I will try and respond to some of the other emails, but thought it better to
get this out first.
In section 9, Vygotsky examines the relationship between language and
scientific conceptualisation. In line with both his insistence on the fact
that concepts must precede knowledge gathering and his focus on word meaning
as the basic unit in which concepts are expressed, he emphasises that the
language of science changes with and through developments in the science
itself. "The language reveals as it were the molecular changes that the
science goes through." (282)
The words used themselves provide both 'a philosophy of that fact, its
theory, its system' and at the same time a framework for scientific
investigation. "The selection of terms and concepts predetermines the
outcome of an investigation." (287). Thus Pavlov's 'investigations led to a
theory of higher nervous activity rather than a chapter on the functioning
of the salivary glands', having located his experiment at 'an enormously
high theoretical level'.
'The word, like the sun in a drop of water, fully reflects the processes and
tendencies in the development of a science. A certain fundamental unity of
knowledge in science comes to light which goes from the highest principles
to the selection of a word. What guarantees this unity of the whole
scientific system? The fundamental methodological skeleton. The
investigator, insofar as he is not a technician, a registrar, an executor,
is always a philosopher who during the investigation and description is
thinking about the phenomena, and his way of thinking is revealed in the
words he uses.' (288)
To pretend otherwise is not to somehow escape philosophy by means of a pure,
empirical science, but rather to fall prey to unsystematic, thought:
'The experimenters in the natural sciences imagine that they free themselves
from philosophy when they ignore it, but they turn out to be slaves of the
worst philosophy, which consists of a medley of fragmentary and unsystematic
views, since investigators cannot move a single step forwards without
thinking, and thinking requires logical definitions.' (291) (I think this is
a rejigging of Marx or Engels but don't have the footnotes to check.)
'We see, therefore, that scientific research is at the same time a study of
the fact and—of the methods used to know this fact. In other words,
methodological work is done in science itself insofar as this science moves
forward and reflects upon its results. The choice of a word is already a
methodological process. That methodology and experiment are worked out
simultaneously can be seen with particular ease in the case of Pavlov. Thus,
science is philosophical down to its ultimate elements, to its words. It is
permeated, so to speak, by methodology. This coincides with the Marxist view
of philosophy as “the science of sciences,” a synthesis that penetrates
science. In this sense Engels [1925/1978, p. 480] remarked that 'Natural
scientists may say what they want, but they are ruled by philosophy. . ..
Not until natural science and the science of history have absorbed
dialectics will all the philosophical fuss. .become superfluous and
disappear in the positive science.''
Here is the quote from Engels that Ricardo quoted. It is first of all
perhaps worth noting that this view is controversial within Marxism and that
there are plenty of Marxists who also denounce Engels' positivism. However,
I think it is worth looking at the origins of this idea and what he means by
it. The idea that philosophy will be superceded by science is not
necessarily associated with positivism. It comes from Feuerbach
(pre-positivism) who identified philosophy (particularly in its Hegelian
form) with religion in that it provides an alienated picture of the human
essence. (Incidentally, Peter Keiler has argued that LSV was strongly
influenced by Feuerbach, both in 'Crisis' and elsewhere.) Alongside an
anthropology that would be a science of humanity, natural science would
undermine the basis of philosophy in the same way as it would undermine
religion. From there it was carried over to Engels who believed (partly
rightly, partly wrongly as it turned out) that scientific thought would
naturally develop in a dialectical materialist direction. The 'proof' of
dialectical materialism would be in the natural and social worlds rather
than in the creation of philosophical systems.
Philosophy would then die a natural death or at least be reduced to
questions of scientific method - but 'not until' then. I see the logic of
the argument, but am sceptical as to whether philosophy will ever quite
wither away in that manner.
At the start of section 10, Vygotsky moves towards an overall analysis of
the crisis of psychology starting from a dialectical conception of science
as a 'a living system which constantly develops and moves forward, and which
consists of proven facts, laws, suppositions, structures, and conclusions
which are continually being supplemented, criticized, verified, partially
rejected, interpreted and organized anew, etc.'
Vygotsky reiterates five points of Lange's analysis of the crisis (294-5):
'(1) There is no generally accepted system of our science. Each of the
expositions of psychology by eminent authors is based upon an entirely
different system…
(2) The crisis is destructive, but wholesome. It reveals the growth of the
science, its enrichment, its force, not its impotence or bankruptcy. The
serious nature of the crisis is caused by the fact that the territory of
psychology lies between sociology and biology, between whith Kant wanted to
divide it.
(3) Not a single psychological work is possible without first establishing
the basic principles of this science. One should lay the foundations before
starting to build.
(4) Finally, the common goal is to elaborate a new theory—a “renewed system
of the science.” However, Lange’s understanding of this goal is entirely
incorrect. For him it is “the critical evaluation of all contemporary
currents and the attempt to reconcile them” (Lange, 1914, p. 43). And he
tried to reconcile what cannot be reconciled…'
Thus again we hear that this possibility depends on 'whether the
contradictions that divide psychology are soluble or whether they are
irreconcilable', (297) in which case the crisis will presumably continue.
Yet
again (rightly, in my view) he attacks the view that a 'mix and match'
combination of contradictory viewpoints can resolve the crisis.
Vygotsky does consider the possibility that the crisis will not be resolved
just before this assage, but in terms of a definitive rupture between
different schools ather than the continuation of a discipline in which they
coexist. I think it is fair to ascribe to Vygotsky an over-rationalistic
approach whereby the most scientific ideas will naturally win out over
others. Thus he saw the crisis of psychology as something that would
essentially be resolved by the creation of a new synthesis, without
considering some of the external social factors that led to the preservation
of reflexology, behaviourism etc as living, if flawed, schools of
psychology. This is ironic as he specifically says that the social context
is important in explaining the nature of the crisis. Thus as Laszlo
discussed, the crisis turned out to be something much more long-lived than
LSV expected, which hasn't totally prevented the development of psychology
as empirical science.
Bruce
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