----- Original Message -----
From: Steve Gabosch
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2003 2:22 PM
Subject: Re: timescale question
Steve:
Sorry for the lateness of my responses; my Motherboard died and then I had problems with the Net. Also I wanted to do some coordination with Andy to "synchronize" basic concepts etc. Hegel's mode of expression is even more mysterious than Heracleitus (the obscure) and his system is still very alien to normal European (including American) thought, so dialogues on Hegel can very easily become monologues and can equally easily lose all touch with Hegelian ideas.
Anyway, it appears that Andy and I agree on most issues concerning Hegel and his relation to Marx's thinking so there's no point in going over the whole discussion. There are, however, a few additional points that I think should be made:
Your message 28/10:_______________________________________________________________________
Issue 1: Hegel as "social psychologist"
Victor, just to provoke some discussion - I would love it if you and Andy would share more of your insights on relating Hegel to activity theory, cultural psychology and the levels of social analysis we have been discussing ... perhaps it can also be said that Hegel, insofar as he was formulating a social psychology, was not only "contextualizing logic in social relations," he was also contextualizing social relations in logic.
Andy's response: 30/10
But always remember that Hegel is not just talking about "logic", he is talking about the logic of human social relations.
My response
Since I completely agree with Andy's (and your formulation of 28/10) I'll just limit my response to the context of the emphasis on the contextualisation of logic in social relations in the Oudeyis message of 26/10. For the last few years I've been working with computational social systems models (including some that are supposed to represent symbolic interactionist paradigms of sociality) that are without exception informed by pragmatic modes of analysis. That is, rationality in human relations is strictly limited to the means for achievement of objects, the determination of the objects to be achieved being treated as givens (sometimes glossed as needs). In general, the approach of most bourgeois economists and social engineers is that beliefs, desires, and intentions are irrational and are regarded as rootless, relativistic ingredients in social relations that can at best be explained as having bio-organic origins (Freud and more recently Biosociology) outside the orbit of social systems. Hegel and Marx both present models of social relations that show the role of reason in the formation of beliefs, desires, and intentions, and the viability - even necessity - for models of social life that explain objectives along with means as an integral aspect of practice.
Your response: 31/10
This makes perfect sense from a materialist point of view, keeping in mind Marx's famous quote "social being determines consciousness." In this sense, any philosopher of logic and cognitive processes - anyone who pays attention to how people think - is in effect thinking and talking about their perceptions about and insights into the logic of human social relations. But from his idealist point of view, what was Hegel's take on the relationship between human social relations and logic?
Andy's response: 31/10
According to Hegel the Logic is the movement of the Spirit in itself, and in the Absolute Idea:
"The Idea, namely, in positing itself as absolute unity of the pure Notion and its reality and thus contracting itself into the immediacy of being, is the totality in this form - nature."
and life, and human life arises out of Nature and the rest is history. People learn logic because they grow plants, crack rocks, build houses, raise animals etc., and thus Spirit becomes conscious of itself through human culture.
Although this idea of logic turning itself into material reality sounds really crazy, it is actually no worse than the normal scientific-materialist view which accepts that Nature "obeys laws" and a study of its movement allows people to "discover" these laws in Nature. This of course begs such questions are why Nature should choose to obey laws, and who is making the laws in which particular Parliament. In short, where did these laws come from? And if, in the history of science, laws are replaced by other laws, how exactly do we understand the objectivity of these laws. If they are part of nature exactly what are they made of?
My response
Besides the issue of the origin of Natural laws cited by Andy, Hegel's elevation of the Spirit and the Absolute Ideal to the role of prime mover of history, suffers from the same conundrum as does Durkheim's Social Idealism (which in his The Elementary Forms... led Emile to identify Society with god). The big poser of both models is that of identifying the conscious, autonomous mover external to the human participant. I present here two arguments concerning this difficulty of Idealistic models of this sort:
1. Undoubtedly, virtually all human behavior is learned and in our relations with others we both consciously and unconsciously tend to tailor our actions in accordance with the practices of those around us, but it this very same learning capacity that guarantees that no two individual humans share identical views no matter how long and intimate their relations with oneanother. When we speak of Ideas, Cultures, and even economic systems as entities we are dealing with abstractions that are still a long way from representing concrete conditions of human relations.
