Phil,
I like the way you pose the problem:
"Certainly the meaning of 'subjective' that translates to 'depends on one's
point of view' is hopeless and unuseful to me, if only because it raises the
question 'and what does one's point of view depends on'?"
A few years ago, I was bugged by the same question. So I decided to conduct a
little research in search of a possible answer to this question. The results
of the study undertaken indicated that subjective states (and social
behaviors) are influenced by paradigmatic domains or cultural scenarios such
as: (a) the culture of the family of origin, (b) religion or theology, (c)
peer culture, (d) media, (e) psychology education or psychotherapy, and (f)
other socialization factors, including environmental support and physical
environmental factors. In other words, subjectivity is very much related to
one's normative (intersubjective) world and the discourses and practices of
the community in which one belongs. The ability to redefine one's own
situation and to reposition oneself vis-à-vis others, both involve the use of
imagination, which requires detachment of oneself from and reconfiguration of
one's normative world and the discourses and practices of the community in
which one belongs.
Bill, it is interesting that you "now think of objectivity as an
intersubjectivity." What became apparent in the study I conducted was that
much of what is experienced as subjective is intersubjective indeed. Some
critical ethnographers would define "objectivity" as "expressed general
consensus" rather than "intersubjectivity," in that intersubjectivity is
usually taken to be tacit. Objective then could be that which has multiple
access, as opposed to subjective-that which has privileged access. In that
sense, like Judy and Diane pointed out, "the subjective refers to the lived
experience" of events the subject is subjected to.
Susan, in my study, it appeared that, like all social categories and routines
and identity, subjectivity is a dynamic process constituted through discourse
, in agreement with Emile Benveniste, and others (Hollway, 1984; Potter &
Edwards, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and practice or interactional
experience (Mead, 1934). However, unlike Giddens's (1991) "reflexive project"
(his view of identity), subjectivity seems best characterized as a
pre-reflective opening out onto, and engagement with alterity, rather that in
an experience or objectification of it (Crossley, 1993). Features of our
experience are only made possible through our relations with others. Thus,
there appears to be an ongoing process of interpenetration between
subjectivity and intersubjectivity. I believe that a similar
conceptualization of subjectivity may be quite compatible with Edward
Sampson's proposed new unit for psychological inquiry--the Acting Ensemble
(2001).
By decontextualizing the self-as a social and cultural artifact-and by
studying subjectivity independently from the world of shared meanings
(Habermas' "lifeworld" or intersubjectivity) of which it is constituted to a
great extent, social science and practice subject both to a process of
reification.
Mike, would the title of the book that discusses this issue you have been
trying to remember be by any chance "Changing the subject: Psychology, social
regulation, and subjectivity," by Henriquez, J., Hollway, W., Urwin, C.,
Venn, C., & Walkerdine, V. (1984)?
I'm enjoying the discussion and hope it will continue.
Doris.
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