I did not find these themes of social consequences as the definer of meaning and intention, evident both in Hegel and Mead (and Wittgenstein) in Piece. My interpretation of Piece is that meaning and intention is fully defined by and preexists in the "producer". Did I miss something?
Not at all. Pragmatism is essentially an American version of English empiricism and Continental positivism. All three philosophic movements are based on the assumption that observed qualities, quantities, and measures are, metaphysically speaking, Real things. While meaning is regarded as implicit in the observed world, Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions (the BDI of positivist social psychology - e.g. H. economicus of classical Political Economics) are attributed to inherited organism, to a-priori needs, or to "free choice," or to a combination of these.
Pierce is interesting because his interest in language somewhat compromised the rigorousness of his empiricism. Your quote;
"You can write down the word "star"; but that does not make you the creator of the word, nor if you erase it have you destroyed the word. The word lives in the minds of those who use it.
Shows some degree of understanding of the essentially conventional nature of language. It appears to me that Pierce's ambiguity concerning the origin of meaning may well have served as part of the inspiration for the "social pragmatism" of Dewey and Mead.
Regards,
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: Eugene Matusov
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Sent: Thursday, November 27, 2003 10:32 PM
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Dear Victor-
Thanks for elaboration on the symbolism of the British flag! Thanks to you, Victor, the British flag became a symbol for me J.
As to "It seems to me that the key of Mead's definition of the symbol, "a significant symbol is a stimulus which calls on its producer the response intended on the part of the receiver." is not the term, "stimulus," but rather the following phrase, "which calls on its producer the response intended on the part of the receiver." The stimulus which is produced with specified intention and is generated to produce an expected (by the producer) response from the reciever is a conscious and interested act. The definition is phrased somewhat differently than the richer and more detailed considerations of symbols and meaning of Hegel and Marx, but its general message is similar to theirs."
I find an interesting point from Hegel that we learn about goals of our actions through consequences of the actions (and their interpretations). Also, Mead insisted that meaning of our actions emerges from reactions of others. I did not find these themes of social consequences as the definer of meaning and intention, evident both in Hegel and Mead (and Wittgenstein) in Piece. My interpretation of Piece is that meaning and intention is fully defined by and preexists in the "producer". Did I miss something?
Eugene
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From: victor [mailto:victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il]
Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2003 4:17 AM
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Multidisciplinary perspectives
The British flag is I believe a layer cake of flags: the big perpendicular red cross (bordered with white) in the middle is St. George's cross, the Heraldic symbol of the Mediaeval Patron Saint of Great Britain; the white diagonal cross on a blue field is St. Andrew's cross, symbol of the Mediaeval Patron Saint of Scotland; The red diagonal cross (superimposed on the white diagonal cross) is St. Patrick's cross, symbol of the Mediaeval Patron Saint of Ireland. Interestingly, the Red Dragon of Wales is not represented on the British Flag.
It seems to me that the key of Mead's definition of the symbol, "a significant symbol is a stimulus which calls on its producer the response intended on the part of the receiver." is not the term, "stimulus," but rather the following phrase, "which calls on its producer the response intended on the part of the receiver." The stimulus which is produced with specified intention and is generated to produce an expected (by the producer) response from the reciever is a conscious and interested act. The definition is phrased somewhat differently than the richer and more detailed considerations of symbols and meaning of Hegel and Marx, but its general message is similar to theirs.
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: Eugene Matusov
Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2003 2:00 AM
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Thanks a lot Luiz for the elaboration!
You wrote that according to Mead, "a significant symbol is a stimulus which calls on its producer the response intended on the part of the receiver." Coming from Hegelian and Marxist perspective, it is difficult for me to think of symbol as a stimulus. I can't understand it. Any behavior has some kind of influence on organism producing it, right? How is it different from "a significant symbol"? What this stimulus mediate? Russian philosopher Losev wrote an interesting book about symbols and signs arguing that symbol is a kind of signs in which there is a certain, not arbitrary, relation between the signifier and signified (e.g., American flag is a symbol while British may be not unless it has symbolism that I do not know). Did Mead have in mind such symbol?
Please help,
Eugene
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From: Luiz Carlos Baptista [mailto:lucabaptista@sapo.pt]
Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2003 8:28 AM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Hi Eugene,
The emphasis on "symbolic" comes from George Herbert Mead's concept of "significant symbol" (in "Mind, Self, and Society"): a significant symbol is a stimulus which calls on its producer the response intended on the part of the receiver. Language is the paramount example. For instance, when I say something to someone else I also hear what I say and - even more important - understand it. And the same goes for my addressee. According to Mead, this commonality of reactions ("taking the role of the other", so to speak) is the basis of the shared character of meaning, an emergent property of interaction. It's from here that Blumer goes to coin the phrase "Symbolic Interactionism".
