Phil,
No this is definitely not the case. Every area of the world has specialists
who are trained in that area's languages at various Language Institutes
although many people who work in the State Department come there with area
specializations. I've listened to some people the past week who were area
specialists. As to the question of "linguists" I'm really not sure. A lot
of people who end up working in the state department come ffrom a wide
variety of academic backgrounds. But as to actually having the job of a
linguist with the state department I don't know. On USAID projects
linguists have probably been used and I know USAID monies have been used to
support literacy in indigenous languages in Peru in the early 70s.
I don't think it so much that there aren't specialists. They are probably
listened to selectively.
Paul H. Dillon
----- Original Message -----
From: Phillip Capper <phillip.capper@webresearch.co.nz>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Saturday, September 15, 2001 8:29 PM
Subject: RE: a contrast [another point of view]
> Thank you Paul. I think you are absolutely right. Your analysis and
Beeman's
> makes perfect sense to me. I think that the particular risk is the
toppling
> of pro American governments in Middle Eastern states. I also strongly
agree
> with the comment on the relationship between technology and war.
>
> Finally I despair of the failure of US foreign policy analysis and its
> inability to learn from experience. Did I read it right? - that it was
only
> LAST WEEK that Congress approved appropriations to allow the State
> Department to employ linguists and Middle East specialists?!
>
> Phillip Capper,
> Centre for Research on Work, Education and Business Ltd. (WEB Research),
> Level 9
> 142 Featherston Street
> (PO Box 2855)
> WELLINGTON
> New Zealand
>
> Ph: +64 4 499 8140
> Fx: +64 4 499 8395
> Mb: +64 021 519 741
>
> http://www.webresearch.co.nz
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul H.Dillon [mailto:illonph@pacbell.net]
> Sent: Sunday, 16 September 2001 1:12 p.m.
> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> Subject: Re: a contrast [another point of view]
>
>
> Phil,
>
> You characterized bin Laden as a "frightening idealogue" who could not
exist
> without the desperate and alienated masses from whom to draw recruits. I
> think it is very important to be as informed as possible about who bin
Laden
> is and what his aims are and also to understand as clearly as possible the
> nature of the desperation and alienation. The cultural historical
dimensions
> of this are immense. Many people (e.g., Colin Powell) are telling us that
> bin Laden hates Americans because they hate "our freedom", "our success",
> etc. but that doesn't seem to be the case. Last night in this area, the
> public tv network ran a documentary on bin Laden. He clearly was a minor
> figure who owes much of his prominence and importance to prior U.S.
> reactions to him: . the US created him twice: first directly by working
with
> him in Afghanistan and then later by getting him kicked out of Sudan.
As
> to his aims I think the report that I've appended below, written by an
> anthropologist who has been living in Tajikistan - northwest of
> Afghanistan - for four years,, provides an even better picture of the
nature
> of bin Laden's "organization" than the PBS documentary. He shows it to
be
> an organization motivated by cells or "tribes" who have their own specific
> complaints, their own different sources of desperation and alienation that
> might vary nationally. One key point concerns the Palestinian cells
since
> their issue, the resolution of the source of their alienation and
> desperation, can only be resolved through a change of the US's Israel
> policy, a change Colin Powell has made categorically clear that the U.S.
> will not make. The specific complaints of the other "cells" might have
> easier resolutions, the causes of desperation and alienation might be
easier
> to address. It's important to know what those real specific causes are.
>
> Admitting that the U.S. has an enemy, it seems imperative that we know who
> it is and what's its real aims are. That's if you want to have an
effective
> strategy. But it seems that that doesn't matter in the U.S. According
to
> one survey, 71% of the people surveyed thought the U.S. should retaliate
> militarily even if it means that there will be civilian casualties but
only
> 44% of the people think it will be effective in stopping terrorism.
That's
> a blood lust factor of 27%. Unfortunately, I think bin Laden has
> calculated exactly what the U.S. response to last week's actions will be.
> The U.S. government apparently didn't learn shit from the Vietnam
experience
> about the relationship between the technology of war and the people who
> fight it. And he certainly knows that the coming response insofar as it
> will clearly kill civilians (I haven't turned the TV on yet so I don't
know
> if it's started) will unite part of the Arab world behind him even more
> than Clinton's bombing of the Sudan and Afghanistan did; it will only
> clearly confirm the message he's making. Many Arab countries have pro-US
> regimes that could be toppled if support for bin Laden's anti-American
> campaign grows , perhaps as easily as the government in Iran in 1979. I
> wonder if even all the rest of the nations of the world could subdue a
> united Arab world without throwing us into an apocalyptic orgy of death
and
> misery.
