RE: false consciousness: real and virtual worlds

From: Eugene Matusov (ematusov@udel.edu)
Date: Fri Dec 26 2003 - 10:57:21 PST


Dear Jay and everybody-

Thanks for the interesting distinguish.

I have a few questions for you, Jay. Jay, are you trying to say that 3) is
more privileged that 1) and 2)? If not, what the relations among them do you
see in terms of "what is better"? Can it be decided in a context-free
manner? If not, what is the point to distinguish them? (I think I may miss
something in your point)

As to "dominant or hegemonic folk-theory about capitalism", I wonder if this
folk-theory involves folk-wisdom of how to adapt to oppressive conditions.
Adjusting and adopting (coping with) to oppressive conditions may involve
oppressed's cooperation with the oppressor. This is can be called
"distributed oppression" and "network of oppression." Taking a critical
stance to one's own oppression requires "dys-functionalizing" oneself in the
network of oppression (i.e., becoming dysfunctional and maladapted in and to
the conditions of oppression).

What do you think?

Eugene

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jay Lemke [mailto:jaylemke@umich.edu]
> Sent: Thursday, December 25, 2003 11:01 PM
> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> Subject: RE: false consciousness: real and virtual worlds
>
>
> I actually had in mind THREE sorts of basis for people's views about how
> society works and what makes sense: (1) personal experience, (2)
> historically-specific folk theories in the culture, and (3) technical
> theories based on networks of information that go beyond personal
experience.
>
> I agree with Andy that the commodity society is directly experienced
> through buying and selling, but this is interpreted in terms of its larger
> scale, macrosocial meaning and implications very differently via (2) and
> via (3). Most people do not have access to (3) at all, or only as mediated
> by the more slowly changing (2), which itself has all sorts of other
> functions (which we often call ideological in the large scale, but which
> also need to be recognized as face-saving, or hope-generating, etc. on the
> personal scale).
>
> Eugene's example of the AmWay (American Way?) scheme is a good one here.
> Because he has access to (3), he sees the scheme differently from the guy
> who only sees it via (2). I think this is more important than the
> difference in cultural values between the Soviet Union and the US. And
more
> important, too, than just the personal experiences that Eugene may have
had
> (apart from those that introduced him to #3). Maybe for Eugene, and some
of
> us, a particular #3 model has already started to take on the character of
a
> new #2 folk-theory. Eugene and many of us can to some extent reason
> informally about judgments without needing to actually check on research
or
> data or work out the details of a political-economic model to decide about
> an AmWay offer.
>
> But our neo-folktheory does not yet seem to have widespread appeal in
> competition with the dominant or hegemonic folk-theory about capitalism or
> entrepreneurialism or just ambition-for-materialist-success or just the
> get-ahead folktheories. (I also smell a certain gender bias in the
dominant
> folk theories, which means that many women may not have the same version
as
> the men's version. Different needs, interests, functions.) How come our
> view of the world is not able to meet people's experienced needs very
well?
> It's not just that the hegemonic model fits the economic world as
> constructed by capitalism ... when a new folkmodel comes along that really
> works for people (emotionally, not just politically and economically), it
> can take over very fast.
>
> We've got the "science" right (#3), but there must be something else we've
> got really wrong ...
>
> JAY.
>
>
> At 02:32 PM 12/26/2003 +1100, you wrote:
> >Certainly insofar as we can deem Marx to have been the originator of the
> >idea of "false consciousness" then very much it was with the idea that
> >"false consciousness" was functional, in terms of what I call "real
> >illusions", e.g., that money has value. The believe otherwise, a person
> >has to "step out of their own times" so to speak.
> >
> >I agree very much with most of Jaye's comments. Only I think it is very
> >much the day-to-day person-to-person experiences in a society which are
> >the basis of people's "theories of society". Of course people learn
> >"scientific" or abstract theories from sources remote from their personal
> >experience. But then the issue is to fill out these abstractions from
> >personal experience. Today, those day-to-day experiences are buying and
> >selling everything from personal security to dinner to sex. This
> >buying-and-selling relation is a particular kind of relation, and one
> >which underlays the abstract theories of history taught in Universities
or
> >via the TV.
> >
> >Andy
> >
> >At 10:12 PM 25/12/2003 -0500, you wrote:
> >>Dear Judy and everybody-
> >>
> >>I do not equate irrationality with "false consciousness" but rather
other
