Elizabeth,
My dictionary defines commensurable as: "having a common measure; specif.
being divisible by a commun unit an integral number of times" -- the related
term "commensurate" extends this meaning to embrace a slightly more
qualitative emphasis; ie, "corresponding in size, extent, amount or degree,
. . . , proportionate."
The point here is that the term refers to a quantitative dimension and
presumes that the two (or more) things being brought into relation (eg,
compared) have some common scale on which they can be measured.
In Hegelian and materialistic dialectics, "What results from the sublation
of something; the whole in which both it and its opposite survive as
moments, is invariably higher than, or the TRUTH of, the items sublated. . .
Earlier stages of a temporal, DEVELOPMENTAL process are sublated in(to)
later stages; e.g., earlier philosophies are both destroyed and preserved in
Hegel's philosophy." (Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary). As such what could be
the unit permitting "commensurability" between the stages? How can the
earlier stage be compared with the later stage of development except and
only in terms of that development. An example might be earlier and later
drafts of a paper. If one is to ask about their commensurability one can
only say that the later drafts are more developed expressions of the earlier
ones in terms of a third framework (eg, canons of style, clarity,
completeness of argument, etc.) They are not directly commensurable with
each other insofar as they are STAGES of the same thing. Is there any
difficulty in seeing them as stages? Without appealing to the third frame
of reference is there anyway to measure them? Does this inability to
measure them in themselves prevent us from seeing them as developmental
stages of the paper, one higher (ie, more complete) than the other?
I used the example from Vygotsky since it is well known to xmca members
although examples from Marx's Capital are more explicit (eg, the sublation
of use value in exchange value in the development of capitalism) In Ch. 4 of
"Thought and Language" Vygotsky gives the following schema:
1. Thought and speech have different roots of ontogenetic development.
2. In children "we can with certainty" identify a preintellectual stage
of the development of speech and and a prelinguistic stage of the
development of thought.
3. Up to a certain point, the two follow different independent lines.
4. At a certain point these lines meet, thought becomes verbal, and speech
rational.
Immediately upon outlining this developmental sequence, Vygotsky turns his
attention to the problem of "inner speech" and its relation to overt speech.
Here he concludes that overt "egocentric speech" in children is speech on
its way inward. It is a mediating, transitional phenomena. The child
"masters syntax of speech before syntax of thought, indeed mastering the
syntax of speech is the activity leading to the development of a syntax of
thought. V accepts Piaget's demonstration that grammar develps before
logic. This stage is "distinguished by external signs, external operations
that are used as aids in the solution of internal problems", ie, overt
egocentric speech is a tool used by thought to achieve its own ends. The
final stage of this process is the development of inner speech: "The child
begins to count in his head, to use "logical memory", that is, to operate
with inherent relations and inner signs."
I fail to see how can we talk of egocentric speech and inner speech as
being commensurable?? What would their common unit of measure be?
According to Vygotsky the latter is the sublated form of the former--They
are incommensurable precisely because they represent different stages of the
same development. But overt egocentric speech, in being sublated, becomes
inner speech. That development isn't measured against anything but itself,
it is, as Hegel might say, a determination reflected into itself; it is an
essential difference, not a quantitative one. Vygotsky's final conclusion
in the chapter expresses this clearly: "If we compare the early development
of speech and intellect with the development of inner speech and verbal
thought, we must conclude that the latter stage is not a simple continuation
of the ealier. The nature of the development itself changes, from
biological to sociohistorical." This is a wonderful description of what
Hegel called the transition to essence, upon reaching this stage, Vygotsky
continues, all previous developments are sublated to the laws of
sociohistorical development and "the premises of historical materialism"
which is the dialectical materialist study of human society. It is also a
great example of sublation: what comes after is not a continuation but a
subordination of the former within the unity of the later stage.
My comment about the abstraction implicit in the measurement of "mental
abilities" was meant to emphasize a point about commensurability in
general. It is my feeling that such measurement usually abstracts from the
total process in which the object measured (eg, quantitative reasoning,
pattern recognition, etc.) is posited. Here I also employ the Hegelian
terminology "posit" (german - gesetzen) which means that what the object is
produced as a moment of an encompassing unity, a moment that only exists as
such as a member of that unity, eg, rational thought, thought mediated by
language which is inherently social, is abstracted from when measured
without reference to the social processs that generated it. My intent was
to simply amplify the sense in which any discussion of commensurability
between stages doesn't make sense, at least from the perspective of
materialist dialectics.
I don't think this is simply a matter of semantics but see it as a question
a question of concept formation which goes to the heart of any activity
oriented toward knowing the truth about anything. I'm still working on my
response to Jay's three posts and will deal there with the question of
truth(s) (ONE? MANY? NONE?)
Hope this helps.
Paul H. Dillon
----- Original Message -----
From: KELLY, ELIZABETH <EKELLY@gc.cuny.edu>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2000 8:49 AM
Subject: RE: Lang embodied? dialectics and ecologies
> About Paul and Andy and Jay:
>
> I want to thank Jay for suggesting that we need not worry too much that
> dialectics and social-semiotic-ecologies are contradictory, and for
> discussing some reasons of their perceived divergence.
>
> Andy's comment on thinking of Hegel's Logic in terms of developing
rational
> social relations helped Jay's thougts to find a place in my own ind.
>
> But now, Paul has confused me (and I hope he follows up after some
sleep ---
> it was 5 a.m.)with sublation and commensurability.
>
> I feel certain this conversation has not ended but here are two questions:
>
> Jay, are you arguing against a "flawed interpretation of Hegel's
definition
> of sublation" and "denying developmental levels" as Paul suggests?
>
> Paul, could explain more of your ideas of commensurabilty? I mean more
than
> that "it is an empty abstraction from the process that posits it" or that
it
> "doesn't make sense" in the example of talking outloud / silent speech?
>
> Elizabeth
>
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