So far so good. But the Symbolic Interactionist tradition indeed has a problem in dealing with structural-historical constraints. To this, the interactionist may reply that he recognizes the existence of structures, but these do not make sense unless viewed as emergent properties of interaction. Anyway, the "obdurate" character of socio-historical structures seems to be missing in much of the interactionist studies, and it is the main source of conflict between this sociological tradition and the "structural-functionalist" (e.g. Parsons, Merton, etc.).
If you're really into it, there is a very nice article by the sociologist Gary Alan Fine in which he discusses these two approaches. It's here:
http://www.cts.cuni.cz/~konopas/liter/Fine_On%20the%20Macrofoundations%20of%20Microsociology.htm
Rgrds,
Luiz Carlos Baptista
lucabaptista@sapo.pt
lucabaptista@hotmail.com
----- Original Message -----
From: Eugene Matusov
Sent: quarta-feira, 12 de Novembro de 2003 23:44
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Dear Luiz-
Thanks a lot for the reference and the concise definition. These three principles sound very similar to what I've learned about a dynamic system approach and Gibson's ecological approach. I guess all of these approaches are family of interactionism. What is about the emphasis on "symbolic"?
So far, I can say that a sociocultural approach includes the three principles but involve much more than socially dynamic and interactive aspects of meaning making. There are historical aspects and structural aspects that seem to be out of interest scope of the symbolic interactionist principles described by Luiz. For example, Jim Wertsch's (and mine) favorite example with the QWERTY American keyboard of how history can help us understand meaning of events seems out of the scope of the symbolic interactionism. Similarly structural inequalities evident in school achievements would be difficult to approach by the symbolic interactionism, I think.
I teach a course on cultural diversity for preservice teachers. The class has a practicum component associated with afterschool program in Latin American Community Center. Recently I came to a conclusion that ideally I need to be teaching another multicultural course in the sequence with this one. In my current course my students are focused on relational and dynamic aspects of issues of multiculturalism emerging from their work with Latino children at LACC. I'd like to teach them a "big picture" focusing on historical and structural issues. Of course, in my current class we touch upon the "big picture" but only touch upon. I think my students need more. I think that my first course is within realms of symbolic interactionism while the imagined second course would not.
What do you think?
Eugene
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From: Luiz Carlos Baptista [mailto:lucabaptista@sapo.pt]
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2003 10:26 AM
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Hi Eugene,
In his book "Symbolic Interactionism", Herbert Blumer gives this concise definition of the interactionist perspective:
Symbolic interactionism rests in the last analysis on three simple premises. The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them. Such things include everything that the human being may note in his world - physical objects, such as trees or chairs; other human beings, such as a mother or a store clerk; categories of human beings, such as friends or enemies; institutions, as a school or a government; guiding ideals, such as individual independence or honesty; activities of others, such as their commands or requests; and such situations as an individual encounters in his daily life. The second premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows. The third premise is that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters.
Maybe this passage could provide the elements for a comparison between "S. I." and "sociocultural approaches".
Rgrds,
Luiz Carlos Baptista
lucabaptista@sapo.pt
lucabaptista@hotmail.com
----- Original Message -----
From: Eugene Matusov
To: 'Jayson Seaman'
Sent: terça-feira, 11 de Novembro de 2003 5:24
Subject: RE: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Dear Jayson-
I'm not very familiar with symbolic interactionism (but I'd like to know more about it), however, I try to study sociocultural approaches for some time. Why don't we combine our knowledge and interests?! Why don't you describe symbolic interactionism and I'll try to compare it with sociocultural approaches (hopefully other xmca-ers can help us as well)? If you agree to do that, please focus on what attracts your attention in symbolic interactionism and try to use examples to your descriptions.
What do you think?
Eugene
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From: Jayson Seaman [mailto:cb450k@juno.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 8:24 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Cc: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Multidisciplinary perspectives
Eugene and all:
I am somewhat new to this list and to the sociocultural approach in general, and I especially appreciate your comment Eugene about the need for multidisciplinary perspectives. It provides an entre into a question I have been pondering for a little while now. I am approaching my dissertation proposal in the upcoming months and will be studying the development of individual and group learning in an outdoor, adventure context--specifically how "adventure" is constructed in small group activity. The field of outdoor adventure education has yet to engage with the sociocultural approach and I am eager to sink my teeth further into the connection, since the fit is quite appropriate, I feel. The field still has something of a "black box" phenomenon going on.
