25 october 2000
from peter jones, sheffield hallam university
RUBINSHTEIN AND VYGOTSKY/LEONTYEV: DIFFERENCES
While we're still on this subject I thought I would add to the discussion of
the differences between R & L. I think this may repeat some of the points from
the very interesting posts from the archive and from general discussion, so
apologies for that. Some of the points below are rather sketchy (I understand
some of them more than others!). My understanding of the differences comes from
reading some of the works of R and L, but also Mikhailov's work (only in
Russian unfortunately) 'Social consciousness and individual self consciousness'
has a detailed examination and critique of the activity approach (and of R),
and a lot of the work of A V Brushlinksy, one of the foremost continuators and
developers of the Rubinshteinian approach.
So some differences as follows:
1) For R not activity as a whole but only the internal, mental (subjective)
side of activity was the proper object of psychology (this is discussed in
detail by L in section 3.3). Perhaps for this reason R talks about 'the unity
of activity and consciousness' which for L, I guess, is an absurdity: activity
is already conscious, ie activity includes consciousness as a necessary moment.
This is discussed at length in Mikhailov's book, where he suggests that one
should indeed begin from activity in the sense of Marx's 'labour' or
'productive activity' ie as a socially organised, purposeful practical
transformation of nature according to human needs and show how human abilities
and subjectivity in all its forms historically develop and differentiate
themselves from this 'cell'.
2) Rubinshtein objected to the notion of 'interiorization' on the grounds that
external activity was always (from the beginning) mediated through/by the
internal mental states and processes of the individual; in other words he
objected to the idea of the internal (mental) plane being completely FORMED ie
CREATED through this process of wholesale 'displacement' of the external form
of activity which he considered a mechanistic, undialectical and reductionist
view. His own alternative was the so-called 'principle of determinism' which
states that 'the external cause acts only through the internal conditions', ie
that the 'logic' of external practical activity into which the human child is
drawn always 'works on' (and due to) a particular state or condition of mental
development which is a precondition and condition for the external activity in
the first place. L criticises R's approach directly in the book we are
discussing - chapter 3 section 3.1. He says 'if we understand as internal
conditions the ongoing condition of the subject exposed to the effect, then it
will contribute nothing essentially new to the formula S-RThe introduction of
the concept of intervening variables undoubtedly enriches the analysis of
behaviour, but it does not remove the postulate of directness [the fault of
behaviourism which abstracts from the subject's activity in the world]'.
3) A related point: Brushlinsky in particular criticises Vygotsky and L for
their view of the human infant as only a 'potential' human being, animal-like
in behaviour and capacity until the 'penetration' of 'natural' behaviour by
social symbols etc. The infant is human from the very beginning -so that
Vygotsky's demarcation between 'natural' and 'cultural' lines of development is
wrong: there is a single, socio-cultural process of development of the human
subject.
4) R saw Vygotsky's approach not as an 'activity' one but as sign-centred in so
far as it gave to language (and not activity) the key role in the formation of
the human mind. This criticism of Vygotsky was accepted to some extent by
members of the Vygotsky-Leont'ev 'school'. L himself orients towards this
critique and rebuts it in section 3.4. He explains that Vygotsky's focus may
have been on meaning 'in its reverse movement', ie on the consequences to the
whole system of activity of the mediating role of meanings and that this gave
the impression (to some) that meaning 'lies behind life and directs activity'
while 'for Vygotsky an opposite thesis remained unshakable: Not meaning, not
consciousness lies behind life, but life lies behind consciousness'. My own
view is that this is right: the criticism of Vygotsky's approach as
'signcentric' is undialectical: it is one question to ask (and keep on
repeating) 'what lies behind meaning' but it is another (and relatively little
studied) to ask: how does the system of activity change as a result of semiotic
mediation? How does the 'reverse effect' of signs manifest itself and what is
the logic of this dynamic? (I tried to look at this question briefly in my
contribution to the recent collection of papers on Ilyenkov).
5) R differed from Vygotsky on the interpretation of egocentric and inner
speech. While for Vygotsky egocentric speech was social in outward appearance
but 'inner' in function (ie had the function of inner speech, the regulation
and control of the child's own behaviour) for R this was an illegitimate
'intellectualizing' of egocentric speech. For R what he called 'monologic
speech' (ie not 'egocentric') has all the functions of speech in general
(although these functions are realized in it it a different form). It is
saturated with emotionality for one thing and therefore cannot be equated with
inner speech [i'm not defending this view, just reporting!]. For R 'monologic
speech' has the function within the subject's activity of rendering speech more
tangible and more accessible to conscious awareness and checking.
6) For L thinking is conceived not as 'activity' but as the 'regulator' of
activity which takes the form of uninterrupted processual movement and
transformation which is always creative (and moves according to the law of
'analysis by synthesis').
7) Brushlinsky argues that R was developing a 'new philosophical paradigm'
which he calls a 'third way' between materialism and idealism (and therefore
not Marxism).
8) As I remember, Brushlinsky also criticises Vygotsky for his conception of
'abstract' and 'concrete' as opposed to meaning and concepts etc. He argues
that Vygotsky's interpretation is a typical empiricist (and non marxist)
understanding of the 'concrete' as something individual, something given to the
senses, with the 'abstract' as something 'generalized' from all the data of
sense. (To be contrasted with eg Ilyenkov's conception of the abstract and the
concrete).
Sorry, folks if this is a bit of a red herring. There are, though, important
issues in here which are rarely discussed (eg the egocentric speech thing to
name one obvious point).
with best wishes to all
P
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