2. Neither the Idea nor Society can be shown to unequivocally reproduce itself or to evolve independent of specified activities of participating individuals (this, despite the silly analogizing of society to organism by some biogeneticists - i.e. Memes!). As Poundstone, (1988 Labyrinths of Reason Chapter 12 Omniscience pp. 239-263), points out: all the relevant neurological and other biophysical information is useless for determination of a specific single human act. On the other hand, we can only explain the development of ideas and of society as a concatenation of interactions between conscious individuals influencing and being influenced through their relations with others. Autonomy and consciousness is, clearly an emergent feature of complex organic systems, as contrasted with social systems or at least human social systems which show none of the independent, integral unity and internal harmony that one would expect from a truly emergent entity.
Issue 2: Hegel's logic as providing the link between micro and macro levels of social analysis
One of the key themes Hegel analyzes in the sections on the Doctrine of Notion, for example, is the syllogism. As for your intriguing comment about micro and macro levels of social analysis, how do you see Hegel's logic as providing the link between them?
My response
More Marx than Hegel. Or perhaps, better, Hegel through Marx.
Hegel's system can be thought of in the broadest of terms as a philosophy of knowledge - more specifically, conscious knowledge. As Andy put it in his message of 31/10, the main thrust of Hegel's work was to build a theory of knowledge as the prime mover of history. In doing so he made the very important points that awareness of world conditions is a function of conscious knowledge and that conscious knowledge is an expression of human social relations. Marx's "turning Hegel on his head" had the general effect of locating the Subjective and Objective Notions in material space and time, respectively in human thought and human practice.
our recent exchanges have concentrated mostly on the Hegelian Subjective Notion and its treatment by Marx and as such we've not really dealt with the relationships between the Notion and the world and between the Notion in the world and its products: i.e. the Absolute Idea for the Hegelian system - or as Raya Dunyevskaya calls it "the self-critical Idea," (Dunyevskaya 1973 "New thoughts on the dialectics of organization and philosophy"- its in the MIA archive) - and the the fact of permanent revolution for Marxian theory (also Dunyevskaya 1973)
The "eternal Idea" in Philosophy of Mind not only reinforced my view of Absolute Method in Science of Logic, but now that I am digging into another subject for my new work on "Dialectics of Organisation," which will take sharp issue with Lenin, both on the Idea of Cognition and on the Absolute Idea, I consider that Marx's concept of "revolution in permanence" is the "eternal Idea." (Raya Dunyevskaya 1973 last paragraph)
The result has been inordinate attention on thought and theory to the detriment of regarding its relation to practice and to the grand synthesis of practice and theory that is the "permanent revolution." To avoid confusion between the general Marxist synthesis and the specific policy debates between the 3rd and 4th international (i.e. the Communist Party and Trotsky and his followers) of the 1920's and 30's It should be noted that the permanent revolution represented here is a far broader concept than the issue of "socialism in one country" vs "international socialist revolution" (wow, we've made almost a full return to the beginning of the discussion) and is as true for analysis of the history of the British empire as it is for the current state of affairs of the Australian University system.
Despite its absolute dependence on objective conditions, conscious thought is restricted to the primary singularity of social analysis; the individual human being. As stated above, there is no material evidence whatsoever for conscious thought on the level of collective human activity. In fact so secretive is conscious thought that it can only be investigated in its manifest form as practical action: speech, writing, the making and use of visual symbols and so on. The theory of the formation of the Subjective Notion is a hypothetical model of the operation of conscious thought formulated from its manifestation as practical action - as objects - and communicated to us through practical activity - through Hegel and Marx's written presentations - which are, of course, also objects. The theory of the Subjective Notion is the microtheory of both Hegelian and Marxist systems. As such it represents the way the subjects of analysis - the interacting members of society - acquire, process, and generate practice as well as the way the investigator/activist acquires, processes and generates his models of social life.
Clearly, there are differences between the Subjective Notion and the collection of human activities and relations of social life. Conscious conceptualization involves the analysis of concrete observed conditions into a fairly small number of abstract general relations. Once established these abstractions are linked (Marx calls this concentration) to develop concrete models of economic, political and ideological systems. The rising from the abstract to the concrete through the concentration of abstractions ( this process is basically that of the assertion, negation and sublation of syllogisms we've spent so much time on) is the only way the concrete can be appropriated by thought. Marx continues the argument:
But this is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being. For example, the simplest economic category, say e.g. exchange value, presupposes population, moreover a population producing in specific relations; as well as a certain kind of family, or commune, or state, etc. It can never exist other than as an abstract, one-sided relation within an already given, concrete, living whole. As a category, by contrast, exchange value leads an antediluvian existence. Therefore, to the kind of consciousness-and this is characteristic of the philosophical consciousness-for which conceptual thinking is the real human being, and for which the conceptual world as such is thus the only reality, the movement of the categories appears as the real act of production-which only, unfortunately, receives a jolt from the outside-whose product is the world; and-but this is again a tautology-this is correct in so far as the concrete totality is a totality of thoughts, concrete in thought, in fact a product of thinking and comprehending; but not in any way a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above observation and conception; a product, rather, of the working-up of observation and conception into concepts. The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can, a way different from the artistic, religious, practical and mental appropriation of this world. The real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as long as the head's conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Hence, in the theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition. Marx 1973 (1st English publication) Grundrisse "The method of political economy," pp. 101-102. (the emphasis is mine).
