Re: The "individual" in socioculturalism

From: Ricardo Ottoni Vaz Japiassu (rjapias@uol.com.br)
Date: Wed May 01 2002 - 06:53:20 PDT


Reading your post, I remembered V's "Psychology of actor" where he claims that the psychology of a character may not lay only on the psychology of its private life, but has to account the social psychology of a certain era, and the art psychology embeded in the artistic creation of a particular dramatist. In other words: the meaning of a word is related to the phrase where it is found, the meaning of the phrase along the paragraph, the paragraph's meaning in the chapiter, the chapiter's one in the book, and the book into the hole production of a writer...
  -----Mensagem original-----
  De: Keith Sawyer <ksawyer@artsci.wustl.edu>
  Para: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
  Data: Terça-feira, 30 de Abril de 2002 21:52
  Assunto: The "individual" in socioculturalism

  Regarding Nate Schmolze's response to my comments about "degrees of
  separability":

  I think I was implicitly raising a new issue. To me, it seems that a lot
  of socioculturalists take a rather strong position that all knowledge and
  cognition is fundamentally socially embedded, and consequently that
  individualistic psychology is wrong-headed and should not exist at all. I
  quote such claims in the "Unresolved tensions" article, and this is
  Giddens' position as well. But to my mind, this is too extreme; I think
  that there will always be a place for traditional--and even
  experimental--cognitive psychology, and that it's a mistake for us to try
  to construct a research program that can only succeed if cognitive
  psychology fails.

  In this I am thinking along the lines of many of the math educators in
  Kirshner and Whitson's volume SITUATED COGNITION (1997 Erlbaum), which I
  have just been reading since the AERA. In their introduction, the editors
  argue a focus on "communities of practice" has often resulted in
  a-psychological ethnographic study, and they claim "the notion of the
  individual in situated cognition theory needs to be fundamentally
  reformulated" (p. 9). (Jaan Valsiner has frequently made similar arguments
  that "the individual" is neglected in sociocultural work.) Paul Cobb et
  al., in their awesome chapter, contrast the "sociocultural perspective"
  with the "emergent perspective." The former "give priority to social and
  cultural processes" and thus they leave little room for psychological
  approaches; they associate this with Vygotsky, I think accurately. In the
  emergent perspective, "individual thought and social and cultural processes
  are considered to be reflexively related, with neither attributed absolute
  priority over the other" (p. 152). And like I conclude in my "emergence in
  psychology" article, they write "The extent to which either a psychological
  or a social analysis is brought to the fore in any particular situation is
  a pragmatic issue that reflects the purposes at hand" (p. 152).

  The implications are that sometimes the psychological analysis will be the
  best one, and will then inform our understanding of the sociocultural
  level; not always the other way around. It depends on the "degree of
  separability"--that's what I was trying to get at in my last posting.

  R. Keith Sawyer

  http://www.keithsawyer.com/
  Assistant Professor
  Department of Education
  Washington University
  Campus Box 1183
  St. Louis, MO 63130
  314-935-8724



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