_____
From: Jayson Seaman [mailto:cb450k@juno.com]
Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 2:56 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Eugene:
It would be great if you could post the message below, and in the mean time
I will contact Bruce and see about the tech issues.
Jayson
>>
Hello all: Sorry for the delay with the posting but I tried to send it twice
in the past two weeks, and somehow it did not make it to the list.
It may help to provide a small bit of context to better understand the
nature of my question about links between a sociocultral approach and
symbolic interaction (and a couple of you have asked specifically for my
context). As I said in my previous posting, I am working toward a
dissertation proposal (comps, first) in which I aim to propose a study of
learning in a small group environment, specifically one in which "adventure
activity" is facilitated by a qualified trainer. My background is in
"experiential education" which, on the whole, relies on theories of learning
that are not entirely satisfactory, in my thinking. This is of concern for
me, for while "experiential education" is perhaps a tautology, there are
forms of education (adventure education, service learning, place-based
education) that explicitly "use" experience to teach as opposed to taking
experience for granted in the act of teaching (which, by my own claim, we
may still do to some extent). My inquiry aims to demonstrate that it is not
the case that there is an objective condition called “adventure,” in which
people enter an experience, gain direct unmediated contact with adventure
through a neutral arbiter (a “trainer”), directly internalize “learnings,”
and apply those learnings in stable, future contexts. Instead, I hope to
help precipitate a basic epistemological shift in the field to illustrate
the processes though which adventure is socially constructed through a
mediated, cultural process that relies on specific structures and
mediational means to be achieved, facilitated by a person with identifiable,
institutionally and culturally guided frames of reference
Here are some preliminary ideas about symbolic interactionism (SI) and a
sociocultural approach. Luiz selects perhaps the most concise definition of
SI that I have seen as well, which can indeed begin the conversation about
comparisons (see below for his posting). I would like to add a few
references and some thoughts about their applicability. I will admit to only
having given a relatively superficial gloss over the historical antecedents
to both SI and the sociocultural approach--I certainly have a lot to learn
from people like Mike Cole. That said, I have begun to read some accounts
that link Mead to Marx (see Batuik, M. E., & Sacks, H. L. (1981). George
Herbert Mead and Karl Marx: Exploring consciousness and community. Symbolic
Interaction, 4(2), 207-223.) Vygotsky to Dewey (and other pragmatists; see
Prawat, R. S. (2000). Dewey meets the "Mozart of psychology" in Moscow: The
untold story. American Educational Research Journal, 37(3), 663-696). I have
yet to get into Dilthey, but Robert Prus writes of his influence in SI (see
Prus, R. (1996). Symbolic interaction and ethnographic research:
Intersubjectivity and the study of lived human experience. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press.). In short, there seems to be some common
theoretical overlap early on. Batuik and Sacks note the common
epistemological grounds to a Marxist social theory and Meadian sociological
inquiry, namely that "the individual and society must be seen not as
separate entities in opposition but as aspects (emergents) of a single
social process" (p. 211).
Other pieces that raised my interest in exploring this connection (or, at
least making sure there is no grounds for excluding one approach or the
other as sources to form an inquiry) are as follows:
Hall, P. M. (1997). Meta-power, social organization, and the shaping of
social action. Symbolic Interaction, 20(4), 397-418. In this piece, Peter
Hall writes about the localized emergence of distal power arrangements
through institutionally structured forms of interaction. He deals
extensively with power as exercised by controlling the social conditions of
experience ( it "privileges the designers" p. 415), but notes that this
power is sometimes expressed in ways that facilitate democratic structures
(such as the Coalition for Essential Schools movement--his example). He also
notes that control of symbols is control of power (p. 411). The connection,
in my mind, to ths sociocultural approach in Hall's analysis is in control
of the symbols as forms that guide participation, and how these symbols and
structures carry the meaning of distal actors. Since much of adventure
education involves deliberately structuring interactions around symbols
("props" and metaphors, for instance), Hall's analysis is relevant to my
work.
Maines, D. R. (1994). In search of mesostructure: Studies in the negotiated
order. In N. J. Herman & L. T. Reynolds (Eds.), Symbolic Interactionism (pp.
277-285). Dix Hills, NY: General Hall. Maines writes about mesostructure as
a way to break from the "micro-macro" dichotomy of broad and minute aspects
of social life (p. 282). In his chapter, he draws on the work of Anselm
Strauss who discussed "negotiation" at length. According to Strauss,
individual activity is seen as a process of negotiation affected by social
structures, in a similar way to how I read Jean Lave's work on communities
of practice: "Strauss' central contention is that all social orders are in
some respects negotiated orders....they are essential for understanding
social organization...Strauss offers three central concepts to forge the
beginnings of a paradigm through wich negotiated orders might be examined
and understood: The first type is negotiation, which refers to the actual
types of interaction engaged in by the participants and the strategies used.
The second is negotiation context, which refers to the relevant features of
the setting which directly enter into negotiations and affect their course.
The third is structural context, which refers to the larger transcending
circumstances in which negotiation contexts exist" (p. 279). Maines contends
that this negotiation process is dialectical and both enrolls actors in its
development and constrains them in its expression. Specifically, he writes
that "Social interaction is always contextualized interaction in the dual
sense that the elements of situation, circumstances, and setting shape what
identities and relevancies will be transacted by participants, and in the
sense that such interaction can be thought of generically as participants
mutually constituting one another's activity in the situation" (p. 283).
Maines' accounting of mesostructure strikes me as supportive of a community
of practices perspective, in that lines of meaning and order can be
illustrated at broad, intermediate and local levels--however they are
carried out only in interactions. I also notice potential similarities to
Rogoff's "foci of analysis" although she perhaps provides a more accessible
view on their functioning across spacial and temporal boundaries. Maines
does not situate learning in this analysis, apparently unconcerned--in this
piece--with how people come to understand the ways negotiation is undertaken
in a given context (i.e. as with peripheral to full participation).
SI posits the concept of "emergence" as an inevitable aspect of socially
constructed meaning, as a way to highlight agency (see Meltzer, B. N., &
Manis, J. G. (1994). Emergence and human conduct. In N. J. Herman & L. T.