The "real subject," society -the macrosystem - retains its autonomous existence in the sense that it never is other than the concrete, "...the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse" (Marx 1973 pg.101). The interface between the microsystem - the processes whereby social life is conceptualized - and the macrosystem - the world of social practice - is in the processes whereby the individual learns to objectify abstractions (and also acquires ready-made objectified abstractions from social experience) and to build from these, concepts and conceptual systems. It is his treatment of this "interface" that makes Vygotsky's work so important to the general theory of society.
General Discussion 28/10 to 30/10__________________________________________________________
Andy's statement:28/10
To explain anything in Hegel's works you have to draw attention to which particular point in his system you are talking about. So, the Notion is preceded by Being and Essence, which constitute the genesis of the Notion. The Subjective Notion is the first part of the Notion, in which the Notion is in itself, and is followed by the Objective Notion and the Idea. The three parts of the Subjection Notion are the Abstract Notion, the Judgment and the Syllogism. In the Abstract Notion, Hegel introduces its three aspects, the Individual, the Particular and the Universal. In the Individual the concept exists in the form of an individual, for example a person. In the Particular, the Notion exists as a category or class. In the Universal, the Notion exists as such. The Judgment deals with the relation of Individual to Particular, Particular to Universal and so on. The syllogism deals with the three-way relations between Individual, Particular and Universal, that is, the various ways in which I, U or P mediate between any two of I, U and P.
Clear on that?
Your response:29/10
******************
SG:
Yes, I think so.
Being
Essence
Notion
Subjective Notion
Abstract Notion - the three aspects of Notion
the Individual (I), such as a person
the Particular (P), such as a category or class
the Universal (U), a notion as such
Judgment - relations between the three aspects of Notion
the relation of Individual to Particular (I to P)
the relation of Particular to Universal (P to U)
etc.
Syllogism - mediations between the three aspects
the mediation of I between U and P
the mediation of U between I and P
the mediation of P between U and I
etc.
Objective Notion
Idea
Does this outline more or less capture your description?
**************************
Andy's response:29/10
The sequence in which Hegel treats the various propositions, judgments and syllogisms I have not paid too much attention to. Consult Science of Logic if you want to get that right.
My response:
Hegel whole philosophic system appear to me to be built in accordance with a dialectical paradigm. So his categories may be regarded in accordance with the ancient Aristotelian triad of thesis - antithesis - synthesis. Being is negated and sublated by Essence generating the Notion that negates Essence and in doing so incorporates Being and Essence in a new construct. The same can be said of the triads: Subjective Notion - Objective Notion - Idea, Abstract Notion - Judgment - Syllogism, and Universal - Particular - Singular. Or the reverse!!?
Andy's statement 28/10
OK. That was difficult enough. I don't think I can go any further without resorting to examples. Hegel uses very obscure explications of the various syllogisms which result from the various three-way relations between I, U and P, and his refutation of them to show that each proposition is fallacious, that is to say, misses the Notion. The idea is that in order to fully develop a Notion must incorporate all the syllogisms which are successively overcome (refuted, sublated) by its development. So, we need some examples.
Your response:29/10
***********************
SG:
Paraphrasing, this passage seems to me to mean that syllogisms by their nature are fallacious and miss the Notion. As a Notion develops, it overcomes (refutes, sublates), and then incorporates these syllogisms.
Is this paraphrase in the ballpark, and what is Hegel's point here?
*********************
Andy's response: 29/10
The point is that every syllogism contains a moment of truth. Some of the syllogisms that Hegel "refutes" are patently absurd, when presented as they are in purely logical terms, but still contain a moment of truth, but, as you say, they miss the Notion and are overcome in the development of the Notion...
My response
While it's important to recognize the shortcomings of each individual syllogism relative to the Notion, it is equally important to keep in mind that the Notion represents the sublated (sublated = "To supersede, put an end to, but simultaneously maintain, preserve" Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks ) of partial truths (as well as their negations) of all the syllogisms generated in the course of its production. The Notion is the synthetic product of the combined analyses of the chain of syllogisms.
