Dot Robbins wrote.
"However, the core of
Vygotsky's view consists in the fact that by means of signs, mental
functions are brought outwards, objectivized, and transformed into
external...actions and activities."
This seems very strange to me but it seems to be the position that underlies
everything else in the message.
Do I have it wrong then? I thought Vygotsky's theory was exactly the
opposite.
I throw my finger randomly across the pages of a book chosen randomly from
the shelf that has books by and about Vygtosky and come up with the
following passage in Wertsch's "Vygotsky and the Social Formation of the
Mind" (p 62):
"It is necessary that everything internal in higher forms was external, that
is, for others if was what is now is for oneself. [Wonderfully non-dualistic
distinction of external/internal]. Any higfher mental function necessarily
goes through an external stage in its development because it is initially a
social function. Thjis is the center of the whole problem of internal and
external behavior . . . When we speak of a process, "external" means
"social". Any higher medntal function was external because it was social at
some point before becoming an internal, truly mental function."
I wonder, Dot, whether you could present some evidence from Vygotsky's
writing to substantiate your rather unusual claim concerning the nature and
meaning of his theory.
Paul H. Dillon
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