Reynolds (Eds.), Symbolic Interactionism (pp. 180-187). Dix Hills, NY:
General Hall.). Since emergence--the development of novel and heretofore
unprecedented meanings--is a product of social interaction, its
investigation requires inquiry into the process of interaction (i.e.
activity). In a way, I wonder if emergence is akin to Wartofsky's (1979)
interactions between primary, secondary and tertiary artifacts since it
seems that Wartosfky understood the tertiary level to be partially free from
the rules of the "real world" and therefore saw it as a partial source of
transformations in praxis. This relates specifically to my inquiry, since I
am interested in how conventional uses and meanings can be changed depending
on a change in context (or perspective, i.e. symbols and their meaning) and
how this process is perhaps socially transformative, especially in a close,
small-group environment.
Fine, G.A. (1979). Small groups and culture creation: The ideoculture of
Little League baseball teams. American Sociological Review, 44(5), 733-745.
Fine offers the notion of "ideoculture" as a way to understand small group
interaction and development. His account of little league baseball teams
provides some ways to view the development of groups along cultural lines.
Specifically, he discusses five elements of ideocultural formation. These
are: "cultural forms may be created and continue to be utilized in
situations if they are known to members of the interacting group, usable in
the course of group interaction, functional in supporting group goals and
individual needs, appropriate in supporting the status hierarchy of the
group, and triggered by advance which occur in group interaction" (p. 733).
According to Fine, the way in which a group defines itself culturally
partially constitutes the "content" of the experience for its actors; they
are mutually inclusive: "The ideoculture construct indicates that groups do
not exist in a content-free context, but are continuously engaged in the
construction of a social reality, a history, and a sense of meaning" (p.
737). In this claim, it seems that Fine moves toward a sociocultural view in
that knowledge and understanding are constituted by forms of social
interaction.
SI seems to place primary significance on the capacity for agents to
interpret meaning and act on that basis (See Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic
interactionism: Perspective and method. Berkeley, CA: Univeristy of
California Press.). One potential limitation to SI is an incomplete account,
from what I have seen thus far, of what forms the basis of
interpretations--the historical constitution of our own perspectives. It
seems that one potential contribution a sociocultural approach can make to a
symbolic interactionist perspective is the understanding that
interpretations themselves are culturally and historically situated. This is
the extent of my inquiry and analysis, and where I would be terribly
appreciative for other perspectives especially to make sure I am not
crossing any dangerous epistemological boundaries. It sounds as if Luiz
interprets this relationship in a similar fashion (please correct me if I am
wrong).
At any rate, this has been a somewhat long email that, in the end, offers a
smattering of "sound bytes" from the literature. I know it is not sufficient
grounds to form a comparison, but perhaps it is enough to suggest that
further inquiry/analysis is warranted. Please understand that I am exploring
these connections myself and have not reached any conclusions--at this point
I'm feeling my way through the potential for enhancing a multidisciplinary
perspective.
Thanks and I hope this helps those of you who have asked for some
references.
Jayson Seaman
Ph.D. Student
University of New Hampshire
On Wed, 3 Dec 2003 13:57:17 -0500 "Eugene Matusov" <ematusov@udel.edu>
writes:
Dear Jayson–-
I could not find your messages in my xmca mailbox either. My suggestion is
to try again. If it does not work please send the message to me and I’ll
forward it. Also you may send a message to Bruce who is in charge of
technical issues.
I’ll be at AERA so I hope to see each other.
Say hello to Pablo, please, – I miss him a lot. Friends of mine came from
South Africa to visit us and I was just telling about Pablo and my
“adventures” in Madrid when we came to a sociocultural conference in 1992.
By the way, are you coming to Seville, Spain, in 2005 for another
sociocultural conference?
Take care,
Eugene
_____
From: Jayson Seaman [mailto:cb450k@juno.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2003 2:02 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Eugene:
As I mentioned, I am working with Pablo Chavajay and therefore only "learn"
from Barbara Rogoff indirectly! Pablo is teaching me a great deal though. He
has been influential in my thinking about my study.
A question--I don't think my emails are getting to the list. Have you seen
an email from me entitled "sociocultural approach and symbolic interaction?"
It is the long one I sent you. I sent it to the list twice now and I have
not seen it in my inbox, so I'm not sure it is getting out. Either that or
people are not finding it compelling enough to respond! Which is OK too.
Thanks for the convversation and I look forward to sharing some results of
my pilot study in the spring. By the way, will you be at the AREA conference
in San Diego in the spring?
best,
Jayson
On Sun, 30 Nov 2003 13:45:24 -0500 "Eugene Matusov" <ematusov@udel.edu>
writes:
Dear Jayson–
Sounds very good. I’m looking forward to read about your research on the
xmca and the following discussion on it.
Good luck,
Eugene
PS I was a student of Barbara and learned from her a LOT!
_____
From: Jayson Seaman [mailto:cb450k@juno.com]
Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 7:05 AM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Eugene:
Thanks for the endorsement. I will post my musings to the list (I thought I
already had, but evidently the email was sent off to cyberspace).
For my study I will be using a grounded theory approach, since I'm
interested in the process of social construction during the outdoor
adventure experience. Hence my interest in symbolic interactionism, which
was the basis for the GT approach. I'm right in the midst of developing some
of my methods and trying to conceptualize the study. Some of my ideas are
coming from Rogoff's work however, so I am crossing the boundaries between
SI and a sociocultural approach.
Thanks for your attached essay--I'll read it and share any thoughts.
Best,
Jayson
On Thu, 27 Nov 2003 15:46:15 -0500 "Eugene Matusov" <ematusov@udel.edu>
writes:
Dear Jayson–
I think your focus on experiential learning and your literature review of SI
are very interesting, important and promising. I think you should share this
small essay with all xmca for the feedback. I agree with you that the role
of interpretation seems to be missing in SI (as well as a bigger
socio-historical picture).
What kind of empirical study are you thinking for your dissertation?
Eugene
PS I took liberty and attached one of my recent paper on experiential
communal learning. I think it may be interesting for you and I’d like to
hear your feedback and suggestions for improvement if you have time for it.
_____
From: Jayson Seaman [mailto:cb450k@juno.com]
Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2003 9:17 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Eugene:
I realized that I did not resend my lengthy email about symbolic
interactionism, so you would have no way of knowing if you already received
it. The text is below.
Thanks.
Jayson
Hello all:
Just back from my conference, so here's the bit I had worked on before I
left. Any ideas, agreements or disagreements are appreciated.
