Dear Victor, Luiz, and everybody–
Thanks a lot, Vicotr, for your super-helpful message and the specific
characterization of Peirce “Even though Pierce does recognize the linguistic
origin of expression, he describes objective experience as unmediated by
social-historical relations. He shares with the Neo-empiricists and
Neo-positivists the view that Logic, or better reason, is a neutral tool for
clarification of experience; and I suspect that his view of language is
also that of a neutral tool for transmitting evidence of the senses” that
resonates in me a lot from the readings of Peirce that Andy, Luiz and you
kindly provided. Also, thanks to Luiz for promoting this helpful discussion
that I follow with a great interest.
Eugene
_____
From: Oudeyis [mailto:victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il]
Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2003 8:29 AM
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives - Peirce
Luiz,
Generally, I find arguments on the kinship affiliations of this or that
theoretician to be time-consuming, inconclusive, and therefore of little
value. This is particularly true for truly original thinkers such as Marx,
Pierce and Veblen whose works are rarely of a piece and never "complete."
In general the judgements I make on the relevance of a theoretician's work
to that of others (it seems to me that this is what we do when we discuss
theory) are based on 3 principles in ascending importance:
1. The relevance of the writings of the theoretician being considered to the
issue under discussion.
If the discussion concerns a theoretical issue, then reference to the works
of any specific thinker should be based on their - and not his - relevance
to the issue.
2. To the extent we are able to generalize the entire body of the work of a
theoretician, we can make some statements concerning his ideas as a whole
relative to those of others under discussion.
As written above this is no easy task when considering the most creative
thinkers. Still, most thinkers build their ideas as complexes of broader
and less broad notions and at least the very broadest of their constructions
may be contrasted with those of others, e.g. Hegel's Objective Idealism vs
Marx's materialism or the early Wittgenstein's Analytical Neopositivism vs
the later Wittgenstein's Social Constructionism. (there is by the way a cute
website on "isms" you might enjoy looking at
http://www.saint-andre.com/ismbook/ism3.html)
3. The social and historical relevance of his work to the subsquent
development of theory.
The works of most philosophers and social theoreticians are usually
characterized and categorized by others who follow them. They do this in at
least three ways; (a) By identifying his work as sharing specified
characteristics with those of other theoreticians (b) By adopting some
portions of his thoughts to develop their own (thereby developing a line or
school of thought that contains elements shared by the writer and his
precursor). (c) By identifying the shared characteristics of a group of
thinkers whose respective works can be shown to form a social and historical
continuum.
Is Pierce an advocate of positivism ?
1. The issue under discussion was the social origin of meaning and
intention, and here Pierce's writing are certainly very different from
those of Mead and Dewey. Even though Pierce does recognize the linguistic
origin of expression, he describes objective experience as unmediated by
social-historical relations. He shares with the Neo-empiricists and
Neo-positivists the view that Logic, or better reason, is a neutral tool for
clarification of experience; and I suspect that his view of language is
also that of a neutral tool for transmitting evidence of the senses.
2. Pierce's rejection of psychologism and his overriding concern for logic
is quite as consistent with Empirical or Positivist Pragmatism as it is with
Phenomenology - especially as it relates to the issues we've been discussing
here. While Pierce's work includes ideas that show up in Frege and Husserl,
Pierce's closest intellectual relatives are the American Pragmatists who
developed and elaborated the system he invented.
3. Through his articles and lectures Pierce had great influence on
American philosophy and some exposure in England, "in 1879, it was
predicted in the British journal Mind that Peirce's pragmatism would be "one
of the most important of American contributions to philosophy." Those who
most actively integrated Pierce into their own work were the Americans;
James, and Royce, and John Dewey, all philosophical Pragmatists. Pierce
wrote exclusively in English - in English and American Journals, he attended
one conference in Germany ( in 1877 as U.S.representative at International
Geodetic Association conference in Stuttgart, 27 Sept.-2 Oct), so it is
highly unlikely that he had any direct influence on German Phenomenology. I
don't believe that Frege, Husserl or even Heidigger ever referred to any of
Pierce's works.
Regards,
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: Luiz Carlos <mailto:lucabaptista@sapo.pt> Baptista
Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 1:27 PM
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives - Peirce
Hi Eugene,
Let me add two other sites, the best IMHO:
Arisbe - The Peirce Gateway (http://members.door.net/arisbe) is a treasure
trove, full of articles by and on Peirce, links to relevant resources, etc.;
The Charles S. Peirce Studies' Web site (http://www.peirce.org) has lots of
links to editorial projects, papers, organizations and mailing lists.