>
>
> Paul H. Dillon
>
>
> >Beyond bin Laden - why are we so hated?
> >by William O. Beeman Pacific News Service
> >
> >PROVIDENCE, Rhode Island - The United States risks a severe
> >miscalculation in dealing with the destruction of the World Trade
> >Center and the attack on the Pentagon on Tuesday. This event is not an
> >isolated instance of violence. This is not an "act of war." It is one
> >symptom of a cancer that threatens to metastasize.
> >
> >The root cause is not terrorist activity, as has been widely stated.
> >It is the relationship between the United States and the Islamic
> >world. Until this central cancerous problem is treated, Americans will
> >never be free from fear.
> >
> >Merely locating and hunting down a single "guilty party" in this case
> >will not stop future violence: such an action will not destroy the
> >organization of terrorist cells already established throughout the
> >world. Of greater importance, it will do nothing to alleviate the
> >residual enmity against America.
> >
> >The perpetrators of the original attack on the World Trade Center in
> >1993 were caught and convicted. This did not stop the attack on
> >Tuesday.
> >
> >The chief suspect is the Saudi Arabian Osama bin Laden, or his
> >surrogates. He has been mischaracterized as an anti-American
> >terrorist. He should rather be thought of as someone who would do
> >anything to protect Islam.
> >
> >Bin Laden began his career fighting the Soviet occupation of
> >Afghanistan in 1979, when he was 22 years old. He has not only
> >resisted the Soviets, but also the Serbians in Yugoslavia. His anger
> >was directed against the United States primarily because of the U.S.
> >presence in the Gulf region, more particularly in Saudi Arabia itself
> >- the site of the most sacred Islamic religious sites.
> >
> >According to bin Laden, during the Gulf War America co-opted the
> >rulers of Saudi Arabia to establish a military presence in order to
> >kill Muslims in Iraq. In a religious decree issued in 1998, he gave
> >religious legitimacy to attacks on Americans in order to stop the
> >United States from "occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of
> >places." His decree also extends to Jerusalem, home of the sacred
> >Muslim site the al-Aqsa Mosque.
> >
> >Bin Laden will not cease his opposition until the United States leaves
> >the region. Paradoxically, his strategy for convincing the United
> >States to do so seems drawn from the American foreign policy playbook.
> >When the United States disapproves of the behavior of another nation,
> >it "turns up the heat" on that nation through embargoes, economic
> >sanctions or withdrawal of diplomatic representation. In the case of
> >Iraq following the Gulf War, America employed military action,
> >resulting in the loss of civilian life.
> >
> >The State Department has theorized that if the people of a rogue
> >nation experience enough suffering, they will overthrow their rulers,
> >or compel them to adopt more sensible behavior.
> >
> >The terrorist actions in New York and Washington are a clear and
> >ironic implementation of this strategy against the United States.
> >
> >Bin Laden takes no credit for actions emanating from his training
> >camps in Afghanistan. A true ideologue, he believes that his mission
> >is sacred, and he wants only to see clear results. For this reason,
> >the structure of his organization is essentially tribal, or cellular,
> >in modern political terms. His followers are as fervent and intense in
> >their belief as he is.
> >
> >They carry out their actions because they believe in the rightness of
> >their cause, not because of bin Laden's orders or approval.
> >
> >Groups are trained in Afghanistan, and then establish their own
> >centers in places as far-flung as Canada, Africa and Europe. Each cell
> >is technologically sophisticated, and may have a different set of
> >motivations for attacking the United States.
> >
> >Palestinian members of his group see Americans as supporters of Israel
> >in the current conflict between the two nations. In the Palestinian
> >view, Ariel Sharon's ascendancy to leadership of Israel has triggered
> >a new era, with U.S. government officials failing to pressure the
> >Israeli government to end violence against Palestinians. Palestinian
> >cell members will not cease their opposition until the United States
> >changes its relationship with the Israeli state.
> >
> >Above all, Americans need to remember that the rest of the world has
> >an absolute right to self-determination that is as defensible as our
> >own. A despicable act of terror such as that committed in New York and
> >Washington is a measure of the revulsion that others feel at U.S.
> >actions that seemingly limit those rights. If we perpetuate a cycle of
> >hate and revenge, this conflict will escalate into a war that our
> >great-grandchildren will be fighting.
> >
> >This is the first in a series by PNS contributor William O. Beeman, a
> >specialist on Middle East culture at Brown University who has written
> >extensively on Iran, where the Islamic Revolution began in November,
> >1978. Beeman has worked for the past four years in Tajikistan, where
> >he has monitored developments in Afghanistan.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Oct 10 2001 - 15:49:15 PDT