It may help to provide a small bit of context to better understand the
nature of my question about links between a sociocultral approach and
symbolic interaction (and a couple of you have asked specifically for my
context). As I said in my previous posting, I am working toward a
dissertation proposal (comps, first) in which I aim to propose a study of
learning in a small group environment, specifically one in which "adventure
activity" is facilitated by a qualified trainer. My background is in
"experiential education" which, on the whole, relies on theories of learning
that are not entirely satisfactory, in my thinking. This is of concern for
me, for while "experiential education" is perhaps a tautology, there are
forms of education (adventure education, service learning, place-based
education) that explicitly "use" experience to teach as opposed to taking
experience for granted in the act of teaching (which, by my own claim, we
may still do to some extent). My inquiry aims to demonstrate that it is not
the case that there is an objective condition called “adventure,” in which
people enter an experience, gain direct unmediated contact with adventure
through a neutral arbiter (a “trainer”), directly internalize “learnings,”
and apply those learnings in stable, future contexts. Instead, I hope to
help precipitate a basic epistemological shift in the field to illustrate
the processes though which adventure is socially constructed through a
mediated, cultural process that relies on specific structures and
mediational means to be achieved, facilitated by a person with identifiable,
institutionally and culturally guided frames of reference
Here are some preliminary ideas about symbolic interactionism (SI) and a
sociocultural approach. Luiz selects perhaps the most concise definition of
SI that I have seen as well, which can indeed begin the conversation about
comparisons (see below for his posting). I would like to add a few
references and some thoughts about their applicability. I will admit to only
having given a relatively superficial gloss over the historical antecedents
to both SI and the sociocultural approach--I certainly have a lot to learn
from people like Mike Cole. That said, I have begun to read some accounts
that link Mead to Marx (see Batuik, M. E., & Sacks, H. L. (1981). George
Herbert Mead and Karl Marx: Exploring consciousness and community. Symbolic
Interaction, 4(2), 207-223.) Vygotsky to Dewey (and other pragmatists; see
Prawat, R. S. (2000). Dewey meets the "Mozart of psychology" in Moscow: The
untold story. American Educational Research Journal, 37(3), 663-696). I have
yet to get into Dilthey, but Robert Prus writes of his influence in SI (see
Prus, R. (1996). Symbolic interaction and ethnographic research:
Intersubjectivity and the study of lived human experience. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press.). In short, there seems to be some common
theoretical overlap early on. Batuik and Sacks note the common
epistemological grounds to a Marxist social theory and Meadian sociological
inquiry, namely that "the individual and society must be seen not as
separate entities in opposition but as aspects (emergents) of a single
social process" (p. 211).
Other pieces that raised my interest in exploring this connection (or, at
least making sure there is no grounds for excluding one approach or the
other as sources to form an inquiry) are as follows:
Hall, P. M. (1997). Meta-power, social organization, and the shaping of
social action. Symbolic Interaction, 20(4), 397-418. In this piece, Peter
Hall writes about the localized emergence of distal power arrangements
through institutionally structured forms of interaction. He deals
extensively with power as exercised by controlling the social conditions of
experience ( it "privileges the designers" p. 415), but notes that this
power is sometimes expressed in ways that facilitate democratic structures
(such as the Coalition for Essential Schools movement--his example). He also
notes that control of symbols is control of power (p. 411). The connection,
in my mind, to ths sociocultural approach in Hall's analysis is in control
of the symbols as forms that guide participation, and how these symbols and
structures carry the meaning of distal actors. Since much of adventure
education involves deliberately structuring interactions around symbols
("props" and metaphors, for instance), Hall's analysis is relevant to my
work.
Maines, D. R. (1994). In search of mesostructure: Studies in the negotiated
order. In N. J. Herman & L. T. Reynolds (Eds.), Symbolic Interactionism (pp.
277-285). Dix Hills, NY: General Hall. Maines writes about mesostructure as
a way to break from the "micro-macro" dichotomy of broad and minute aspects
of social life (p. 282). In his chapter, he draws on the work of Anselm
Strauss who discussed "negotiation" at length. According to Strauss,
individual activity is seen as a process of negotiation affected by social
structures, in a similar way to how I read Jean Lave's work on communities
of practice: "Strauss' central contention is that all social orders are in
some respects negotiated orders....they are essential for understanding
social organization...Strauss offers three central concepts to forge the
beginnings of a paradigm through wich negotiated orders might be examined
and understood: The first type is negotiation, which refers to the actual
types of interaction engaged in by the participants and the strategies used.
The second is negotiation context, which refers to the relevant features of
the setting which directly enter into negotiations and affect their course.
The third is structural context, which refers to the larger transcending
circumstances in which negotiation contexts exist" (p. 279). Maines contends
that this negotiation process is dialectical and both enrolls actors in its
development and constrains them in its expression. Specifically, he writes
that "Social interaction is always contextualized interaction in the dual
sense that the elements of situation, circumstances, and setting shape what
identities and relevancies will be transacted by participants, and in the
sense that such interaction can be thought of generically as participants
mutually constituting one another's activity in the situation" (p. 283).
Maines' accounting of mesostructure strikes me as supportive of a community
of practices perspective, in that lines of meaning and order can be
illustrated at broad, intermediate and local levels--however they are
carried out only in interactions. I also notice potential similarities to
Rogoff's "foci of analysis" although she perhaps provides a more accessible
view on their functioning across spacial and temporal boundaries. Maines
does not situate learning in this analysis, apparently unconcerned--in this
piece--with how people come to understand the ways negotiation is undertaken
in a given context (i.e. as with peripheral to full participation).
SI posits the concept of "emergence" as an inevitable aspect of socially
constructed meaning, as a way to highlight agency (see Meltzer, B. N., &
Manis, J. G. (1994). Emergence and human conduct. In N. J. Herman & L. T.
Reynolds (Eds.), Symbolic Interactionism (pp. 180-187). Dix Hills, NY:
General Hall.). Since emergence--the development of novel and heretofore
unprecedented meanings--is a product of social interaction, its
investigation requires inquiry into the process of interaction (i.e.
activity). In a way, I wonder if emergence is akin to Wartofsky's (1979)
interactions between primary, secondary and tertiary artifacts since it
seems that Wartosfky understood the tertiary level to be partially free from
the rules of the "real world" and therefore saw it as a partial source of
transformations in praxis. This relates specifically to my inquiry, since I
am interested in how conventional uses and meanings can be changed depending
on a change in context (or perspective, i.e. symbols and their meaning) and
how this process is perhaps socially transformative, especially in a close,
small-group environment.
Fine, G.A. (1979). Small groups and culture creation: The ideoculture of
Little League baseball teams. American Sociological Review, 44(5), 733-745.
