and consciousness" published as,(1977)
Philosophy
> > in the USSR: Problems of dialectical materialism.   I just finished
> > reading/rereading the available writings of Leontiev (reread his, (1978)
> > Activity Consciousness and Personality, and read and reread his, (1977)
> > "Activity and Consciousness," several times) and a respectable number of
> > links between "The Concept...," and "Activity and Consciousness,"
suggests
> > that the anomalies of "The Concept of the Ideal" might well be the
> > consequence of a theoretical expansion of Leont'ev's Activity theory.
> >
> > -----------------------------On the
Issues--------------------------------
> >
> > As I wrote earlier Vygotsky's work is one of the most accomplished
> > adaptation of materialist dialectics to new issues. I can't say the same
> for
> > Leontiev.  Leont'ev's theorizing represents a reversion to subjective
> > idealism; interesting because he succeeds in doing this without
appearing
> to
> > reject official dialectical materialism.  He manages to do this mainly
by
> > refraining from writing about the general philosophic implications of
his
> > ideas.  It appears to me that Ilyenkov in his article of 1977 presents a
> > broad philosophical foundation for Leont'ev's Action Theory and collides
> > head on with the subjective idealism implicit to Leont'evs basic ideas.
> Our
> > differential evaluation of Vygotsky's work - especially his theories on
> the
> > production of language - from the Action model of Leont'ev is mostly
based
> > on several basic features of material logic and its .
> >
> >    First, a definition of terms: the abstract and the concrete; the
> > universal, the particular and the singular
> > (You can skip this if you're acquainted with these terms).
> > 1. Abstract and Concrete: Materialist logic (and here my main reference
is
> > Ilyenkov's 1960 work The *Dialectics of the Abstract & the Concrete in
> Marx'
> > s Capital* particularly Chapter 2 - The Unity of the Abstract & the
> Concrete
> > as a Law of Thought and Chapter 3 - Ascent from the Abstract to the
> > Concrete) regards abstract and concrete concepts as being equally linked
> to
> > the material world and distinguishes between them only in terms of their
> > relatedness to other concepts regarding that world.  For example,
> primitive
> > exchange or barter represents the most elementary form of
commodification
> > and can be regarded as both historically abstract and as a fairly
abstract
> > feature of Capitalist economy.  It is historically abstract because as a
> > pre-capitalist form of exchange it plays a rather minimal role, i.e. it
is
> a
> > fairly isolated form of activity, in the general mode of production by
> which
> > men produced the conditions that perpetuate the life of their households
> > etc. It is abstract within the context of modern Capitalism because it
is
> > only the basic cell of the whole system of the Capitalist mode of
> > production.  To arrive at the latter, a great many other abstractions;
> > theory of surplus value, money, and so on must be added to the basic
> > abstraction of primitive exchange.
> > 2. Universal, particular and singular (individual): The logical
categories
> > of general, particular and singular (individual) are generally, though
not
> > universally related to the distinction between the abstract and the
> > concrete.  The Materialist version of universality (here I also rely
> > considerably on Ilyenkov's (1974)  *Dialectical Logic* Chapter 11:
Problem
> > of the General in Dialectics) is essentially one of shared origin rather
> > than one of shared properties (as it is in the case of formal logical
> > reasoning).  Take, for example, the principle of exchange of commodities
> as
> > a universal feature of Capitalism.  The contradictions implicit to
> commodity
> > exchange that so characterize the whole of the Capitalist mode of
> production
> > are as fundamental as primitive exchange itself, yet primitive exchange
is
> a
> > most rare and marginal form of social relation in modern Capitalism.
> > Relations may and usually do develop from individual cases as singular
> > phenomena, become particular forms of social activity as limited but
> > recurrent events, and may as in the case of commodity exchange become
> > universal features of whole social systems.
> >
> > The important theoretical achievement of Vygotsky is a thoroughly
material
> > and dialectical theory of the production of a special kind of object;
the
> > object produced strictly as a means for information transmission.  This
> kind
> > of object emerges from a dialectical union of material production (in
the
> > case of spoken language this is the production of speech), with the
> > formation of the notion or logic. No less brilliant are the means
whereby
> > LSV demonstrates the processes whereby this union is first achieved and
> > develops.  LSV's scientific research shows is that the production of
> objects
> > for transmission of information (let's call them semiotic objects)
enables
> > 1. Objectification of the notion at any and all stages of its
development
> > 2. The objective representation of the structures of simple and complex
> > stages of the notion: syntax and logic.
> > 3.  Interaction between the production of semiotic objects and the
> > development of more complex forms of the notion.
