I think a more productive use of "reflection" is to refer how psychological
processes embody features of social activities. Emotions, mental illness,
etc. reflect features of roles that individuals play in social activities.
The traditional gender differentiation of personality attributes reflects
the differentiation of family from economic activities in the 19th and 20th
centuries. While there may not be an complete identity between psychological
phenomena and positions in social activities, there is certainly a high
correlation.
Objectivity is also a function of social activities. Marx clearly observed
that certain social activities generate concepts that misconstrue/mystify
the social world. E.g., the free market generates the ideology of
individualism which fails to understand social processes. Just as various
concepts misconstrue the natural world, so various concepts misconstrue the
social world.
Carl Ratner
-- Carl Ratner, Ph.D. cr2@humboldt1.com http://www.humboldt1.com/~cr2P.O.B. 1294 Trinidad, CA 95570 USA
> From: Andy Blunden <a.blunden@pb.unimelb.edu.au> > Reply-To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2000 10:36:48 +1100 > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > Subject: Re: Leontiev Ch. 2 -- II on "Psychic Reflection" > Resent-From: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > Resent-Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2000 16:36:38 -0700 (PDT) > > On the term "reflection" ... > > anyone writing in the Soviet Union would know how political the word > "reflection" is, mainly because of Lenin's book "Materialism and > Empirio-criticism" and the position that book has had in disputes over the > years. Ilyenkov's defence of this book, published by New Park, is at > http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/index.htm and this > gives us the opportunity to see how someone of the same School as Leontyev > (more or less, as I understand it?) defends the use of the term. > > Where "Reflection" is being used in the crudest manner as a metaphor for > sense perception, then of course it is nothing more than a barrier to > understanding the genuinely human relation, but it is nevertheless a > perfectly useful term which incorporates the idea that an objectively > existing natural world is the utlimately determining side in the > human-nature relation, and also expresses the way a host of processes find > their properties reflected in another process, including human society > reflecting aspects of the natural world it lives in. Surely? > > Andy > > > At 22:02 11/10/2000 +0200, you wrote: >> Continuation to: on "ob-" and "subjective" >> >> Now, as to the concept of "reflection" it is entered into the scene >> in order to bridge between subject and object, and this in the >> direction from object to subject. >> >> In philosophy the term "reflection" covers an absolute and increasing >> mess ever since its reintroduction by Locke on the basis of >> Descartes' distinction between extended and cognizing matter. Whether >> it has avoided to improve on this with its introduction into >> psychology remains to be shown. In the German translation of >> Leontiev, Rubinstein and others "reflection" is usually rendered by >> "Wiederspiegelung", literally "re-mirroring". Now this is >> tautological which may have been invented in the intent to cover, >> i.e. hide the mess. It is obvious that Lenin's theory of perception >> as reflection in the sense of sensory imaging is sheer nonsense. The >> senses by their proper construction add a lot of their own -- color >> is not in the world, nor is sound or glare or bitterness etc.; all >> qualities etc. are relational rather than factual attributes of >> either the things / events or the mind. The sensory systems are >> transactional rather than reduplicating. In fact, I would even say, >> they are as much symbolic as their are iconic, in Peircean terms. But >> that's another story. >> >> It is clear from Leontiev's use of the word that "Wiederspiegelung", >> translation notwithstanding, is exactly not the meaning he is giving >> the term. This is a bit strange and may perhaps express some >> hesitation on part of the translator to bring Leontiev too close the >> Hegel since the latter in German used the term "Reflexion". I also >> think L. is not using the term in the sense of "reflection". i.e. as >> a sort of meta-cognition of conscious pondering again and inquiring >> this and that facet or relationship of what one is already aware of. >> In this sense of metaphor, the inner mirror, so to say, the term has >> originally been introduced into philosophy by Platon and Aristoteles. >> But in Leontiev's thought reflection in his sense should be a >> precondition to the possibility of this awareness-psychological sense. >> >> So the question is how and where Leontiev settles his notion between >> mirroring and pondering reflection, quantitatively or qualitatively. >> I must confess that I have great troubles understanding what Leontiev >> really has in mind. He touches many facets of the the field but does >> not state what he means. Similar troubles as I have had reading the >> German translation although I have a much better understanding of >> Vygotsky and the philosophical background back into the 18th century >> now than then. Sure, what happens in the brain-mind is to some extent >> dependent on that system of internal conditions, which is probably >> what L. calls "subjective" (p.33 et passim). But the same is true for >> the other part in the process, namely that part of the world actually >> having influence on the senses and merging with and distinguishing >> from memory; so the result is neither "subjective" nor "objective" >> but both or none. L. in this text has a lot of pertinent criticism >> towards the common conception of perception as passive, isolated, >> stimulus-bound etc. But his own picture remains dark. E.g. when he >> speaks of "the language of sensory modalities (in a sensory "code")" >> (p. 34), and then implies something akin to the Brunswikian lens >> model, i.e. impoverishment on the sense level and re-enrichment on >> the "psychic reflection" level, we do not learn how he thinks this is >> possible. >> >> Indeed, perception, or to be more general "reception", is a >> relational process and so are the