Fine offers the notion of "ideoculture" as a way to understand small group
interaction and development. His account of little league baseball teams
provides some ways to view the development of groups along cultural lines.
Specifically, he discusses five elements of ideocultural formation. These
are: "cultural forms may be created and continue to be utilized in
situations if they are known to members of the interacting group, usable in
the course of group interaction, functional in supporting group goals and
individual needs, appropriate in supporting the status hierarchy of the
group, and triggered by advance which occur in group interaction" (p. 733).
According to Fine, the way in which a group defines itself culturally
partially constitutes the "content" of the experience for its actors; they
are mutually inclusive: "The ideoculture construct indicates that groups do
not exist in a content-free context, but are continuously engaged in the
construction of a social reality, a history, and a sense of meaning" (p.
737). In this claim, it seems that Fine moves toward a sociocultural view in
that knowledge and understanding are constituted by forms of social
interaction.
SI seems to place primary significance on the capacity for agents to
interpret meaning and act on that basis (See Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic
interactionism: Perspective and method. Berkeley, CA: Univeristy of
California Press.). One potential limitation to SI is an incomplete account,
from what I have seen thus far, of what forms the basis of
interpretations--the historical constitution of our own perspectives. It
seems that one potential contribution a sociocultural approach can make to a
symbolic interactionist perspective is the understanding that
interpretations themselves are culturally and historically situated. This is
the extent of my inquiry and analysis, and where I would be terribly
appreciative for other perspectives especially to make sure I am not
crossing any dangerous epistemological boundaries. It sounds as if Luiz
interprets this relationship in a similar fashion (please correct me if I am
wrong).
At any rate, this has been a somewhat long email that, in the end, offers a
smattering of "sound bytes" from the literature. I know it is not sufficient
grounds to form a comparison, but perhaps it is enough to suggest that
further inquiry/analysis is warranted. Please understand that I am exploring
these connections myself and have not reached any conclusions--at this point
I'm feeling my way through the potential for enhancing a multidisciplinary
perspective.
Thanks and I hope this helps those of you who have asked for some
references.
Jayson Seaman
Ph.D. Student
University of New Hampshire
On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 15:26:25 -0000 "Luiz Carlos Baptista"
<lucabaptista@sapo.pt> writes:
Hi Eugene,
In his book "Symbolic Interactionism", Herbert Blumer gives this concise
definition of the interactionist perspective:
Symbolic interactionism rests in the last analysis on three simple premises.
The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the
meanings that the things have for them. Such things include everything that
the human being may note in his world – physical objects, such as trees or
chairs; other human beings, such as a mother or a store clerk; categories of
human beings, such as friends or enemies; institutions, as a school or a
government; guiding ideals, such as individual independence or honesty;
activities of others, such as their commands or requests; and such
situations as an individual encounters in his daily life. The second premise
is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the
social interaction that one has with one’s fellows. The third premise is
that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative
process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters.
Maybe this passage could provide the elements for a comparison between "S.
I." and "sociocultural approaches".
Rgrds,
Luiz Carlos Baptista
lucabaptista@sapo.pt
lucabaptista@hotmail.com
----- Original Message -----
From: Eugene Matusov <mailto:ematusov@udel.edu>
To: 'Jayson Seaman' <mailto:cb450k@juno.com>
Sent: terça-feira, 11 de Novembro de 2003 5:24
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Dear Jayson–
I’m not very familiar with symbolic interactionism (but I’d like to know
more about it), however, I try to study sociocultural approaches for some
time. Why don’t we combine our knowledge and interests?! Why don’t you
describe symbolic interactionism and I’ll try to compare it with
sociocultural approaches (hopefully other xmca-ers can help us as well)? If
you agree to do that, please focus on what attracts your attention in
symbolic interactionism and try to use examples to your descriptions.
What do you think?
Eugene
_____
From: Jayson Seaman [mailto:cb450k@juno.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 8:24 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Cc: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Eugene and all:
I am somewhat new to this list and to the sociocultural approach in general,
and I especially appreciate your comment Eugene about the need for
multidisciplinary perspectives. It provides an entre into a question I have
been pondering for a little while now. I am approaching my dissertation
proposal in the upcoming months and will be studying the development of
individual and group learning in an outdoor, adventure context--specifically
how "adventure" is constructed in small group activity. The field of outdoor
adventure education has yet to engage with the sociocultural approach and I
am eager to sink my teeth further into the connection, since the fit is
quite appropriate, I feel. The field still has something of a "black box"
phenomenon going on.
My question for the list is along these multidisciplinary lines--I have been
reading studies and theories in a symbolic interactionist tradition, and it
strikes me that the sociocultural approach and symbolic interaction are
somewhat complementary. I can notice some similarities and differences, but
overall I am drawn to both (my aim in my work is to understand what it means
to "experientially educate", so I don't pledge allegiance to one particular
discipline). Symbolic Interactionism does not seem to give as much credence
to object history, for example (although it does come up), but it does
provide a way to examine the group construction of meaning in a given
context, specifically how one thing leads to the next--made even more potent
by including object histories and distal influences. One obvious overlap is
the frequent reference made to John Dewey.
Here is the question--can anyone point me in the direction of a
straightforward treatment of the similarities or differences between the
sociocultural approach (admittedly a broad stroke) and symbolic
interactionism? Or, any other works that draw on both? I have yet to come
across any studies where people reference scholars from both traditions.
Perhaps there's a "good reason" people don't draw from each tradition...? I
don't want to run headlong into a dilemma that others have encountered
previously.
Any thoughts or past explorations in this area are greatly appreciated. I
apologize if I am overlooking obvious references. If you are interested, I
can reciprocate by passing along specific references that illustrate
similarities, at least in my thinking.
With regards,
Jayson Seaman
Ph.D. Student
University of New Hampshire
On Sun, 9 Nov 2003 19:36:32 -0500 "Eugene Matusov" <ematusov@udel.edu>
writes:
Dear Andy and everybody–
I think our sociocultural (or whatever it can be called) approach forces us
to be "jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none". It represents a difficult dilemma
for us: how to be multidisciplinary but avoid being shallow and arrogant. I
think the solution of this dilemma is in our collective efforts rather than
in individual achievements. That is why I so value the diverse xmca
community because we can help each other avoid shallow judgments without
losing broad multidisciplinary perspective required by our approach. By the
way, because of this (and other) features, our approach is on odds with
mainstream institutional demands judging quality of our work based on
individualistic authorship…. I feel that behind authorship of articles that
I contribute is a broad academic community (or even communities).
