Andy responded:
>Yes. But correctly interpreting the meaning of scientific laws turns out
>to be not as obvious as it seems at first.
>Steve said:
>Thank you. I agree. To be sure, any generalization - "natural law" - is
>subject to further interpretations and refinements as human knowledge
>(hopefully) progresses, and eventually whole systems of generalizations,
>once thought to apply universally, become subjected to more and more
>exceptions, more and more qualifications and limitations, more and more
>critical interpretations - such as Newton's laws of mechanics, now a
>special case of the larger and more universal field of quantum
>mechanics. And so will be the fate of all scientific laws, including
>those of quantum mechanics and even dialectical materialism. The
>parliament of modern science is ever-revising its observations and
>theories, and no law, no matter how deeply etched it might be in a stone
>tablet, is absolute. There will always be better ways to understand
>things. Whether we understand the meanings of these understandings and
>put them into practice in time is the historic problem.
No, you miss my point. I'm off to the airport shortly, so I'll have to
break off, and then over the next week my replies may be a bit erratic. ...
must go!
Andy
>Andy remarked:
>>Steve, I will respond to your points one at a time, but you might reflect
>>on the observation that if you were to re-write your message inserting
>>the word "God" in lieu of "Nature" and the names of the various Christian
>>saints and prophets in lieu of the names of Marxist figures, it would
>>read perfectly well as a defence of Christianity. Are we really disputing
>>over the name of God?
>
>No, I didn't at all think we were disputing the name of God, or, in
>general, discussing the comparison of Marxism and scientific thinking in
>general to religious ideology. I must admit, I didn't expect this
>discussion to head in this kind of direction. It appears that you are
>drawing parallels between dialectical materialism and religion. Is this
>your intent?
>
>
>>... why not say "Plekhanov, Stalin, Mao" instead of "Engels, Lenin,
>>Vygotsky", after all it was Plekhanov who invented the term?
>
>If I get your comment, you are pointing out that Plekhanov invented the
>term dialectical materialism. Something in the back of my brain wants to
>say it was Kautsky who first popularized it - somebody did - (another
>tidbit for a dictionary of philosophical etymology) - but the point you
>make is the same, Marx and Engels did not originally invent this term.
>
>I would agree that Plekhanov belongs on the list of dialectical
>materialists - which includes Engels, Lenin and Vygotsky - that adhere to
>the "two great camps" thesis, but I personally draw the line at including
>Stalin and Mao. I would not include Marxist philosophy on their list of
>historic accomplishments - in my opinion, they did much damage and no good
>to dialectical materialism as a mode of scientific thought.
>
>
>>Steve said:
>>>Andy, what do you believe happened in the post-world war two period - or
>>>for that matter, since the latter half of the 19th century - that has
>>>invalidated or rendered obsolete the positions of Engels, Lenin,
>>>Vygotsky and others on the historic struggle between idealism and
>>>materialism in science and philosophy?
>
>Andy responded:
>>One of the things we have learnt from Hegel is the concept of
>>"Zeitgeist", and the way the focus of struggle changes in the course of
>>history. Despite Engels' observation about "two great camps", this
>>conception does not withstand an actual study of the history of
>>philosophy. A reading of the history of philosophy (and even more
>>science) shows that the focus of disputes changes from generation to
>>generation.
>
>
>As you stress, the precise focus of struggle certainly changes with the
>course of history and from generation to generation, but this point does
>not necessarily invalidate Engels' thesis that the struggle of the "two
>great camps" of idealism and materialism is underlying philosophical
>debate in general. What actual study of the history of philosophy in your
>opinion provides contrary evidence to this traditional Marxist
>thesis? What analysis does it not withstand?
>
>Andy continued:
>>"Materialism vs. Idealism" was indeed the focus of philosophical struggle
>>in the wake of the collapse of Hegelianism in 1841, until sometime close
>>to the beginning of the first world war, i.e., exactly that period when
>>the classics of Marxism were written.
>
>This sentence points once more to the need to distinguish a "focus" from
>an "underlying debate." I would agree that the focus of the struggle did
>shift, but in my thinking, while the forms of the discussion moved to new
>parameters, the underlying debate between the ideologies of idealism and
>materialism has remained the essential point of contention. In your
>comments, you agree that this was the case up to a point, but then things
>changed. What do you believe happened just before WWI that changed this
>situation?