And let me tell you that I totally disagree with the characterization of
Peirce as a "positivist", whatever that means. It's nearly impossible to fit
Peirce into a neatly defined category, though "logicist" might be closer to
the truth. Peirce's work is not that distant from Frege's and even
Husserl's, at least in the attempt to avoid "psychologism".
Rgrds,
Luiz Carlos Baptista
<mailto:lucabaptista@sapo.pt> lucabaptista@sapo.pt
<mailto:lucabaptista@hotmail.com> lucabaptista@hotmail.com
----- Original Message -----
From: Oudeyis <mailto:victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il>
To: ematusov@udel.edu ; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 11:07 AM
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Gene,
The web is filled with material on Pierce. Here's two sites that are most
useful;
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/index.htm This is a site for searching
Pierce's writings (it's my main source of information on Pierce.)
and
http://humanities.uwichill.edu.bb/RLWClarke/Philosophy/Contemporary/Pragmati
sm/Pragmatism.htm This site is a very good source for all sorts of material
on American Pragmatism.
There are many others as well: look for Pierce Pragmatism with the Google
machine.
Regards,
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: Eugene Matusov <mailto:ematusov@udel.edu>
Sent: Thursday, November 27, 2003 10:03 PM
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Dear Andy, Victor, and everybody –
Andy, thanks a lot for sending the link and application of Peirce’s approach
to the problem of addiction. Can you elaborate what you see in the article
as useful application of Peirce’s approach, please?
The article by Koski-Jannes says, “Why did this specific incident suddenly
have such a profound effect on this man? Ludwig speaks about subconscious
ripening of motives. A semiotic perspective on this event, however, provides
another hint to what could have been going on in this situation. According
to Peirce, the most powerful or ‘perfect signs are those in which the
iconic, indicative and symbolic characters are blended equally.’ It may be
assumed, therefore, that similar events that before had only iconic and
indicative functions for this person now somehow also conveyed a more
generalized symbolic meaning for him.”
I understand that Koski-Jannes is not Peirce but I’m very worry when the
word “somehow” is used in explanation (it reminds me Friedian comprehensive
but circular explanations). I found that the article uses a combination of
behaviorist and cognitive frameworks. But I can be wrong and I’d like to
hear what you see in the paper.
I was also re-reading Peirce’s paper on sign that you Andy provided to all
of us. I found very interesting statements by Peirce like “You can write
down the word “star”; but that does not make you the creator of the word,
nor if you erase it have you destroyed the word. The word lives in the minds
of those who use it. Even if they are all asleep, it exists in their
memory.” It reminds me Il’enkov. However, in my view Peirce stopped when
Il’enkov started. Peirce did not provide analysis of how people use words
and what shapes that use (unlike Il’enkov).
Victor, I find your characterization of Peirce as “positivist pragmatist”
very-very interesting and helpful, at least, for me. I should admit that I
read little of Peirce but what I read and heard of him fits to this
characterization. Thanks a lot for that. Where can I read more about Peirce
from this characterization? Does anybody disagree with it and if so, why?
I also like Victor’s point about “From the purely formal point of view
Losev's signs are Pierce's symbols and vice versa. But Losev, like
Vygotsky, the later Wittgenstein, and Mead is concerned with the social
origin and significance of human activity, hence his deep understanding of
the symbol-sign distinction is distinct from that of Pierce.” Exactly! In my
view, Peirce reified his icon-index-symbol distinguish. For him only symbols
are polysemic while icons or indexes are not. While in reality everything is
polysemic.
Victor asks me about what new I see in Losev. I think for one, Losev can
help us to separate decontextualization from de-symbolozation/reification
that, in my view, both were both present in Vygotsky.
What do you think?
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2003 8:58 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Slightly aside from this Eugene, a paper i was recommended to by someone
here which has had a lasting impact on me was a paper which combined
Peirce's semiotics with Vygotskyan activity theory in a study of addiction
and its remedies.
http://home.mira.net/~andy/blackwood/addiction.htm
Ever since, I have treated Peirce with respect.
Andy
At 08:42 PM 25/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Dear Andy
Thanks a lot for the very useful link to Peirce essay on sign! How different
Peirce from Davydov and Losev from whom I learned about sign. Davydov
defined sign through a special sign action(znakovoe deistvie) in which a
person successfully uses the signifier instead of the signified
(successfullyfor the persons goal). You can find this idea of the sign
action in Vygotsky when Vygotsky discussed, for example, what object can be
involved into a role play. I think that this activity-based approach is
different from Peirces introspection and representation who seemed to be
more concerned with traditional psychology with its uncritical acceptance
that likenesses and indication are rooted in the nature of the things rather
than in human activity of acting with and upon the things.
