Just for clarification, my reference to the sign was probably more
Walkerdinian or Butlerian. In this sense saying the biotic functions as a
sign in not so much it is determined or follows culture, but rather they are
relational and can only be understood as such.
Bruner's piece on "dialectics of culture" captures this well for me. We
can't understand theories past or present without some consideration of the
political, social, and historical context in which they exist.
Nate
-----Original Message-----
From: Alfred Lang [mailto:alfred.lang@psy.unibe.ch]
Sent: Friday, September 01, 2000 11:09 AM
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: RE: don't debiologize it (culture and development)
Nate has written:
>I think biotic factors are present throughout life, and have "importance"
>"for culture" rather than "in themselves". We could take the highly
>energetic child or a child that maybe does not engage like "most other
>children" in which biotic factors no doubt exist. Those factors it seems to
>me serve as a sign for the child, teacher, family, culture etc. The meaning
>a teacher gives to this may be lack of self regulation, a call to alter the
>educational environment, the child having a different learning style etc.
>The child may be seen as disrespectful, disruptive, or needing to receive
>special educational services. So, rather than culture being an expansion of
>the biotic, I would see the biotic more along the lines of a sign that get
>its meaning from culture.
>
>One thing that emerges from time to time is the notion of levels. Ethel
>Tobach has written about this coming from a dialectical materialist
>theoretical foundation, and Jay has also touched on this with his time
>zones. If we are talking about an activity system or semiotic ecology the
>level of analysis could be of central importance. That socio-biology stuff
>that reduces culture to memes and all would be incorporating an analysis
>from one level to another (inappropriately). We get the wonderful ideas
>that how we vote is somehow determined by our genes. I guess one question I
>would have is how Sem-Eco handles the level question?
Agreed to all, Nate, especially the meme-critique, but except,
however, in two points: the first is a certain one-sidedness you seem
to imply, as I read you, in the relation between bios and culture in
view some differences in their flexibility and their amendability and
some other characters. Some of the interpretations of biotic signs
will proof problematic; and the biotic will sometimes pass a point of
no return in re-finding some balance that has been disturbed on
cultural grounds. And more of the like. Maybe it is dangerous to try
to generalize as to this very complex relation. But in the overall
picture we appear to agree.
As to the levels: sure something of the kind may be important
dependent on how they are to be conceived; but I am very careful with
levels, they easily turn into layers and may end as reifications of
abstractions. I prefer to speak of horizons because the observer
plays an important role in how to see hierarchies or encapsulations.
But I think first we should know the heart of the thing: semiosis in
the function circle. Only after that are horizons reasonable to treat
of; as I understand them they are of great methodological value and
also through a light on the realism / nominalism distinction. There
are a couple of more facets of semiotic ecology.
An addendum both in relation to the above and to semiotic ecology in
its dealing with ecosystems evolving: Now it's you having shifted
attention from development to culture. As an afterthought Stanley N.
Salthe's "Development and Evolution -- complexity and change in
biology" (1993) came to my mind which has been discussed on the list
a few years ago, I don't remember whether it was Jay or Rolph
Windward who has introduced it. It's a very thorough and innovative
treatment of change in biology which he calls development. It's major
shortcoming is the restriction to biological development. Very
remarkable indeed: this is one of the still not so numerous
biologists radically refuting reductionism; in addition he is
interested and has knowledge in the traditions of nature philosophy,
including Peirce and "the play of signs", and is willing to break the
closes of traditional scientific discourse. He writes how it became
clear to him "that philosophical mechanicism [e.g. (Neo-)Darwinism,
sociobiology, mechanistic materialism in general] was the local
attitude of a culture that was bent primarily on dominating nature in
every way (not only through totalitarian governments) and which gave
little time to trying to understand the world." (p. xi) Also he has
convinced himself that "information theory must become embedded in
semiotics" (p.xi) A key summary formulation, also from the preface,
says: "The present text views environments and the systems evolving
within them as more closely integrated from the start, suggesting
that environments have structures and that organisms realize some of
these structures materially, ask parts."
Alfred
-- --------------------------------------------------------------------- Alfred Lang, Psychology, Univ. Bern, Switzerland --- alfred.lang@psy.unibe.ch Website: http://www.psy.unibe.ch/ukp/langpapers/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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