Dear XMCA friends,
I have been asked why I do not proceed with SemEco. There are three
reasons coming together and letting me hesitate. Firstly I shall be
off-net from next week for probably the rest of September, so I could
not follow-up; it may then be better to present generative semiosis
in the function circle when I am back. Secondly, I have papers to
finish before traveling that require my full concentration. And
thirdly, there is a curious relationship between Ilyenkov's and my
purpose; only we go very different ways. So perhaps it is better to
discuss my perspective on the mind-body and matter-idea/form problem
when the discussants including myself fully understand Ilyenkov's
solution.
I may give here a very general impression now of this difference:
Whereas, in my understanding, Ilyenkov attempts to add another of
those numerous solutions for that problem of sorts two and a half
millennia unsolved (what was before we don't know, maybe there was no
problem; it has never been in the Northern Far East, except now for
Western influence), I think it is time for it -- to be dissolved. So
I start with radically different basic assumptions and want to find
out whether I can arrive at an understanding of the human condition
wherein the mind-body problem is a non-problem. After all, two and a
half millennia of failure might really be enough. This is sort of a
very high level description of what SemEco is about; apart from many
low level and intermediate points. You may find me pretentious, when
I admit to thinking it is a problem solely arisen by certain concepts
predefined and retained in a certain way. Please, feel free. It's
been to my own severe and lasting consternation when I first realized
the scope of what I was trying; originally I only wanted to
understand the dwelling activity, perhaps introduce the ecologica
view into psychology. I am not at all alone with the view that things
have gone awry in philosophy and the sciences; yet convincing
alternatives have yet to be proposed. My objective though is modest:
In presenting SemEco on this list and to other people interested I
hope that somebody will prove me making this or that mistake or
showing me the price that is to pay. So far in the ten years nobody
has and my own impression is that so many problematic theories and
judgments turn into no-problems, that my own enthusiasm and delight
might eventually spread, should SemEco survive. I know I often sound
very critical of almost everything, psychology and beyond; but my
real interest is not critic nor cynic but a way to finally leave
certain repeating and repeating criticism really behind. Life's too
interesting to ruminate the same and again ...
However, I warn you. SemEco is equally critical onto both principal
sides, with the philosophers and humanists or their logicistic as
much as with the scientists and their materialistic or physicalistic
reduction attempts.
I give a brief illustration. The concept of matter until today
(regardless of its modern conjunction with the concept of energy) is
one of those superinfluential abstractions reified; by courtesy of
Aristoteles. Matter simply does not occur un-formed, or only in a
limit such as in plasma. As well, ideas simply do not exist without
content; pure form is again an abstraction. On this level I
absolutely agree with Ilyenkov's endeavor to disjoin ideas from
"consciousness" because this would be a much too narrow and scattered
dwelling for ideas to be generally effective as something like ideas
really is. "Consciousness" and the role given it by Descartes and his
followers from Leibniz to the Neo-Kantians and beyond, whether
individual or "collective" is perhaps on par with the matter thing,
as judged from the dead-ends this other grand abstraction reified has
generated. Only, Platon had started with the same claim of ideas to
exist without consciousness and even being prime to matter and so has
incited the Aristotelian opposition of matter an form and together
they produced their shared clients down onto the modern scientists'
with their proposals of how the obvious organization of matter comes
about and onto the modern humanists hiding in their word castles when
the technics shovel away the soil under their feet. Neither words nor
physico-chemical law is sufficient beyond their proper domains.
As the since unfulfilled solution proposals claiming either primacy
of matter or of form we have these two totally irreconcilable
reduction programs, relentlessly pursued by their respective
devotees. But the organization of the things of this world we can
observe cannot be explained by the character of their smallest
elements; nor can ideas existing separately from the organized bring
about such organization. Both are empty claims if you request
enlightening insight as to how the organization really comes about
according to theories from this or to that approach. In the former
case natural law can widely account for what organization is possible
at all (all molecules are composed of atoms according to their
valencies and with required energy needed or spent and so onward so
to more and increasingly so complex structures); but the possible we
can observe so abundantly on this planet's surface should by theory
be so extremely improbable that it should truly never occur (what has
brought some to sadly derive their own extreme nothingness or to
happily be confirmed in their feeling of being of the elected for
eternity therefrom, both so unrealistic a stance in view of the fact
that humans have already changed and can change this planet's surface
to an extent and in a direction few events before or nothing ever did
we can find traces of). And in the latter proposal nobody has ever
gotten a form outside of what it's supposed to have been formed; but
as I said, humans often love fiction where they better would care for
the real. Both approaches obviously have failed in particular, as I
have tried to show in my messages the last weeks, to take the genuine
evolutions serious; they strive, following Platon and/or the instinct
principle to find the forever valid solutions. With which they failed
so far. Does anybody still hope they can succeed?
But I have also two questions to ask the informed: (1) I don't
understand why Ilyenkov should speak of "ideals" rather than of
"ideas" since in common language use an ideal is an extremely highly
valuated idea or thing or state and so a very special case of an
idea, obviously relational and thus incapable of existing and having
effects all by itself (as is the case for ideas, I think).
And (2) am I rightly seeing Ilyenkov to make abstractions from
concrete ideas (and ideals) which themselves max be observed or
inferred to have effects and so are concrete reals; i.e. to make
abstractions towards "ideality" which can only exist in those who
think it; and so we might be back "in consciousness" because how and
with what can the words representing ideality or idealities interact
outside "consciousness"? I wonder in this respect whether Ilyenkov
will turn out the (monistic) materialist he appears often to declare
himself, the (monistic) idealist he is sometimes described as (also
by himself, it seems), or simply another normal dualist. But I
haven't read him in total.
Contrary to my intention, I have written a post pertaining to both
discussion threads. Should I retain it to send it later? You have a
right to read. Heavy food, anyway, with my excuses,
Yours, Alfred
-- --------------------------------------------------------------------- Alfred Lang, Psychology, Univ. Bern, Switzerland --- alfred.lang@psy.unibe.ch Website: http://www.psy.unibe.ch/ukp/langpapers/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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