Peirce wrote, §3. There are three kinds of signs. Firstly, there are
likenesses, or icons; which serve to convey ideas of the things they
represent simply by imitating them. Secondly, there are indications, or
indices; which show something about things, on account of their being
physically connected with them. Such is a guidepost, which points down the
road to be taken, or a relative pronoun, which is placed just after the name
of the thing intended to be denoted, or a vocative exclamation, as Hi!
there,which acts upon the nerves of the person addressed and forces his
attention. Thirdly, there are symbols, or general signs, which have become
associated with their meanings by usage. Such are most words, and phrases,
and speeches, and books, and libraries.
For Losev, words are symbols only in mythology and naïve thinking as it is
illustrated in Lev Tolstoys short story about old Russian soldier (in
tsarist Russian Empire soldier served for 25 years) who went through many
military campaigns and was teaching young soldier about life abroad. The old
soldier was telling how weird German people were because they twisted names
of things. For example, the soldier took a knife and showed it to the young
soldier. Look at this knife. Its clearly knifebut a German says it is
messer. Where is messer here?!Losev would argue that for this old soldier a
word is a symbol because the soldier saw a deep relationship between the
word knife(the signifier) and the object knife (the signified) while for
educated people a word is a sign because the word is a convention any word
or even sound could have signified the object. Similarly, many Latin numbers
(e.g., I, II, III, IV, V) are symbols while Arab numbers (e.g.,1,2,3,4,5)
are signs. Losev argued that education often involves de-symbolization. The
Arab number system is more advanced over the Latin number system exactly
because frees itself from unnecessary symbolism. (Although, it can be argued
that the Arabic numbers with their system base as well as words with their
morphology are not simple conventional signs sign systems but they are not
symbols either in Losevs sense!)
Although Vygotsky did not seem to use Losevs symbol-sign terminology (Losev
published his book about symbol in 1920s and theoretically Vygotsky could
read it), I think he was aware of the difference when he was insisting on
liberation of a child from contextual dependency (with his reference to work
of Kohler with apes). In part, it is clear that Vygotsky argued for teaching
kids decontextualization (which became very problematic now) but in part I
think he was talking about de-symbolization(in Losevs terms) or
de-reification(using Marxs terms).
What do you think?
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2003 7:14 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Surely Mead would draw his terminology for C S Peirce?
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm
What is a Sign?
Andy
At 07:00 PM 25/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Thanks a lot Luiz for the elaboration!
You wrote that according to Mead, a significant symbol is a stimulus which
calls on its producer the response intended on the part of the
receiver.Coming from Hegelian and Marxist perspective, it is difficult for
me to think of symbol as a stimulus. I cant understand it. Any behavior has
some kind of influence on organism producing it, right? How is it different
from a significant symbol? What this stimulus mediate? Russian philosopher
Losev wrote an interesting book about symbols and signs arguing that symbol
is a kind of signs in which there is a certain, not arbitrary, relation
between the signifier and signified (e.g., American flag is a symbol while
British may be not unless it has symbolism that I do not know). Did Mead
have in mind such symbol?
Please help,
Eugene
_____
From: Luiz Carlos Baptista [mailto:lucabaptista@sapo.pt]
Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2003 8:28 AM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Hi Eugene,
The emphasis on "symbolic" comes from George Herbert Mead's concept of
"significant symbol" (in "Mind, Self, and Society"): a significant symbol is
a stimulus which calls on its producer the response intended on the part of
the receiver. Language is the paramount example. For instance, when I say
something to someone else I also hear what I say and - even more important -
understand it. And the same goes for my addressee. According to Mead, this
commonality of reactions ("taking the role of the other", so to speak) is
the basis of the shared character of meaning, an emergent property of
interaction. It's from here that Blumer goes to coin the phrase "Symbolic
Interactionism".
So far so good. But the Symbolic Interactionist tradition indeed has a
problem in dealing with structural-historical constraints. To this, the
interactionist may reply that he recognizes the existence of structures, but
these do not make sense unless viewed as emergent properties of interaction.
Anyway, the "obdurate" character of socio-historical structures seems to be
missing in much of the interactionist studies, and it is the main source of
conflict between this sociological tradition and the
"structural-functionalist" (e.g. Parsons, Merton, etc.).
