----- Original Message -----
From: "Mike Cole" <mcole@weber.ucsd.edu>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: 09 October 2001 16:56
Subject: psychological theory
>
> One problem I appear to share with Alena and Diane (at least) is that I
> have great doubts about the viablity of psychology as a discipline
separate
> from anthropology, sociology, linguistics, etc. Which is why I am in a
> department of communication where mediation is THE central concept.
The use of mediation as a unifying concept is precisely what I am working on
in a paper as a suggested solution to the crisis
of the information systems discipline where I believe it also fits very
well! Though obviously the differing subject matter means the two fields are
differently located as interdisciplinary endeavours.
Getting back to LSV's 'Crisis', this seems to me to show that there is some
validity to his notion of the 'general science', which, he suggests,
flows not just directly from the content and crisis of psychology, but also
from the relationship between disciplinary divisions and empirical science
(of necessity one-sided and concerned with the particular), on the one hand,
and the need to have a integrative metatheory.
Vygotsky argues that such a theory must necessarily be multi-disciplinary
and integrative for reasons that flow from the structure of knowledge in
general (p.240):
"We see that the tendency to generalise and unite knowledge turns or grows
into a tendency to explain this knowledge. The unity of the generalising
concept grows into the unity of the explanatory principle, because to
explain means to establish a connection between one fact or a group of facts
and another group, to refer to another series of phenomena. For science to
explain means to explain causally. As long as the unification is carried out
within a single discipline, such an explanation is established by the causal
linkage of the phenomena that lie within a single area. But as soon as we
proceed to the generalisation across different disciplines, the unification
of different areas of facts, the generalisation of the second order, we
immediately must search for an explanation of a higher order as well, i.e.,
we must search for the link of all areas of the given knowledge with the
facts that lie outside of them. In this way the search for an explanatory
principle leads us beyond the boundaries of the given science and compels us
to find the place of the given area of phenomena amidst the wider circle of
phenomena.
"This second tendency, which is the basis of the isolation of a general
science, is the tendency toward a unified explanatory principle and toward
transcending the borders of the given science in the search for the place of
the given category of being within the general system of being and the given
science within the general system of knowledge. This tendency can already be
observed in the competition of the separate disciplines for supremacy. Since
the tendency of becoming an explanatory principle is already present in
every generalising concept, and since the struggle between the disciplines
is a struggle for the generalising concept, this second tendency must
inevitably appear as well."
Two questions seem to follow from this. Firstly, is it generally true (e.g.
for the humanities or natural sciences) or does it apply particularly to
those disciplines that are on the fault line between the 'hard' and the
'soft', between science / engineering and the social sciences such as both
psychology and information systems? At least in part LSV argues that the
need for a general science is specifically rooted in the problems of
psychology. Secondly, how does CHAT measure up to Vygotsky's notion of a
'general science', both in terms of its historical development and its real
and potential status as a unifying metatheory
across existing disciplines? Are extensions / amendments necessary to
perform that role? (I have some ideas on this, but will leave the questions
hanging for now.)
It
> gives me an odd slant on reading about the crisis in psychology.
> mike
Please say more, Mike.
Bruce
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