structures spanning parts of an >> individual and parts of her environment the sensory system and what >> can influence them, excitatory and stabilizing (adaptive, constancy, >> idealizing, valuation, etc.) factors or tendencies. L. knows and says >> some of that, but he stops much too short for he does not seem to >> acknowledge the enormous part of the sensory systems' proprieties >> constituting the majority, in some way all of the qualities in which >> the process results (for the nervous process has non of the qualities >> the phenomena have nor of the potentials the things may have. Neither >> does he acknowledge the part played by the ground without which and >> without sufficient contrast to which no stimulus can bring forth a >> reasonable perception. And it is a process in time where what's >> coming in and what's already there, from processes on a time scale >> reaching both back to early until recent ontogenesis and to older and >> more recent phylogenesis. The notion of a sensory image has simply >> misleading. And there is mutual influence of these two components >> from outside and from inside, if you want, on each other; and that >> process takes time and can go in quite different directions depending >> often on very subtle components or events of itself. John Dewey has >> wonderfully described this in 1896 in his critique on the reflex arc >> concept in psychology and said almost everything essential on the >> relational nature of the process. But a century and more of modern >> psychology did not listen. Has Leontiev known that article? He hints >> at the basic idea with the example of the activity of the touching >> hand (p. 36) but does not elaborate. >> >> Leontiev, in particular does not explicitly acknowledge what you >> might expect first from somebody propagating the crucial role of >> activity in understanding psychological functioning. For who says >> perception or psychic reflection must result in some representation >> of the world as it is or looks to some subject etc.? Could not much >> of what is happening in the mind-brain, elicited by the sensory >> systems attending to some particular part of the environment, be >> heavily tinged, and in the wool, so to say, by what it is gathered >> for, namely guiding activity or action? Who has proven or can prove >> that perception must have taken place before action can start? On the >> contrary, there is some evidence (little effort has been spent to >> research the question) that situation sensitive action can start long >> before the respective decision has become conscious. This possibility >> could go much beyond the regulation of sense organ behavior by the >> sensory input itself, which is mentioned by L. on p. 36 and 39. >> Altogether, here is another analytical distinction taken for >> something real and put at the base of researching and theorizing >> which might be quite unrealistic and indeed misleading. It is true >> that you can make anatomical distinctions between afferent and >> efferent nerves. But, of course, there is no clearcut distinctability >> of a center being so to say between the two or mediating. Large parts >> of the brain-mind are always active and involved when an individual >> is non-sleeping in the world, and to some extent even or more so in >> sleep when the afferent and the efferent periphery is somehow >> reduced. An instinct is obviously only analytically separable into >> elicitory and elicited parts. How come this should or could be >> different when a few end-brain structures are added and/or enlarged. >> Again, he hints at this perspective by giving a role to efferences in >> the perceptive process (p. 35); but he does not propose concepts >> covering the kind of role or of connection, too. >> >> Why does L. see primarily the barrier between the individual and its >> environment rather than the bridges that the specialized organs of >> receiving and of execution patterns of behavior constitute and that >> change not only the relation between the two but in addition induce >> change in each of the two themselves (one of the latter being his >> principal theme of the book!). He is so clever and keen in disclosing >> that psychology developed upon silly abstractions such as the one >> from the social and the one of the object (p. 41); why does he stick >> to and elaborate another one, that of reflection of something out >> there into in here? And in a way that at least this reader cannot >> differentiate between the extreme possibilities of re-mirroring and >> of free-wheeling imagination and symbolization? >> >> A nice special detail to end, if you want: I applaud the English (and >> the German) translators of speaking of "psychic reflection" rather >> than "psychological r.". Could somebody knowledgeable tell me whether >> the distinction between psychical and psychological is as easy and >> un-ambivalent in Russian as it is in German psychisch and >> psychologisch, the former referring to the phenomena, the latter to >> scientific concepts based more or less upon the former (however >> problematic that distinction lastly may be)? But I can barely >> suppress my impression that L.'s concept of "psychic reflection" is >> heavily psychological (or perhaps philosophical, as are his notions >> of objective and subjective) in a very particular sense and sort of >> misses enough phenomenology and careful observation both of inner and >> of outer kinds of being-aware of. I say this well aware of and >> acknowledging the fact that Leontiev has heavily contributed to >> directing attention of the scientists in the right direction: more of >> activity, more of culture, more of change in time. >> >> Alfred >> -- >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> Alfred Lang, Psychology, Univ. Bern, Switzerland --- alfred.lang@psy.unibe.ch >> Website: http://www.psy.unibe.ch/ukp/langpapers/ >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > ************************************************** > * Andy Blunden, Teaching Space Support Team Leader > * Email ablunden@unimelb.edu.au or andy@mira.net > * http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > * University of Melbourne 9344 0312 (W) 9380 9435 (H) > ************************************************** > >
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