> > Though LSV's research is realized through structured examination of
> > individual activity, its aims are to determine and test general -
> > universal - laws of the production of semiotic objects (see the
> definitions
> > of universal, particular and singular (individual) using the same
> scientific
> > approach as that used by Marx to determine the laws of production and
> their
> > manifestation in the Capitalist mode of production.
> > VYGOTSKY DOES NOT PRODUCE A PSYCHOLOGY!
> >
> > Leont'ev's "Activity and Consciousness," makes no explicitly
philosophical
> > observations and appears on the surface to be what its author asserts it
> to
> > be; a materialist theory of personality.  However, a careful reading
> raises
> > some pretty pointed questions concerning the materialist character of
> Leont'
> > ev's version of Activity Theory.  For example, Leontiev in "Activity and
> > consciousness", and Ilyenkov in "The Concept of the Ideal." describe the
> > object as representing the ideational "image of the object" presumably
in
> > the mind of the observer.  This is a very peculiar assertion for
> > materialists and even for objective idealists.  Ideation - the formation
> of
> > the Notion - is ideality because it involves the development of
knowledge
> -
> > that of recurrent relation - that cannot be immediately sensed by human
> > perception (by the active spirit for Hegelians).  Both Idealist realism
> and
> > Materialism firmly assert that the object itself is immediately
detectable
> > by sensual means.  The various forms of subjective idealism; Kantian,
> > Logical Positivism and so on, do argue that perception is as ideational
as
> > relation and that immediate access to the material world is beyond human
> > abilities. The assertion that the object represents an image of the
object
> > is much more consistent with how subjective idealists regard the
relation
> > between the mind and the world than it does either objective idealism or
> > Marxist materialism.
> >
> > Leontiev aim; the formulation of laws of individual behaviour, is a
direct
> > challenge to objectivist logic. In objectivist logic; Idealist and
> > Materialist there can be no laws of individual behaviour.  Individuals'
> > behaviours are singular manifestations of laws involving relations on
the
> > scale of communities, social system, humanity, and life forms in
general.
> > Leontiev does not even make an effort to justify the formation of a
> general
> > theory of personality.  He just makes one, and ignores the broader
> > ontological and epistemological implications.  I think Ilyenkov's 1977
> > article may well have been an attempt to deal with the philosophic
> problems
> > posed by Leont'ev's general theory of personality.  It's an interesting
> but
> > unconvincing effort. Bakhurst,  (1991) "The Problem of the Ideal."
> > Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy: From the Bolsheviks
to
> > Evald Ilyenkov, makes a considerable effort to distinguish between
> > Ilyenkov's concept of the ideal and the general run of subjective
idealist
> > philosophy; but ultimately comes to the conclusion that Ilyenkov's
> writings
> > on the ideal are neither clear nor decisive.  No great wonder! Ilyenkov
> was
> > trying to find some way of reconciling a philosophical argument at least
> as
> > ancient as the first publication of Aristotle's logics.
> >
> > Enough for now.
> >
> > Addendum: the place of psychology as a scientific discipline.
> > As I wrote above, there is a general or rough correspondence between
> > development towards the concrete and the development of less general
> > concepts.  Simple statistics is sufficient to show that the more
concrete
> > the concept, the more relations are incorporated in its formation, and
so
> > the more likely that at least some of the relations that contribute to
its
> > formation will differ from other similarly concrete concepts.  The
> > individual case, be it a person, a movement or whatever will, by
> definition
> > be one that contains some or many relations or combination of relations
to
> > the material world that are entirely its own.  Such an individual or
> > singularity may serve as the subject of analysis as a manifestation of
> more
> > general laws governing human activity in the case of the individual, but
> it
> > is worthless as a basis for the formation of a general theory.  For this
> way
> > of thinking psychology and research into individual personality is an
> > important application of theory to real problems (like the engineer who
> > concentrates all the general and particular knowledge about bridge
> building
> > to actually construct a bridge in an actual location having specific -
> > unique - material conditions etc.), but it cannot form the basis for
> general
> > theory.
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Mike Cole" <mcole@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2004 9:55 PM
> > Subject: Re: Does no one read [between] Vygotsky's words?
> >
> >
> >  > Victor-- Could you elaborate on the comment about the differences
> between
> >  > LSV and his students/colleagues? Davydov, for example, was a big
> champion
> >  > of Ilyenkov and a critic of LSV's ideas on concepts on, I believe,
> their
> >  > marxist foundations. Leontiev is used by a lot of current AT people
as
> a
> >  > guiding light. What differences that make a difference do you see?
> >  > mike
>

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