If you're really into it, there is a very nice article by the sociologist
Gary Alan Fine in which he discusses these two approaches. It's here:
http://www.cts.cuni.cz/~konopas/liter/Fine_On%20the%20Macrofoundations%20of%
20Microsociology.htm
Rgrds,
Luiz Carlos Baptista
lucabaptista@sapo.pt
lucabaptista@hotmail.com
----- Original Message -----
From: Eugene Matusov <mailto:ematusov@udel.edu>
Sent: quarta-feira, 12 de Novembro de 2003 23:44
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Dear Luiz
Thanks a lot for the reference and the concise definition. These three
principles sound very similar to what Ive learned about a dynamic system
approach and Gibsons ecological approach. I guess all of these approaches
are family of interactionism. What is about the emphasis on symbolic?
So far, I can say that a sociocultural approach includes the three
principles but involve much more than socially dynamic and interactive
aspects of meaning making. There are historical aspects and structural
aspects that seem to be out of interest scope of the symbolic interactionist
principles described by Luiz. For example, Jim Wertschs (and mine) favorite
example with the QWERTY American keyboard of how history can help us
understand meaning of events seems out of the scope of the symbolic
interactionism. Similarly structural inequalities evident in school
achievements would be difficult to approach by the symbolic interactionism,
I think.
I teach a course on cultural diversity for preservice teachers. The class
has a practicum component associated with afterschool program in Latin
American Community Center. Recently I came to a conclusion that ideally I
need to be teaching another multicultural course in the sequence with this
one. In my current course my students are focused on relational and dynamic
aspects of issues of multiculturalism emerging from their work with Latino
children at LACC. Id like to teach them a big picturefocusing on historical
and structural issues. Of course, in my current class we touch upon the big
picturebut only touch upon& I think my students need more& I think that my
first course is within realms of symbolic interactionism while the imagined
second course would not.
What do you think?
Eugene
_____
From: Luiz Carlos Baptista [mailto:lucabaptista@sapo.pt]
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2003 10:26 AM
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Hi Eugene,
In his book "Symbolic Interactionism", Herbert Blumer gives this concise
definition of the interactionist perspective:
Symbolic interactionism rests in the last analysis on three simple premises.
The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the
meanings that the things have for them. Such things include everything that
the human being may note in his world physical objects, such as trees or
chairs; other human beings, such as a mother or a store clerk; categories of
human beings, such as friends or enemies; institutions, as a school or a
government; guiding ideals, such as individual independence or honesty;
activities of others, such as their commands or requests; and such
situations as an individual encounters in his daily life. The second premise
is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the
social interaction that one has with ones fellows. The third premise is that
these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative
process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters.
Maybe this passage could provide the elements for a comparison between "S.
I." and "sociocultural approaches".
Rgrds,
Luiz Carlos Baptista
----- Original Message -----
From: Eugene Matusov <mailto:ematusov@udel.edu>
To: 'Jayson Seaman' <mailto:cb450k@juno.com>
Sent: terça-feira, 11 de Novembro de 2003 5:24
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Dear Jayson
Im not very familiar with symbolic interactionism (but Id like to know more
about it), however, I try to study sociocultural approaches for some time.
Why dont we combine our knowledge and interests?! Why dont you describe
symbolic interactionism and Ill try to compare it with sociocultural
approaches (hopefully other xmca-ers can help us as well)? If you agree to
do that, please focus on what attracts your attention in symbolic
interactionism and try to use examples to your descriptions.
What do you think?
Eugene
_____
From: Jayson Seaman [mailto:cb450k@juno.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 8:24 PM
Subject: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Eugene and all:
I am somewhat new to this list and to the sociocultural approach in general,
and I especially appreciate your comment Eugene about the need for
multidisciplinary perspectives. It provides an entre into a question I have
been pondering for a little while now. I am approaching my dissertation
proposal in the upcoming months and will be studying the development of
individual and group learning in an outdoor, adventure context--specifically
how "adventure" is constructed in small group activity. The field of outdoor
adventure education has yet to engage with the sociocultural approach and I
am eager to sink my teeth further into the connection, since the fit is
quite appropriate, I feel. The field still has something of a "black box"
phenomenon going on.