>
>Andy continued:
>>Now Marx, Engels and Lenin are beyond criticism in taking a clear
>>position in the forefront of the philosophical dispute of their day, but
>>it gives no glory to their followers to repeat these arguments in a later
>>period. Need I explain that this does not mean that failing to join in
>>this ancient battle means joining the enemy (i.e., idealist) camp; it
>>simply means to fight the battle of today rather than the battle of the
>>day before yesterday.
>
>Once again, I suspect we are wrestling here with distinctions of form and
>content. If the idealist camp is still the "enemy", isn't there still a
>battle? I suggest these essentially opposed conceptions of the world are
>still at the root and comprise the essential content of contemporary
>scientific and philosophical debate. I am with Engels, Vygotsky and their
>followers on this. But I am certainly interested in arguments to the
>contrary, and I welcome your thoughts on this.
>
>At the same time, and to emphasize the very valid point I believe you are
>making, the forms and foci of this debate have indeed shifted since the
>19th century and with the successive generations. So here is my take, see
>what you think. As the 20th century rolled on, many forms of what I would
>call mechanical and objectivist materialism became dominant in many
>quarters of scientific reasoning, replacing the openly idealist tendencies
>predominant in the late 19th century, especially in the social
>sciences. This has accelerated in recent decades, to the point where it
>might be valid to argue that objectivist-mechanical materialism in social
>science is the new form of philosophical idealism. A common methodology
>associated with this trend of materialism - which I am suggesting is a
>form of idealism in disguise - is to promote biological explanations for
>social activity. Hence, a major focus in modern social science philosophy
>today is on the role of biology in human affairs. Two popular
>contemporary trends provide examples: one, the tendency to look at the
>human genome as a direct cause of human behavior and ailment; another, the
>tendency to seek explanations of modern behavior in speculations about how
>and why bio-psychological characteristics originally evolved.
>
>This view attempts to take into account both the general historic truth of
>the struggle of "two great camps" thesis as well as the specific changing
>forms and foci of their ideological debates. Thoughts?
>
>
>Andy said:
>>My point is that in the sense in which the word "Nature" is used in
>>philosophy (as opposed to meaning "the birds and the bees", etc), it
>>means exactly the same thing as "God".
>
>As you surmised, I am not religious, and I do not mean God when I say
>Nature. Perhaps I create a problem when I capitalize the "n" in
>nature. In doing so, I may be guilty of trying to sound pretentiously
>Philosophical. But by Nature I really just mean the Birds and the
>Bees. So, please, let me restate my original question as: "is nature
>lawful?". Asking "is Nature lawful" may have gotten us off Track - I
>mean, track. :-))
>
>
>>Steve said:
>>>As I understand it, reification is the process of treating thoughts as
>>>real objects and acting accordingly. Surely, I am misreading your
>>>statement if I take it to mean that the process of reification in
>>>general is a valid practical guide to day-to-day action. What am I
>>>missing in your statement?
>Andy responded:
>>No you did not misread me. If I treat a policeman with the respect due to
>>the law, I am being wise. Equally well I don't step in front of the thing
>>I call "bus" (unless its indicators are blinking).
>
>Andy a few sentences later said:
>>If I were to act as if socialist society had arrived, and not bother
>>about earning a wage or paying for what I take from the shop I would have
>>a very bad life.
>
>
>The last example demonstrates why the process of reification in general
>cannot in my opinion be a reliable guide to day-to-day action. In
>reification, thoughts, including false thoughts about what rules a society
>expects us to follow, may not serve us well in practical action. From the
>materialist point of view, much more practical than treating abstract
>thoughts as real, is thinking concretely about reality. As for stepping
>in front of a bus with its indicators blinking: the assumption that a
>blinking turn signal means that a bus is actually turning is another
>example of reification - the substitution of a semiotic sign for a real
>event. As any wise pedestrian knows, it is best to observe the real
>motion of the bus before proceeding. :-))
>
>
>Thanks for your posts, Andy.
>- Steve
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Dec 01 2003 - 01:00:11 PST