Andy's statement 28/10
At one level we have an individual union member, a particular branch (a "local" in American, but equally it could be a union or division etc) and the union itself (or the entire union movement or "unionism", a true universal). Hegel goes through 12 different syllogisms. That is, he looks at 12 different combinations of I, U and P mediating between each other.
Your response:29/10
********************
SG:
12 combinations ... hmmm ...
P mediating from U to I
P mediating from I to U
U mediating from P to I
U mediating from I to P
I mediating from U to P
I mediating from P to U
What are the other 6 combinations?
****************************
Andy's response: 29/10
Without picking up the book (or the Hegel-by-HyperText site) you also have things like U-U-U or I-U-I so there are altogether 27 possible combinations!
My response
There's another possible (or perhaps additional) way of regarding the possible combinations of UPI. That is to regard the UPI system as a template for generating syllogisms. Every member of triad of elements of a syllogism can be regarded as a U, P, or I. Take, for example, Andy's example of the member, branch, and Union. A member can be singular: Steve G, member of local 245 (my union experience is American); particular, the members of local 245; or universal, the membership (or the principle of membership). So for each of the 6 members of the UPI template there are at least 6 possible arrangements of the triad under consideration. That should bring us up to 36 possible syllogisms. If we include Andy's proposal (sorry Andy but I have my doubts) then we would have 729 possible syllogisms. Whatever the number, surely even Hegel tired of the exercise somewhere around the 12th syllogism.
Andy's statement 29/10
The point is that every syllogism contains a moment of truth. Some of the syllogisms that Hegel "refutes" are patently absurd, when presented as they are in purely logical terms, but still contain a moment of truth, but, as you say, they miss the Notion and are overcome in the development of the Notion. Hegel claims that his logical presentation reveals the movement of Spirit. In non-metaphysical terms, Notions concretise themselves in their development in culture and history in this way. This can be seen as the relative truth of various "maxims", as the development of specific social relations, and the deepening of the idea itself.
Your response: 30/10
This in turn has me thinking of the truth as something in perpetual development - the idea that truth is something in constant motion (the "movement of Spirit" in Hegel's system) that can be captured only incompletely when using the inadequate (incomplete) methods of formal logic. I get from your explanations that Hegel scrutinizes key elements of formal logic - the identification and analysis of aspects (individuality, particularity, and universality), the making of judgments about their relations (U/I, I/P, U/P etc.), the use of syllogisms describing their possible mediations (I-U-P, U-P-I) etc., and the creation of maxims derived from these methods - and then concludes that the truth in the hands of these methods of formal logic can capture the truth only for moments. In this way, Hegel points to the larger task of applying much more than just formal logic to understanding the truth.
My response
Again, it is critical here to consider the sublation of the stages of the dialectical process in the final product; the Notion. The truths of the syllogisms do not simply pass away with their negation, they are incorporated into the final product. Here is what Marx has to say on the dialectical process vis a vis the Notion of Capitalism
Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic organization of production. The categories which express its relations, the comprehension of its structure, thereby also allows insights into the structure and the relations of production of all the vanished social formations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up, whose partly still unconquered remnants are carried along within it, whose mere nuances have developed explicit significance within it, etc. Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of higher development among the subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the higher development is already known. The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the ancient, etc. But not at all in the manner of those economists who smudge over all historical differences and see bourgeois relations in all forms of society. One can understand tribute, tithe, etc., if one is acquainted with ground rent. But one must not identify them. Further, since bourgeois society is itself only a contradictory form of development, relations derived from earlier forms will often be found within it only in an entirely stunted form, or even travestied. For example, communal property. Although it is true, therefore, that the categories of bourgeois economics possess a truth for all other forms of society, this is to be taken only with a grain of salt. They can contain them in a developed, or stunted, or caricatured form etc., but always with an essential difference. The so-called historical presentation of development is founded, as a rule, on the fact that the latest form regards the previous ones as steps leading up to itself, and, since it is only rarely and only under quite specific conditions able to criticize itself-leaving aside, of course, the historical periods which appear to themselves as times of decadence-it always conceives them one-sidedly. The Christian religion was able to be of assistance in reaching an objective understanding of earlier mythologies only when its own self-criticism had been accomplished to a certain degree, so to speak. Likewise, bourgeois economics arrived at an understanding of feudal, ancient, oriental economics only after the self-criticism of bourgeois society had begun. In so far as the bourgeois economy did not mythologically identify itself altogether with the past, its critique of the previous economies, notably of feudalism, with which it was still engaged in direct struggle, resembled the critique which Christianity leveled against paganism, or also that of Protestantism against Catholicism. (Marx Grundrisse Methods of Political Economy" - yeah, Andy, again)
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