Eugene
PS I noticed that when people reply to my messages they reply to me
personally and not to XCMA. I do not know why it is but suspect some faulty
configuration of my email program (I use Outlook 2003). If anybody knows how
I can change it and fix the problem, please, let me know. Meanwhile, please
make sure that you reply to all xmca and not just me (unless you want to).
Thanks and sorry!
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 5:54 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: RE: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
Indeed, I am sure I would. As you may have gathered from the posts I sent at
the beginning of this strange surge in activity on my part, my interest is
CHAT/psychology supports my primary aim in elucidating the study of "ethical
politics", that is to say in trying to find an approach to the "big
problems" of the world which is translatable into person-to-person
collaborative activity. As a result, I am a bit of a
"jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none" and have to put up with very imperfect
knowledge of the many branches of enquiry I find myself involved in!
Andy
At 05:41 PM 9/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Andy, you may be interested reading Davydovs work, for example:
Davydov, V. V. (1998). What is formal learning activity? Journal of Russian
& East European Psychology, 36(4), 37-47.
I think you will enjoy his writing because I sense some similarities between
him and you.
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 5:16 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: RE: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
I know the name of course. He is one of the famous names of CHAT. I think we
may have a short piece by him on the MIA. But I don't know his work,
Andy
At 01:20 PM 9/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Thanks, Andy. You wrote, there has to be a separation between theoretical
thinking and practical thinking before you can have formal thinking. Sounds
like Vasilii V. Davydov are you familiar with his work?
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 7:01 AM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: Re: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
At 10:41 PM 8/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Thanks a lot, Andy, for such deep and detailed reply. Your political example
and analysis made me think that formal thinking is based on oppression,
alienation, manipulation, and privilege in other words on certain social
relations.
Well I think that it wouldn't be far wrong to say that formal thinking
arises on the same basis as mathematics, so I would be cautious. Perhaps I
overstated my case again. I mean, there has to be a separation between
theoretical thinking and practical thinking before you can have formal
thinking.
-------------
On the other hand, it may be that people do not think formally in the exact
sense of this term at all but rather they think in some other alienated ways
that are much broader and richer than "formal thinking" and "formal logic"
described by philosophers and mathematicians. Jim Gee in his 1996 book on
literacy describes ideological colonization (probably Marx did it before
him) when one class uncritically uses ideology of another class.
I think this is another issue altogether. The ruling ideas of any society
are going to be the ideas of the ruling class since thinking appropriates
the form of life of that society.
--------------
I wonder if focus on alienated thinking is better than on formal thinking to
capture the phenomenon of alienated life, so nicely described by Andy, Every
question is detached from the form of life in which it arises and treated
abstractly. People's knowledge is not a knowledge from their own life, with
consequences from their own actions, but a stream of arbitrarily assembled
news-bytes and images, fabricated in studios. The formal thinking with all
its syllogisms and rigid rules seems to be rarely a part of everyday
thinking of people even in Western societies. I doubt you can convince
people in Western societies using formal logic very often& On the other
hand, as Mike's and Sylvia Scribner's and Luria's research shows Western
people are very familiar with the formal logic and strongly believe that it
is the Logic&.
Well, I think alienated thinking and formal thinking are two different but
inter-related things, both of them with an element of rationality precisely
because they reflect certain objectively true relations in society.
Any person who is capable of mentally separating the attributes of an object
from the object itself is capable of formal thinking. Anyone who loses sight
of the object through seeing only its attributes is trapped in formal
thinking.
Andy
What do you think?
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Saturday, November 08, 2003 1:32 AM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: RE: timescale question
Andy wrote, A whole politics of "getting the numbers" then flows from this
which is not only based on a conception of human society as little coloured
dots in a Venn Diagram, but actually creates such a type of society. In
other words, we live in a society which is actually structured as a formal
logical conception.
Eugene wrote: I wonder what you mean by creates such a type of society.Do
you mean that through the election practice people start thinking formally?
Do you mean that this practice makes people believe that they think formally
while actually they do not (i.e., creates a certain false ideology)? Or do
you mean that this practice makes people prioritize formal logic as the
logic? I agree with you that something related to formal logic "hooks on"
the existing practice of the Western election process guided by the formal
logic (as if the formal logic is correct). The question for me is what
exactly is this "something"?
Very broadly, ways of thinking and ways of living mutually create and
sustain one another, don't they. Of course, in this relation, living and
acting has a position of primacy over thinking, captured in aphorisms such
as "One must eat before one can paint" or "One must have something to talk
about before one can talk". But the relation is two-way noetheless.
It is of course not just parliamentary democracy which creates and sustains
a culture of formal thinking, it is also the ubiquitous practice of
exchanging products of labour under contract rather than actually
cooperating with other people. Commercial TV has a lot to answer for as
well.
Specifically, what I am saying about the practice of voting for governments
in large geographical electorates would be like this. (i) The job or career
of deciding how we should live we give to an institution remote from our own
lives, so we externalise our selves and put our ethical powers into an alien
body which then rules us; (ii) because our vote is just one vote among
100,000 votes of other people with whom we have no relation at all, we are
aware that the will created in the form of a powerful state is not our will,
but that of an external, alien force (why bother to vote?); (iii) thus when
pondering on the meaning of our lives and how we should live we have already
externalised out selves from ourselves. This is the first pre-requisite for
formal thinking, external relation-to-self. Then, a public political life is
conducted on our behalf in which any question can be carried if 50.1% of the
population can be persuaded to vote "Yes" (although plebiscite is not the
normal way of deciding, the system approximates to plebiscite); this means
that a political actor has to redefine a question so as to assemble the
50.1% under "yes" and people are reduced to carriers of external
characteristics of being for or against on the various isolated aspects of
the issue. This produces what people call "politicians with no vision" and
"thinking which only goes as far as the next election". It is the difference
between the General and the Universal. For example, when there was a
plebiscite in Australia over getting rid of the monarchy and having a
republic, the question was so posed that when you added the number of
monarchists to those who wanted a popularly elected head of state, they
outnumbered those who were willing to accept as a second-best a head of
state nominated by parliament (note the fact that people wanted an
Individual directly responsible to the people, not a creature of the
politicians). The two diametrically opposite camps both voted "no" and we
are stuck with a monarchy, which had the support of only a small minority.
Thus politicians treat people not as citizens and actors within a community,
but as carriers of "opinions" or "attributes". They address themselves not
to citizens but to opinions.
