Dear David-
I think you are making a very good point. I've learned from Bakhtin to
check/test theoretical concepts by heteroglossia of "who is talking", "in
what dialogue", and "with whom". I'm actually not sure that the Marxian
notion of "false consciousness" can even pass "postmodernist muster". It
contradicts "I-YOU" dialogic relations (e.g., the phrase "your consciousness
is false" or "you have false consciousness" sounds like a challenge if not
an insult) and can only exist in "WE-THEY" (monologic) space.
I think you are raising an important issue of monologic social science
describing (finalizing and objectivizing) people (report about THEM for US)
versus dialogic social science talking to and with the people (I with YOU,
about US). Bakhtin argued about such social science is not only possible but
highly desirable.
I agree with Victor, Andy, and Ricardo that David's comment is not within
Marxism... but so what? I found it useful to look on concepts intrinsically
developed in one framework from a point of view of another framework. For
example, I wonder how Marxist texts would look like (and if they are
possible) if Marx wrote not ABOUT working class (to a community of
middle-class revolutionary intellectuals) but TO working class people (not
as a mentor but as a "buddy"). I'm not talking about popularization of
Marx's ideas to working class people but again to talking to (if not with)
them. Is such text possible? Would it have "false consciousness" wording?
What do you think?
Eugene
> -----Original Message-----
> From: David H Kirshner [mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu]
> Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2003 3:19 PM
> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> Subject: RE: false consciousness: real and virtual worlds
> Andy,
> Whereas, the Marxian notion of false consciousness as rooted in a view of
> multiple class perspectives may pass postmodernist muster, it doesn't work
> for poststructuralists. Essentializing a "class perspective" at the level
> of the individual actor ignores the contradictory and shifting relations
of
> our constituent subjectivities.
> David
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.ne To:
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> t> cc: (bcc: David H
Kirshner/dkirsh/LSU)
> Subject: RE: false
consciousness: real and virtual worlds
> 12/25/2003 05:47
> PM
> Please respond to
> xmca
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Judy, "False consciousness" has never been a word in my vocabulary, I
> suppose because I find it kind of offensive. To the postmodern mind of
> course it is offensive because it contains the implication, as you
suggest,
> that there is a "true" consciousness.
>
> However, I think that very natural presumption misses the point of the
> basic idea behind "false consciousness". As I understand it, it is normal
> that every person or group of people has a viewpoint which flows from
their
> own position in society, their special interests and so on. This idea
leads
> to the basic idea that there is no "true" consciousness, only different
> perspectives on the same totality, and broader or narrower visions.
"False"
> consciousness however, is where a person or group adopts the viewpoint of
> another group not their own; so it is the employee who adopts the
viewpoint
> of the boss, mainly.
>
> >From the old standpoint of "being determines consciousness" it is obvious
> why people hold opinions expressing their own self-interest. What Marx had
> to explain was why/how people adopted views which expressed the interests
> of those groups who oppress and exploit them.
>
>
> Andy
>
> At 06:38 PM 25/12/2003 -0500, you wrote:
>
>
> Eugene, I agree with you (Ilenkov, apparently) that all
consciousness
> (& all
> semiosis) has its virtual basis, so virtuality cannot be the basis
of
> false
> consciousness. I don't understand your use of Latour, however; you
> seem to
> be equating irrationality w/ false consciousness, which just seems
to
> rephrase the claim about virtuality (except that your/Latour's
> emphasis is
> on cultural practices...) Where there is incomprehensibility between
> subjects, there is the evidence that the culture is irrational --
can
> you
> please explain your notion of a rational (& thus coherent???)
> culture?
>
> I would like a definition of false consciousness that I could use to
> refer
> to a regrettable condition, but every definition I've heard refers
to
> a
> condition that could be just the opposite -- a saving grace (like
> denial in
> general) for the subject under certain conditions. Like faith. But I
> do see
> the working class Latino's support for someone like Bush to be
> regrettable,
> in terms of that persons's interests. I suppose what I'm really
> struggling
> with is the notion that there is a consciousness of some kind that
> ISN'T
> false. But maybe that's because I "grew up" with Bateson, not
> Ilenkov.
>
> Judy
>
> Eugene wrote: (snip)
> In this sense, I more incline to Latour's analysis of cultural
> "irrationality" in his book "Science in action" who tries to
> reconstruct
> cultural practices to understand apparent "irrationality" (or "false
> consciousness"). Latour is definitely right that the issue of
> irrationality
> or "false consciousness" is about relationship of
incomprehensibility
> between I and another (or in an extreme case between I-in-past and
> I-am-now).
>
> What makes sense for a Latino male in California voting for
> Schwarzenegger
> embedded in his history and his relations does not make sense for
> Mike
> embedded in his own history and his relations. Often this
> incomprehensibility is based on fragmentation of communities when
> people do
> not have direct contact with each other and can't talk. Mike, do you
> know
> any Latino male in California who voted for Schwarzenegger? If so,
> did you
> ask him a question, why he voted this way and if he was aware about
> possible
> economic consequences for his family?
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