Charles,
Please give an example of how different contexts could require different
explanatory concepts of psychological phenomena. I can see that particular
may be more directly influenced by particular cultural contexts -- e.g.,
family, work, religion. But these relations would still seem to be within
the general explanatory framework that psychological phenomena originate in,
embody, and perpetuate social activities (and occasionally lead to changing
activities). Therefore, I wouldn't see particular relations within cultural
psych. as contradicting the general formulation. Please provide some
examples that we can discuss in detail.
Carl
-- Carl Ratner, Ph.D. cr2@humboldt1.com http://www.humboldt1.com/~cr2P.O.B. 1294 Trinidad, CA 95570 USA
> From: Charles Nelson <c.nelson@mail.utexas.edu> > Reply-To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2000 07:24:32 -0700 (PDT) > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > Subject: Re: Leontiev > Resent-From: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > Resent-Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2000 07:24:36 -0700 (PDT) > > Carl, > > I was wondering not which conceptual system was considered to be > primary in a particular social environment, but more along the lines > of Einstein's essential principles, whether in some contexts, some > principles explain pychological phenomena better, but in different > contexts, other principles better explain them, something along the > lines of whether to consider light as a particle or wave phenomenon. > > Charles Nelson > >> Charles, >> Yes any conceptual system is only primary in particular social >> environments. INdividualism is primary under capitalism and that's why >> Vygotsky's marxism has been denigrated. Valsiner & Van der Veer, in their >> new book, The Social Mind, go so far as to say that "it SEEMS that Vygotsky >> was influenced by Marxism..." They refuse to acknowledge Vyg.'s passionate >> belief in Marxism and his insistence that any good psychology will be a >> marxist psychology. >> >> Even natural science paradigms are only primary in particular social >> environments. E.g., conceptual paradigms like evolutionary theory, the >> atomic theory of matter, etc. are only accepted in particular societies. Of >> course, they may be very accurate, but they are still inspired by a cultural >> weltanschauung. >> Regards, Carl >> >> -- >> Carl Ratner, Ph.D. >> cr2@humboldt1.com >> http://www.humboldt1.com/~cr2 >> >> P.O.B. 1294 >> Trinidad, CA 95570 >> USA >> >>> From: Charles Nelson <c.nelson@mail.utexas.edu> >>> Reply-To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2000 21:25:55 -0700 >>> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: Re: Leontiev >>> Resent-From: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> Resent-Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2000 19:21:04 -0700 (PDT) >>> >>> Carl, >>> >>> That makes a lot of sense. Still, I wonder, Is one conceptual system >>> always primary? Can context/environment/time influence the >>> primariness of a conceptual system? >>> >>> Charles Nelson >>> >>>> IN response to Charles Nelson's question about how we tie >> diverse viewpoints >>>> together: >>>> I think that one has to decide on the essential concepts/elements of a >>>> viable cultural psychological approach. These need to be >> logically coherent >>>> among themselves. All the related facets of the approach should >> be logically >>>> coherent as well. I think this is the essence of scientific thinking. >>>> Einstein explained this in great detail. He firmly believed in >> identifying a >>>> small core of essential principles that underlie all phenomena. In >>>> developing a cultural psychology, IF we agree w. Marx & Leontiev that the >>>> social organization of activities is basic to psychological phenomena, and >>>> that the social relations of production are the most impt. >> activity within a >>>> social system, then all of our concepts about self, agency, personality, >>>> emotions, cognition, mental illness, etc. would have to construe these as >>>> originating in, bearing the characteristics of, and functioning to >>>> recapitulate the social organization of activities, and especially of >>>> economic activity. Any concepts about psychological change would also have >>>> to be related to concepts of social change. >>>> These, of course, are all daunting questions. But I believe that this is >>>> the general approach that cultural psychs. need to explore. It would >>>> comprise a logically coherent conceptual system. I don't think >> that progress >>>> will be made by trying to combine antithetical conceptual >> viewpoints such as >>>> marxism + individualism + Freudianism. That's why I believe it is impt. to >>>> distinguish conceptual systems, decide which is primary, and then extract >>>> elements of other systems that can be logically integrated with the basic >>>> one. >>>> Does this make sense? >>>> Carl >>>> -- >>>> Carl Ratner, Ph.D. >>>> cr2@humboldt1.com >>>> http://www.humboldt1.com/~cr2 >>>> >>>> P.O.B. 1294 >>>> Trinidad, CA 95570 >>>> USA >>> >>> > >
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