Yrjö writes:
"Be that as it may, I think that we can see a tension between individual-centered psychologism and collectively oriented activity theory in many places in Leont'ev's book."
Which Phillip asked for more explication. Attempting the first pass at such for a paragraph about 10 pages in the document, parsing with carriage returns to bring out the fine grain, that one can otherwise lose in the large grain of the integrated paragraph and document. Brackets are my inserts/substitutions.
Initially, cognition of the properties of the object world
that are beyond the limits of direct sensory cognition
is the unpremeditated result of actions directed to a practical purpose, that is, actions included in work activity of people.
[work activity here, being (in my take) *that which expends effort*. This includes "thinking" of the individual-centered psychologist sense, that is often mediated materially : as an example, planning efforts.]
Subsequently, [cognition of the properties of the object world] begins to adapt to special tasks, for example, the task of evaluating the suitability of the original material by means of preliminary practical testing, a simple experiment.
Actions of this kind, serving conscious, cognitive goals, already represent in themselves real thinking, although [the thinking] preserves the form of external processes.
[An isomorphism between external and internal forms? Hmmmmm.... This could be problematic. ]
The recognizable results of these actions, generalized and fixed by means of language,
[social/language mediation invoked]
differ essentially from the results of direct sensory reflection, which are generalized in respective sensory formations.
[(thinking) actions] differ from [direct sensory reflection] not only in that [ (thinking) actions] include properties, connections, and relations
inaccessible to direct sensory evaluation but also in that,
transmitted in the process of verbal communication with other people,
[social/language mediation invoked again]
[(thinking) actions] form a system of knowledge
[this I take to be a definition of consciousness as a dynamic, as a process of communication, as action, as interaction, and goes beyond what an individual 'knows' in the individual-centered psychologistic sense, but what an individual contributes in interaction with what other individuals also contribute in interaction]
that comprises the content of the consciousness of the collective, society.
Owing to this the concepts, understanding, and ideas that are generated in separate people are formed, enriched, and subject to selection not only in the course of their individual use (unavoidably narrowly limited, and subject to chance)
but also on the basis of the immeasurably wider experience that they attain in social use.
[interaction with others transforms societal consciousness into "vicarious consciousness" at the level of the individual i.e. "I know about X because so-and-so said so". Another reference on this train of thought appears in the book "Socializing Epistemology"]
[my $.02]
Bill Barowy, Associate Professor
Lesley University
29 Everett Street, Cambridge, MA 02138-2790
Phone: 617-349-8168 / Fax: 617-349-8169
http://www.lesley.edu/faculty/wbarowy/Barowy.html
_______________________
"One of life's quiet excitements is to stand somewhat apart from yourself
and watch yourself softly become the author of something beautiful."
[Norman Maclean in "A river runs through it."]
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