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These files are maintained strictly for historical reference, research, and recordkeeping purposes,
and the content has not been altered or updated since archiving.
Content on this site may not meet current digital accessibility standards.
If you require an alternative, accessible format of any information found on this site,
please contact Bruce Jones, bjones@ucsd.edu to request an accommodation.
A quick thought or two. in my interpretation of leont'ev, "individual
activity" is an oxymoron. "individual in activity" makes sense nevertheless,
and nearly precipitates out of the category "division of labor", when
different people must do diferent things, while in coordination with each
other, and while responsible to each other. recognition of the individual in
activity makes theoretically possible contrary decisions, freedom of choice,
responsibility. as boyce aptly put it, there is no responsibility for action
without freedom of choice.
Agent could be what a person is while making things happen, and subject could
be what others are as a theorist studies them, an unfortunate carry over from
when people were experimented on?. that is not to say agent and subject are
mutually exclusive, as one cannot study interventions without being both.
yet is it possible that activity theory is slow to respond to the tide
because subject is its anchor?
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