My question for the list is along these multidisciplinary lines--I have been
reading studies and theories in a symbolic interactionist tradition, and it
strikes me that the sociocultural approach and symbolic interaction are
somewhat complementary. I can notice some similarities and differences, but
overall I am drawn to both (my aim in my work is to understand what it means
to "experientially educate", so I don't pledge allegiance to one particular
discipline). Symbolic Interactionism does not seem to give as much credence
to object history, for example (although it does come up), but it does
provide a way to examine the group construction of meaning in a given
context, specifically how one thing leads to the next--made even more potent
by including object histories and distal influences. One obvious overlap is
the frequent reference made to John Dewey.
Here is the question--can anyone point me in the direction of a
straightforward treatment of the similarities or differences between the
sociocultural approach (admittedly a broad stroke) and symbolic
interactionism? Or, any other works that draw on both? I have yet to come
across any studies where people reference scholars from both traditions.
Perhaps there's a "good reason" people don't draw from each tradition...? I
don't want to run headlong into a dilemma that others have encountered
previously.
Any thoughts or past explorations in this area are greatly appreciated. I
apologize if I am overlooking obvious references. If you are interested, I
can reciprocate by passing along specific references that illustrate
similarities, at least in my thinking.
With regards,
Jayson Seaman
Ph.D. Student
University of New Hampshire
On Sun, 9 Nov 2003 19:36:32 -0500 "Eugene Matusov" <ematusov@udel.edu>
writes:
Dear Andy and everybody
I think our sociocultural (or whatever it can be called) approach forces us
to be "jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none". It represents a difficult dilemma
for us: how to be multidisciplinary but avoid being shallow and arrogant. I
think the solution of this dilemma is in our collective efforts rather than
in individual achievements. That is why I so value the diverse xmca
community because we can help each other avoid shallow judgments without
losing broad multidisciplinary perspective required by our approach. By the
way, because of this (and other) features, our approach is on odds with
mainstream institutional demands judging quality of our work based on
individualistic authorship&. I feel that behind authorship of articles that
I contribute is a broad academic community (or even communities).
Eugene
PS I noticed that when people reply to my messages they reply to me
personally and not to XCMA. I do not know why it is but suspect some faulty
configuration of my email program (I use Outlook 2003). If anybody knows how
I can change it and fix the problem, please, let me know. Meanwhile, please
make sure that you reply to all xmca and not just me (unless you want to).
Thanks and sorry!
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 5:54 PM
Subject: RE: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
Indeed, I am sure I would. As you may have gathered from the posts I sent at
the beginning of this strange surge in activity on my part, my interest is
CHAT/psychology supports my primary aim in elucidating the study of "ethical
politics", that is to say in trying to find an approach to the "big
problems" of the world which is translatable into person-to-person
collaborative activity. As a result, I am a bit of a
"jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none" and have to put up with very imperfect
knowledge of the many branches of enquiry I find myself involved in!
Andy
At 05:41 PM 9/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Andy, you may be interested reading Davydovs work, for example:
Davydov, V. V. (1998). What is formal learning activity? Journal of Russian
& East European Psychology, 36(4), 37-47.
I think you will enjoy his writing because I sense some similarities between
him and you.
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 5:16 PM
Subject: RE: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
I know the name of course. He is one of the famous names of CHAT. I think we
may have a short piece by him on the MIA. But I don't know his work,
Andy
At 01:20 PM 9/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Thanks, Andy. You wrote, there has to be a separation between theoretical
thinking and practical thinking before you can have formal thinking. Sounds
like Vasilii V. Davydov are you familiar with his work?
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 7:01 AM
Subject: Re: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
At 10:41 PM 8/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Thanks a lot, Andy, for such deep and detailed reply. Your political example
and analysis made me think that formal thinking is based on oppression,
alienation, manipulation, and privilege in other words on certain social
relations.
Well I think that it wouldn't be far wrong to say that formal thinking
arises on the same basis as mathematics, so I would be cautious. Perhaps I
overstated my case again. I mean, there has to be a separation between
theoretical thinking and practical thinking before you can have formal
thinking.
-------------
On the other hand, it may be that people do not think formally in the exact
sense of this term at all but rather they think in some other alienated ways
that are much broader and richer than "formal thinking" and "formal logic"
described by philosophers and mathematicians. Jim Gee in his 1996 book on
literacy describes ideological colonization (probably Marx did it before
him) when one class uncritically uses ideology of another class.
I think this is another issue altogether. The ruling ideas of any society
are going to be the ideas of the ruling class since thinking appropriates
the form of life of that society.