My question for the list is along these multidisciplinary lines--I have been reading studies and theories in a symbolic interactionist tradition, and it strikes me that the sociocultural approach and symbolic interaction are somewhat complementary. I can notice some similarities and differences, but overall I am drawn to both (my aim in my work is to understand what it means to "experientially educate", so I don't pledge allegiance to one particular discipline). Symbolic Interactionism does not seem to give as much credence to object history, for example (although it does come up), but it does provide a way to examine the group construction of meaning in a given context, specifically how one thing leads to the next--made even more potent by including object histories and distal influences. One obvious overlap is the frequent reference made to John Dewey.
Here is the question--can anyone point me in the direction of a straightforward treatment of the similarities or differences between the sociocultural approach (admittedly a broad stroke) and symbolic interactionism? Or, any other works that draw on both? I have yet to come across any studies where people reference scholars from both traditions. Perhaps there's a "good reason" people don't draw from each tradition...? I don't want to run headlong into a dilemma that others have encountered previously.
Any thoughts or past explorations in this area are greatly appreciated. I apologize if I am overlooking obvious references. If you are interested, I can reciprocate by passing along specific references that illustrate similarities, at least in my thinking.
With regards,
Jayson Seaman
Ph.D. Student
University of New Hampshire
On Sun, 9 Nov 2003 19:36:32 -0500 "Eugene Matusov" <ematusov@udel.edu> writes:
Dear Andy and everybody-
I think our sociocultural (or whatever it can be called) approach forces us to be "jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none". It represents a difficult dilemma for us: how to be multidisciplinary but avoid being shallow and arrogant. I think the solution of this dilemma is in our collective efforts rather than in individual achievements. That is why I so value the diverse xmca community because we can help each other avoid shallow judgments without losing broad multidisciplinary perspective required by our approach. By the way, because of this (and other) features, our approach is on odds with mainstream institutional demands judging quality of our work based on individualistic authorship.. I feel that behind authorship of articles that I contribute is a broad academic community (or even communities).
Eugene
PS I noticed that when people reply to my messages they reply to me personally and not to XCMA. I do not know why it is but suspect some faulty configuration of my email program (I use Outlook 2003). If anybody knows how I can change it and fix the problem, please, let me know. Meanwhile, please make sure that you reply to all xmca and not just me (unless you want to). Thanks and sorry!
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From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 5:54 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: RE: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
Indeed, I am sure I would. As you may have gathered from the posts I sent at the beginning of this strange surge in activity on my part, my interest is CHAT/psychology supports my primary aim in elucidating the study of "ethical politics", that is to say in trying to find an approach to the "big problems" of the world which is translatable into person-to-person collaborative activity. As a result, I am a bit of a "jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none" and have to put up with very imperfect knowledge of the many branches of enquiry I find myself involved in!
Andy
At 05:41 PM 9/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Andy, you may be interested reading Davydovs work, for example:
Davydov, V. V. (1998). What is formal learning activity? Journal of Russian & East European Psychology, 36(4), 37-47.
I think you will enjoy his writing because I sense some similarities between him and you.
Eugene
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From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 5:16 PM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: RE: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
I know the name of course. He is one of the famous names of CHAT. I think we may have a short piece by him on the MIA. But I don't know his work,
Andy
At 01:20 PM 9/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Thanks, Andy. You wrote, there has to be a separation between theoretical thinking and practical thinking before you can have formal thinking. Sounds like Vasilii V. Davydov are you familiar with his work?
Eugene
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From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 7:01 AM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: Re: Formal thinking or alienated thinking
At 10:41 PM 8/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Thanks a lot, Andy, for such deep and detailed reply. Your political example and analysis made me think that formal thinking is based on oppression, alienation, manipulation, and privilege in other words on certain social relations.
Well I think that it wouldn't be far wrong to say that formal thinking arises on the same basis as mathematics, so I would be cautious. Perhaps I overstated my case again. I mean, there has to be a separation between theoretical thinking and practical thinking before you can have formal thinking.
-------------
On the other hand, it may be that people do not think formally in the exact sense of this term at all but rather they think in some other alienated ways that are much broader and richer than "formal thinking" and "formal logic" described by philosophers and mathematicians. Jim Gee in his 1996 book on literacy describes ideological colonization (probably Marx did it before him) when one class uncritically uses ideology of another class.
I think this is another issue altogether. The ruling ideas of any society are going to be the ideas of the ruling class since thinking appropriates the form of life of that society.