TV and other forms of mass media funded by advertising are not only one-way
forms of communication, but are also designed to address the 50.1% or to
target "audiences". Thus again people are atomised and reduced to passive
receivers possessed of preferences and opinions, not as human beings. Every
question is detached from the form of life in which it arises and treated
abstractly. People's knowledge is not a knowledge from their own life, with
consequences from their own actions, but a stream of arbitrarily assembled
news-bytes and images, fabricated in studios.
These institutions which promote and sustain formal thinking are not 100% of
human life in modernity; real life is complex and multifaceted, and people
think mostly formally, but not entirely and not uniformly. But capitalist
democracy and formal thinking mutually reinforce and sustain one another.
Andy
With regards,
Jayson Seaman
Orford, NH
On Tue, 25 Nov 2003 20:42:34 -0500 "Eugene Matusov" <ematusov@udel.edu>
writes:
Dear Andy–
Thanks a lot for the very useful link to Peirce essay on sign! How different
Peirce from Davydov and Losev from whom I learned about sign. Davydov
defined sign through a special “sign action” (“znakovoe deistvie”) in which
a person successfully uses the signifier instead of the signified
(“successfully” for the person’s goal). You can find this idea of the sign
action in Vygotsky when Vygotsky discussed, for example, what object can be
involved into a role play. I think that this activity-based approach is
different from Peirce’s introspection and representation who seemed to be
more concerned with traditional psychology with its uncritical acceptance
that likenesses and indication are rooted in the nature of the things rather
than in human activity of acting with and upon the things.
Peirce wrote, Ҥ3. There are three kinds of signs. Firstly, there are
likenesses, or icons; which serve to convey ideas of the things they
represent simply by imitating them. Secondly, there are indications, or
indices; which show something about things, on account of their being
physically connected with them. Such is a guidepost, which points down the
road to be taken, or a relative pronoun, which is placed just after the name
of the thing intended to be denoted, or a vocative exclamation, as “Hi!
there,” which acts upon the nerves of the person addressed and forces his
attention. Thirdly, there are symbols, or general signs, which have become
associated with their meanings by usage. Such are most words, and phrases,
and speeches, and books, and libraries.”
For Losev, words are symbols only in mythology and naïve thinking as it is
illustrated in Lev Tolstoy’s short story about old Russian soldier (in
tsarist Russian Empire soldier served for 25 years) who went through many
military campaigns and was teaching young soldier about life abroad. The old
soldier was telling how weird German people were because they twisted names
of things. For example, the soldier took a knife and showed it to the young
soldier. “Look at this knife. It’s clearly ‘knife’ but a German says it is
‘messer’. Where is messer here?!” Losev would argue that for this old
soldier a word is a symbol because the soldier saw a deep relationship
between the word “knife” (the signifier) and the object knife (the
signified) while for educated people a word is a sign because the word is a
convention – any word or even sound could have signified the object.
Similarly, many Latin numbers (e.g., I, II, III, IV, V) are symbols while
Arab numbers (e.g.,1,2,3,4,5) are signs. Losev argued that education often
involves de-symbolization. The Arab number system is more advanced over the
Latin number system exactly because frees itself from unnecessary symbolism.
(Although, it can be argued that the Arabic numbers with their system base
as well as words with their morphology are not simple conventional signs –
sign systems – but they are not symbols either in Losev’s sense!)
Although Vygotsky did not seem to use Losev’s symbol-sign terminology (Losev
published his book about symbol in 1920s and theoretically Vygotsky could
read it), I think he was aware of the difference when he was insisting on
liberation of a child from contextual dependency (with his reference to work
of Kohler with apes). In part, it is clear that Vygotsky argued for teaching
kids decontextualization (which became very problematic now) but in part I
think he was talking about “de-symbolization” (in Losev’s terms) or
“de-reification” (using Marx’s terms).
What do you think?
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2003 7:14 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Surely Mead would draw his terminology for C S Peirce?
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm
What is a Sign?
Andy
At 07:00 PM 25/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Thanks a lot Luiz for the elaboration!
You wrote that according to Mead, a significant symbol is a stimulus which
calls on its producer the response intended on the part of the
receiver.Coming from Hegelian and Marxist perspective, it is difficult for
me to think of symbol as a stimulus. I cant understand it. Any behavior has
some kind of influence on organism producing it, right? How is it different
from a significant symbol? What this stimulus mediate? Russian philosopher
Losev wrote an interesting book about symbols and signs arguing that symbol
is a kind of signs in which there is a certain, not arbitrary, relation
between the signifier and signified (e.g., American flag is a symbol while
British may be not unless it has symbolism that I do not know). Did Mead
have in mind such symbol?
Please help,
Eugene
_____
From: Luiz Carlos Baptista [mailto:lucabaptista@sapo.pt]
Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2003 8:28 AM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Hi Eugene,
The emphasis on "symbolic" comes from George Herbert Mead's concept of
"significant symbol" (in "Mind, Self, and Society"): a significant symbol is
a stimulus which calls on its producer the response intended on the part of
the receiver. Language is the paramount example. For instance, when I say
something to someone else I also hear what I say and - even more important -
understand it. And the same goes for my addressee. According to Mead, this
commonality of reactions ("taking the role of the other", so to speak) is
the basis of the shared character of meaning, an emergent property of
interaction. It's from here that Blumer goes to coin the phrase "Symbolic
Interactionism".
So far so good. But the Symbolic Interactionist tradition indeed has a
problem in dealing with structural-historical constraints. To this, the
interactionist may reply that he recognizes the existence of structures, but
these do not make sense unless viewed as emergent properties of interaction.
Anyway, the "obdurate" character of socio-historical structures seems to be
missing in much of the interactionist studies, and it is the main source of
conflict between this sociological tradition and the
"structural-functionalist" (e.g. Parsons, Merton, etc.).
If you're really into it, there is a very nice article by the sociologist
Gary Alan Fine in which he discusses these two approaches. It's here:
http://www.cts.cuni.cz/~konopas/liter/Fine_On%20the%20Macrofoundations%20of%
20Microsociology.htm
Rgrds,
Luiz Carlos Baptista
lucabaptista@sapo.pt
lucabaptista@hotmail.com
----- Original Message -----
From: Eugene Matusov <mailto:ematusov@udel.edu>
Sent: quarta-feira, 12 de Novembro de 2003 23:44
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Dear Luiz
Thanks a lot for the reference and the concise definition. These three
principles sound very similar to what Ive learned about a dynamic system
approach and Gibsons ecological approach. I guess all of these approaches
are family of interactionism. What is about the emphasis on symbolic?