> >>way around namely, for me, "false consciousness" is manifestation of
> >>irrationality. However, I'd agree (following Latour) that irrationality
is a
> >>characterization of incomprehensible others. In other words, "false
> >>consciousness" (like irrationality in general) is a relational rather
than
> >>an essential notion. In this, I may be different from Marx who seemed to
> >>coin the notion of "false consciousness" (but may be not!).
> >>
> >>I think that the phenomenon of "false consciousness" is born out of (at
> >>least) two consciousnesses whose practices (and ways of being) do not
> >>overlap in some serious ways. When I just came to US as a refugee from
the
> >>Soviet Union, a guy tried to convince me to join Am-Way
> >>(http://www.amway.com). It took me a while to realize how this consumer
> >>pyramid works and that it is based on robbing (although lawful robbing)
> >>those who are at the bottom of the pyramid. The guy had somewhat cynical
> >>attitude and quickly agreed with me. However, he was shocked with my
> >>conclusion of rejection to participate in Am-Way. In his view, I
probably
> >>had "false consciousness" (he did not know this term) because I betrayed
my
> >>economic interests and my family (he called me "a communist"). I was
> >>definitely irrational to him. Indeed, why would a person be more loyal
to
> >>unknown others rather than to his own family? I knew that from being
that
> >>this guy came from my reasoning was false, irrational, and stupid. I
> >>remember that he said with frustration "You came from a communist
country to
> >>a capitalist country that is based on people like in Am-Way!" He was
> >>right...
> >>
> >>I wonder what would take this guy to understand me? Would understanding
me
> >>jeopardize his well-being? Would my understanding of this guy jeopardize
my
> >>well-being aiming at that time at a social science academician (where
I'm
> >>now)?
> >>
> >>In other words, I argue that "false consciousness" is always functional
and
> >>always relational.
> >>
> >>What do you think?
> >>
> >>Eugene
> >>
> >> > -----Original Message-----
> >> > From: Judy [mailto:jdiamondstone@clarku.edu]
> >> > Sent: Thursday, December 25, 2003 6:39 PM
> >> > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> > Subject: RE: false consciousness: real and virtual worlds
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > Eugene, I agree with you (Ilenkov, apparently) that all consciousness
(&
> >>all
> >> > semiosis) has its virtual basis, so virtuality cannot be the basis of
> >>false
> >> > consciousness. I don't understand your use of Latour, however; you
seem
> >>to
> >> > be equating irrationality w/ false consciousness, which just seems to
> >> > rephrase the claim about virtuality (except that your/Latour's
emphasis is
> >> > on cultural practices...) Where there is incomprehensibility between
> >> > subjects, there is the evidence that the culture is irrational -- can
you
> >> > please explain your notion of a rational (& thus coherent???)
culture?
> >> >
> >> > I would like a definition of false consciousness that I could use to
refer
> >> > to a regrettable condition, but every definition I've heard refers to
a
> >> > condition that could be just the opposite -- a saving grace (like
denial
> >>in
> >> > general) for the subject under certain conditions. Like faith. But I
do
> >>see
> >> > the working class Latino's support for someone like Bush to be
> >>regrettable,
> >> > in terms of that persons's interests. I suppose what I'm really
struggling
> >> > with is the notion that there is a consciousness of some kind that
ISN'T
> >> > false. But maybe that's because I "grew up" with Bateson, not
Ilenkov.
> >> >
> >> > Judy
> >> >
> >> > Eugene wrote: (snip)
> >> > In this sense, I more incline to Latour's analysis of cultural
> >> > "irrationality" in his book "Science in action" who tries to
reconstruct
> >> > cultural practices to understand apparent "irrationality" (or "false
> >> > consciousness"). Latour is definitely right that the issue of
> >>irrationality
> >> > or "false consciousness" is about relationship of incomprehensibility
> >> > between I and another (or in an extreme case between I-in-past and
> >> > I-am-now).
> >> >
> >> > What makes sense for a Latino male in California voting for
Schwarzenegger
> >> > embedded in his history and his relations does not make sense for
Mike
> >> > embedded in his own history and his relations. Often this
> >> > incomprehensibility is based on fragmentation of communities when
people
> >>do
> >> > not have direct contact with each other and can't talk. Mike, do you
know
> >> > any Latino male in California who voted for Schwarzenegger? If so,
did you
> >> > ask him a question, why he voted this way and if he was aware about
> >>possible
> >> > economic consequences for his family?
>
>
> Jay Lemke
> Professor
> University of Michigan
> School of Education
> 610 East University
> Ann Arbor, MI 48104
>
> Tel. 734-763-9276
> Email. JayLemke@UMich.edu
> Website. www.umich.edu/~jaylemke



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