There's so much to say/ask...
First, I appreciate the distinction between the ideal and consciousness,
the latter entailed by the former. There is a problem here, however, in
that a history of capitalism/alienation [perhaps not just that?] has
resulted in multiple materially based social worlds -- this is where
things get confusing, I think, at least for me. The practices that we
engage in and their artifacts are both objective and ideal, and some such
worlds have their basis in [and this is in response to Paul] consciousness
-- that is, [alter] subjectivities get realized in artifacts & practices
and even institutionalized through collective labor. It's not a one-way deal.
Personally I think it's important to orient to an object, but to assume
that the material social world can be discussed as if it transcended
consciousness is something I don't accept.
Judy
At 11:08 AM 9/4/00 +1100, you wrote:
>Diane asked: "what is the relation seen here between "intellect" and
>"consciousness"?"
>
>My understanding is that the concept of "intellect" is the result of
>abstracting from consciousness that side which accommodates itself to the
>ideal object, as opposed to *will*, that side of consciousness which takes
>the object as something to be subordinated; a concept made possible by the
>deveelopment of intellectual activities, separate from actually changing
>the world.
>
>Q: "what is the difference between "idea" - "ideal" and David Hume's
>concepts of "impressions"?"
>
>As part of the whole line of British Empiricism, Hume took 'ideas' to be
>the result of a working up, by the Ego, of sensual impressions into various
>forms of aggregate, but for Ilyenkov et al, "idea" comes from a completely
>different direction. The ideal exists objectively to mental activity, as
>part of social activity, before it is part of individual, mental activity.
>
>Q: "are we to accept here that consciousness is (a) effectively human and
>so (b) essentially social and cultural and historical?"
>
>I think at this point it is worth re-looking at Ilyenkov's advice to
>recognise the concept of 'ideal' as the importantly human entity, rather
>than 'consciousness'.
>
>About 80% of the way through Ilyenkov's article, I read:
>
>"... the passage (of Marx) may be understood to mean that man acquires a
>new, second plane of life activity precisely because he possesses
>consciousness and will, which the animal does not possess. But this is just
>the opposite of the case. Consciousness and will appear in man only because
>he already possesses a special plane of life activity that is absent in the
>animal world - activity directed towards the mastering of forms of life
>activity that are specifically social, purely social in origin and essence,
>and, therefore, not biologically encoded in him."
>
>So the question is whether the objects recognised by the animal include
>ideal objects. I don't see any great problem here. The extent to which the
>world an animal lives in is a cultural product, and a non-human cultural
>product, is something which is not a 'philosophical', but a practical
>question.
>
>I would add that it is not so much the "appearance" of consciousness and
>will, but the separation of the psyche into "intellect" and "will" as
>distinct, opposed mental activities.
>
>Andy
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