--------------
I wonder if focus on alienated thinking is better than on formal thinking to
capture the phenomenon of alienated life, so nicely described by Andy, Every
question is detached from the form of life in which it arises and treated
abstractly. People's knowledge is not a knowledge from their own life, with
consequences from their own actions, but a stream of arbitrarily assembled
news-bytes and images, fabricated in studios. The formal thinking with all
its syllogisms and rigid rules seems to be rarely a part of everyday
thinking of people even in Western societies. I doubt you can convince
people in Western societies using formal logic very often& On the other
hand, as Mike's and Sylvia Scribner's and Luria's research shows Western
people are very familiar with the formal logic and strongly believe that it
is the Logic&.
Well, I think alienated thinking and formal thinking are two different but
inter-related things, both of them with an element of rationality precisely
because they reflect certain objectively true relations in society.
Any person who is capable of mentally separating the attributes of an object
from the object itself is capable of formal thinking. Anyone who loses sight
of the object through seeing only its attributes is trapped in formal
thinking.
Andy
What do you think?
Eugene
_____
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Saturday, November 08, 2003 1:32 AM
Subject: RE: timescale question
Andy wrote, A whole politics of "getting the numbers" then flows from this
which is not only based on a conception of human society as little coloured
dots in a Venn Diagram, but actually creates such a type of society. In
other words, we live in a society which is actually structured as a formal
logical conception.
Eugene wrote: I wonder what you mean by creates such a type of society.Do
you mean that through the election practice people start thinking formally?
Do you mean that this practice makes people believe that they think formally
while actually they do not (i.e., creates a certain false ideology)? Or do
you mean that this practice makes people prioritize formal logic as the
logic? I agree with you that something related to formal logic "hooks on"
the existing practice of the Western election process guided by the formal
logic (as if the formal logic is correct). The question for me is what
exactly is this "something"?
Very broadly, ways of thinking and ways of living mutually create and
sustain one another, don't they. Of course, in this relation, living and
acting has a position of primacy over thinking, captured in aphorisms such
as "One must eat before one can paint" or "One must have something to talk
about before one can talk". But the relation is two-way noetheless.
It is of course not just parliamentary democracy which creates and sustains
a culture of formal thinking, it is also the ubiquitous practice of
exchanging products of labour under contract rather than actually
cooperating with other people. Commercial TV has a lot to answer for as
well.
Specifically, what I am saying about the practice of voting for governments
in large geographical electorates would be like this. (i) The job or career
of deciding how we should live we give to an institution remote from our own
lives, so we externalise our selves and put our ethical powers into an alien
body which then rules us; (ii) because our vote is just one vote among
100,000 votes of other people with whom we have no relation at all, we are
aware that the will created in the form of a powerful state is not our will,
but that of an external, alien force (why bother to vote?); (iii) thus when
pondering on the meaning of our lives and how we should live we have already
externalised out selves from ourselves. This is the first pre-requisite for
formal thinking, external relation-to-self. Then, a public political life is
conducted on our behalf in which any question can be carried if 50.1% of the
population can be persuaded to vote "Yes" (although plebiscite is not the
normal way of deciding, the system approximates to plebiscite); this means
that a political actor has to redefine a question so as to assemble the
50.1% under "yes" and people are reduced to carriers of external
characteristics of being for or against on the various isolated aspects of
the issue. This produces what people call "politicians with no vision" and
"thinking which only goes as far as the next election". It is the difference
between the General and the Universal. For example, when there was a
plebiscite in Australia over getting rid of the monarchy and having a
republic, the question was so posed that when you added the number of
monarchists to those who wanted a popularly elected head of state, they
outnumbered those who were willing to accept as a second-best a head of
state nominated by parliament (note the fact that people wanted an
Individual directly responsible to the people, not a creature of the
politicians). The two diametrically opposite camps both voted "no" and we
are stuck with a monarchy, which had the support of only a small minority.
Thus politicians treat people not as citizens and actors within a community,
but as carriers of "opinions" or "attributes". They address themselves not
to citizens but to opinions.
TV and other forms of mass media funded by advertising are not only one-way
forms of communication, but are also designed to address the 50.1% or to
target "audiences". Thus again people are atomised and reduced to passive
receivers possessed of preferences and opinions, not as human beings. Every
question is detached from the form of life in which it arises and treated
abstractly. People's knowledge is not a knowledge from their own life, with
consequences from their own actions, but a stream of arbitrarily assembled
news-bytes and images, fabricated in studios.
These institutions which promote and sustain formal thinking are not 100% of
human life in modernity; real life is complex and multifaceted, and people
think mostly formally, but not entirely and not uniformly. But capitalist
democracy and formal thinking mutually reinforce and sustain one another.
Andy
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