Judy,
I've been reading your posts on this labor day with interest and am glad to
see that the subject invites your participation. It seems that a lot of us
are just hanging out today and not out at picnics or whatever else it is
that people do to celebrate this holiday that commemorates capital's
conquest of labor in the USA -- in most parts of the world the same holiday
occurs on May 1. but . . .
I want to comment on both the question of non-human animal cs. and will in
more detail, more slowly, but I have a couple of comments that are really
pressing to get out.
The idea of a transcendental social consciousness is not unique and occured
importantly in american anthropology with both A.L. Kroeber and Leslie
White, the latter of course strongly influenced by marxist thought. Andy's
statement concerning focusing on the ideal instead of cs. deserves more
careful consideration.
The discussion of will is fascinating and motivates several areas of
additional consideration. First, are we totally ignoring the existence of
conditioned reflexes (a basic fact of human behavior and consciousness) and
the processes by which actions become operations in human behavior, the
processes through which the self concept to which the "freedom of choice"
and will are attributed becomes formed? One needs only think of consumer
behavior, marketing studies, and the entire arsenal by which "consciousness"
is controlled to generate demand for consumer products in capitalist
economies. Does anyone who is buying a product specifically tailored to
generate and co-produce a specific representation of self (from Virginia
Slims to the SUV to Marlboro cigarettes) say to themselves "I am buying this
product because I am responding to images of self and personality generated
in Madison Ave." or do they say to themselves, "I am buying this product
because I want to and am thereby exercising my freedom of choice (=free
will)". I think only a few would say the former to themselves although
hopefully AdBusters will slowly change this--me <= incurably optimistic.
We so cherish the idea that we have something called free will and that this
is an individual quality. Bergson, a philosopher about as far removed from
Marxism as one can get, considered that the true exercise of whatever might
be called will occurred very rarely and only in moments in which the
mechanical temporality -- the temporality characteristic of mechanical
behavior, conditioned responses-- occurred only during rare peak
experiences.. These peak experiences in which individuals experience a
sense of deep, free exercise of will, if we examine them closely, tend to
occur in times of social movements when entire systems of social
representation (idealities) are on the block and people recognize that their
"choices" make a big difference, and usually involve a sacrifice, a
renunciation of an entire set of possibilities and another a social
personality that is bound up with adhering to and fitting within systems of
social representation tied to very concrete social relationships granting
access to the products of the social division of labor in its specific,
class-structured patterns of distribution.
One might well talk of "the illusion of will". A basic rethinking of our
concept of "will" might lead to a much more fruitful way of thinking about
co-construction, the model that seems to be somewhere not too far beneath
the surface of the difficulties that several participants are feeling about
the implications of Ilyenkov's proposals.
Well the sun is shining and I'm going to enjoy it but will more carefully
look at this fascinating (and well-mannered) thread tonight since so much
ground has been covered and really deserves fully thought out responses.
Paul H. Dillon
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