--------------
I wonder if focus on alienated thinking is better than on formal thinking to capture the phenomenon of alienated life, so nicely described by Andy, Every question is detached from the form of life in which it arises and treated abstractly. People's knowledge is not a knowledge from their own life, with consequences from their own actions, but a stream of arbitrarily assembled news-bytes and images, fabricated in studios. The formal thinking with all its syllogisms and rigid rules seems to be rarely a part of everyday thinking of people even in Western societies. I doubt you can convince people in Western societies using formal logic very often& On the other hand, as Mike's and Sylvia Scribner's and Luria's research shows Western people are very familiar with the formal logic and strongly believe that it is the Logic&.
Well, I think alienated thinking and formal thinking are two different but inter-related things, both of them with an element of rationality precisely because they reflect certain objectively true relations in society.
Any person who is capable of mentally separating the attributes of an object from the object itself is capable of formal thinking. Anyone who loses sight of the object through seeing only its attributes is trapped in formal thinking.
Andy
What do you think?
Eugene
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: Saturday, November 08, 2003 1:32 AM
To: ematusov@UDel.Edu
Subject: RE: timescale question
Andy wrote, A whole politics of "getting the numbers" then flows from this which is not only based on a conception of human society as little coloured dots in a Venn Diagram, but actually creates such a type of society. In other words, we live in a society which is actually structured as a formal logical conception.
Eugene wrote: I wonder what you mean by creates such a type of society.Do you mean that through the election practice people start thinking formally? Do you mean that this practice makes people believe that they think formally while actually they do not (i.e., creates a certain false ideology)? Or do you mean that this practice makes people prioritize formal logic as the logic? I agree with you that something related to formal logic "hooks on" the existing practice of the Western election process guided by the formal logic (as if the formal logic is correct). The question for me is what exactly is this "something"?
Very broadly, ways of thinking and ways of living mutually create and sustain one another, don't they. Of course, in this relation, living and acting has a position of primacy over thinking, captured in aphorisms such as "One must eat before one can paint" or "One must have something to talk about before one can talk". But the relation is two-way noetheless.
It is of course not just parliamentary democracy which creates and sustains a culture of formal thinking, it is also the ubiquitous practice of exchanging products of labour under contract rather than actually cooperating with other people. Commercial TV has a lot to answer for as well.
Specifically, what I am saying about the practice of voting for governments in large geographical electorates would be like this. (i) The job or career of deciding how we should live we give to an institution remote from our own lives, so we externalise our selves and put our ethical powers into an alien body which then rules us; (ii) because our vote is just one vote among 100,000 votes of other people with whom we have no relation at all, we are aware that the will created in the form of a powerful state is not our will, but that of an external, alien force (why bother to vote?); (iii) thus when pondering on the meaning of our lives and how we should live we have already externalised out selves from ourselves. This is the first pre-requisite for formal thinking, external relation-to-self. Then, a public political life is conducted on our behalf in which any question can be carried if 50.1% of the population can be persuaded to vote "Yes" (although plebiscite is not the normal way of deciding, the system approximates to plebiscite); this means that a political actor has to redefine a question so as to assemble the 50.1% under "yes" and people are reduced to carriers of external characteristics of being for or against on the various isolated aspects of the issue. This produces what people call "politicians with no vision" and "thinking which only goes as far as the next election". It is the difference between the General and the Universal. For example, when there was a plebiscite in Australia over getting rid of the monarchy and having a republic, the question was so posed that when you added the number of monarchists to those who wanted a popularly elected head of state, they outnumbered those who were willing to accept as a second-best a head of state nominated by parliament (note the fact that people wanted an Individual directly responsible to the people, not a creature of the politicians). The two diametrically opposite camps both voted "no" and we are stuck with a monarchy, which had the support of only a small minority. Thus politicians treat people not as citizens and actors within a community, but as carriers of "opinions" or "attributes". They address themselves not to citizens but to opinions.
TV and other forms of mass media funded by advertising are not only one-way forms of communication, but are also designed to address the 50.1% or to target "audiences". Thus again people are atomised and reduced to passive receivers possessed of preferences and opinions, not as human beings. Every question is detached from the form of life in which it arises and treated abstractly. People's knowledge is not a knowledge from their own life, with consequences from their own actions, but a stream of arbitrarily assembled news-bytes and images, fabricated in studios.
These institutions which promote and sustain formal thinking are not 100% of human life in modernity; real life is complex and multifaceted, and people think mostly formally, but not entirely and not uniformly. But capitalist democracy and formal thinking mutually reinforce and sustain one another.
Andy
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