So far, I can say that a sociocultural approach includes the three
principles but involve much more than socially dynamic and interactive
aspects of meaning making. There are historical aspects and structural
aspects that seem to be out of interest scope of the symbolic interactionist
principles described by Luiz. For example, Jim Wertschs (and mine) favorite
example with the QWERTY American keyboard of how history can help us
understand meaning of events seems out of the scope of the symbolic
interactionism. Similarly structural inequalities evident in school
achievements would be difficult to approach by the symbolic interactionism,
I think.
I teach a course on cultural diversity for preservice teachers. The class
has a practicum component associated with afterschool program in Latin
American Community Center. Recently I came to a conclusion that ideally I
need to be teaching another multicultural course in the sequence with this
one. In my current course my students are focused on relational and dynamic
aspects of issues of multiculturalism emerging from their work with Latino
children at LACC. Id like to teach them a big picturefocusing on historical
and structural issues. Of course, in my current class we touch upon the big
picturebut only touch upon& I think my students need more& I think that my
first course is within realms of symbolic interactionism while the imagined
second course would not.
What do you think?
Eugene
_____
From: Luiz Carlos Baptista [mailto:lucabaptista@sapo.pt]
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2003 10:26 AM
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Hi Eugene,
In his book "Symbolic Interactionism", Herbert Blumer gives this concise
definition of the interactionist perspective:
Symbolic interactionism rests in the last analysis on three simple premises.
The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the
meanings that the things have for them. Such things include everything that
the human being may note in his world physical objects, such as trees or
chairs; other human beings, such as a mother or a store clerk; categories of
human beings, such as friends or enemies; institutions, as a school or a
government; guiding ideals, such as individual independence or honesty;
activities of others, such as their commands or requests; and such
situations as an individual encounters in his daily life. The second premise
is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the
social interaction that one has with ones fellows. The third premise is that
these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative
process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters.
Maybe this passage could provide the elements for a comparison between "S.
I." and "sociocultural approaches".
Rgrds,
Luiz Carlos Baptista
----- Original Message -----
From: Eugene Matusov <mailto:ematusov@udel.edu>
To: 'Jayson Seaman' <mailto:cb450k@juno.com>
Sent: terça-feira, 11 de Novembro de 2003 5:24
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Dear Jayson
Im not very familiar with symbolic interactionism (but Id like to know more
about it), however, I try to study sociocultural approaches for some time.
Why dont we combine our knowledge and interests?! Why dont you describe
symbolic interactionism and Ill try to compare it with sociocultural
approaches (hopefully other xmca-ers can help us as well)? If you agree to
do that, please focus on what attracts your attention in symbolic
interactionism and try to use examples to your descriptions.
What do you think?
Eugene
_____
From: Jayson Seaman [mailto:cb450k@juno.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 8:24 PM
Subject: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Eugene and all:
I am somewhat new to this list and to the sociocultural approach in general,
and I especially appreciate your comment Eugene about the need for
multidisciplinary perspectives. It provides an entre into a question I have
been pondering for a little while now. I am approaching my dissertation
proposal in the upcoming months and will be studying the development of
individual and group learning in an outdoor, adventure context--specifically
how "adventure" is constructed in small group activity. The field of outdoor
adventure education has yet to engage with the sociocultural approach and I
am eager to sink my teeth further into the connection, since the fit is
quite appropriate, I feel. The field still has something of a "black box"
phenomenon going on.
My question for the list is along these multidisciplinary lines--I have been
reading studies and theories in a symbolic interactionist tradition, and it
strikes me that the sociocultural approach and symbolic interaction are
somewhat complementary. I can notice some similarities and differences, but
overall I am drawn to both (my aim in my work is to understand what it means
to "experientially educate", so I don't pledge allegiance to one particular
discipline). Symbolic Interactionism does not seem to give as much credence
to object history, for example (although it does come up), but it does
provide a way to examine the group construction of meaning in a given
context, specifically how one thing leads to the next--made even more potent
by including object histories and distal influences. One obvious overlap is
the frequent reference made to John Dewey.
Here is the question--can anyone point me in the direction of a
straightforward treatment of the similarities or differences between the
sociocultural approach (admittedly a broad stroke) and symbolic
interactionism? Or, any other works that draw on both? I have yet to come
across any studies where people reference scholars from both traditions.
Perhaps there's a "good reason" people don't draw from each tradition...? I
don't want to run headlong into a dilemma that others have encountered
previously.
Any thoughts or past explorations in this area are greatly appreciated. I
apologize if I am overlooking obvious references. If you are interested, I
can reciprocate by passing along specific references that illustrate
similarities, at least in my thinking.
With regards,
Jayson Seaman
Ph.D. Student
University of New Hampshire
On Sun, 9 Nov 2003 19:36:32 -0500 "Eugene Matusov" <ematusov@udel.edu>
writes:
Dear Andy and everybody
I think our sociocultural (or whatever it can be called) approach forces us
to be "jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none". It represents a difficult dilemma
for us: how to be multidisciplinary but avoid being shallow and arrogant. I
think the solution of this dilemma is in our collective efforts rather than
in individual achievements. That is why I so value the diverse xmca
community because we can help each other avoid shallow judgments without
losing broad multidisciplinary perspective required by our approach. By the
way, because of this (and other) features, our approach is on odds with
mainstream institutional demands judging quality of our work based on
individualistic authorship&. I feel that behind authorship of articles that
I contribute is a broad academic community (or even communities).
Eugene
PS I noticed that when people reply to my messages they reply to me
personally and not to XCMA. I do not know why it is but suspect some faulty
configuration of my email program (I use Outlook 2003). If anybody knows how
I can change it and fix the problem, please, let me know. Meanwhile, please
make sure that you reply to all xmca and not just me (unless you want to).
Thanks and sorry!
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 5:54 PM
Subject: RE: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
Indeed, I am sure I would. As you may have gathered from the posts I sent at
the beginning of this strange surge in activity on my part, my interest is
CHAT/psychology supports my primary aim in elucidating the study of "ethical
politics", that is to say in trying to find an approach to the "big
problems" of the world which is translatable into person-to-person
collaborative activity. As a result, I am a bit of a
"jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none" and have to put up with very imperfect
knowledge of the many branches of enquiry I find myself involved in!
Andy
At 05:41 PM 9/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Andy, you may be interested reading Davydovs work, for example:
Davydov, V. V. (1998). What is formal learning activity? Journal of Russian
& East European Psychology, 36(4), 37-47.
I think you will enjoy his writing because I sense some similarities between
him and you.
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 5:16 PM
Subject: RE: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
I know the name of course. He is one of the famous names of CHAT. I think we
may have a short piece by him on the MIA. But I don't know his work,
Andy
At 01:20 PM 9/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Thanks, Andy. You wrote, there has to be a separation between theoretical
thinking and practical thinking before you can have formal thinking. Sounds
like Vasilii V. Davydov are you familiar with his work?
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 7:01 AM
Subject: Re: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
At 10:41 PM 8/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Thanks a lot, Andy, for such deep and detailed reply. Your political example
and analysis made me think that formal thinking is based on oppression,
alienation, manipulation, and privilege in other words on certain social
relations.
Well I think that it wouldn't be far wrong to say that formal thinking
arises on the same basis as mathematics, so I would be cautious. Perhaps I
overstated my case again. I mean, there has to be a separation between
theoretical thinking and practical thinking before you can have formal
thinking.
-------------
On the other hand, it may be that people do not think formally in the exact
sense of this term at all but rather they think in some other alienated ways
that are much broader and richer than "formal thinking" and "formal logic"
described by philosophers and mathematicians. Jim Gee in his 1996 book on
literacy describes ideological colonization (probably Marx did it before
him) when one class uncritically uses ideology of another class.
I think this is another issue altogether. The ruling ideas of any society
are going to be the ideas of the ruling class since thinking appropriates
the form of life of that society.
--------------
I wonder if focus on alienated thinking is better than on formal thinking to
capture the phenomenon of alienated life, so nicely described by Andy, Every
question is detached from the form of life in which it arises and treated
abstractly. People's knowledge is not a knowledge from their own life, with
consequences from their own actions, but a stream of arbitrarily assembled
news-bytes and images, fabricated in studios. The formal thinking with all
its syllogisms and rigid rules seems to be rarely a part of everyday
thinking of people even in Western societies. I doubt you can convince
people in Western societies using formal logic very often& On the other
hand, as Mike's and Sylvia Scribner's and Luria's research shows Western
people are very familiar with the formal logic and strongly believe that it
is the Logic&.
Well, I think alienated thinking and formal thinking are two different but
inter-related things, both of them with an element of rationality precisely
because they reflect certain objectively true relations in society.
Any person who is capable of mentally separating the attributes of an object
from the object itself is capable of formal thinking. Anyone who loses sight
of the object through seeing only its attributes is trapped in formal
thinking.
Andy
What do you think?
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Saturday, November 08, 2003 1:32 AM
Subject: RE: timescale question
Andy wrote, A whole politics of "getting the numbers" then flows from this
which is not only based on a conception of human society as little coloured
dots in a Venn Diagram, but actually creates such a type of society. In
other words, we live in a society which is actually structured as a formal
logical conception.
Eugene wrote: I wonder what you mean by creates such a type of society.Do
you mean that through the election practice people start thinking formally?
Do you mean that this practice makes people believe that they think formally
while actually they do not (i.e., creates a certain false ideology)? Or do
you mean that this practice makes people prioritize formal logic as the
logic? I agree with you that something related to formal logic "hooks on"
the existing practice of the Western election process guided by the formal
logic (as if the formal logic is correct). The question for me is what
exactly is this "something"?
Very broadly, ways of thinking and ways of living mutually create and
sustain one another, don't they. Of course, in this relation, living and
acting has a position of primacy over thinking, captured in aphorisms such
as "One must eat before one can paint" or "One must have something to talk
about before one can talk". But the relation is two-way noetheless.
It is of course not just parliamentary democracy which creates and sustains
a culture of formal thinking, it is also the ubiquitous practice of
exchanging products of labour under contract rather than actually
cooperating with other people. Commercial TV has a lot to answer for as
well.
Specifically, what I am saying about the practice of voting for governments
in large geographical electorates would be like this. (i) The job or career
of deciding how we should live we give to an institution remote from our own
lives, so we externalise our selves and put our ethical powers into an alien
body which then rules us; (ii) because our vote is just one vote among
100,000 votes of other people with whom we have no relation at all, we are
aware that the will created in the form of a powerful state is not our will,
but that of an external, alien force (why bother to vote?); (iii) thus when
pondering on the meaning of our lives and how we should live we have already
externalised out selves from ourselves. This is the first pre-requisite for
formal thinking, external relation-to-self. Then, a public political life is
conducted on our behalf in which any question can be carried if 50.1% of the
population can be persuaded to vote "Yes" (although plebiscite is not the
normal way of deciding, the system approximates to plebiscite); this means
that a political actor has to redefine a question so as to assemble the
50.1% under "yes" and people are reduced to carriers of external
characteristics of being for or against on the various isolated aspects of
the issue. This produces what people call "politicians with no vision" and
"thinking which only goes as far as the next election". It is the difference
between the General and the Universal. For example, when there was a
plebiscite in Australia over getting rid of the monarchy and having a
republic, the question was so posed that when you added the number of
monarchists to those who wanted a popularly elected head of state, they
outnumbered those who were willing to accept as a second-best a head of
state nominated by parliament (note the fact that people wanted an
Individual directly responsible to the people, not a creature of the
politicians). The two diametrically opposite camps both voted "no" and we
are stuck with a monarchy, which had the support of only a small minority.
Thus politicians treat people not as citizens and actors within a community,
but as carriers of "opinions" or "attributes". They address themselves not
to citizens but to opinions.
TV and other forms of mass media funded by advertising are not only one-way
forms of communication, but are also designed to address the 50.1% or to
target "audiences". Thus again people are atomised and reduced to passive
receivers possessed of preferences and opinions, not as human beings. Every
question is detached from the form of life in which it arises and treated
abstractly. People's knowledge is not a knowledge from their own life, with
consequences from their own actions, but a stream of arbitrarily assembled
news-bytes and images, fabricated in studios.
These institutions which promote and sustain formal thinking are not 100% of
human life in modernity; real life is complex and multifaceted, and people
think mostly formally, but not entirely and not uniformly. But capitalist
democracy and formal thinking mutually reinforce and sustain one another.
Andy
With regards,
Jayson Seaman
Orford, NH
With regards,
Jayson Seaman
Orford, NH
With regards,
Jayson Seaman
Orford, NH
With regards,
Jayson Seaman
Orford, NH
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Jan 01 2004 - 01:00:09 PST