Andy,
I think you point to something very important. Very, very few people have
taken the effort to understand Hegel's Science of Logic, yet it remains
fundamental and many criticisms of dialectical theory raise issues that
Hegel had clearly addressed in the Logic (or Marx in Grundrisse and Capital
read dialectically). A good example comes from Jay Lemke's comments on
history. He states that "views" are "not logically superseded except when
they are also still commensurable with what takes their place historically."
I think Jay is arguing against either a very rigid or very flawed
interpretation of Hegel's definition of sublation (aufheben). Clearly the
notion of sublation is central to Hegelian and materialist dialectics but
the notion that there is some "commensurability" between levels doesn't
really make sense in either system. Levels define scales and there is no
scale on which different levels are themselves commensurable, rather the
differences are essential, containing quantity as only an abstract moment.
I hear Jay denying any developmental levels, let alone dialectically
related ones. But the position Vygotsky argued against Piaget is a classic
example of the dialectical process of sublation: it is not simply negation
of the prior stage but incorporation of the prior stage in the new synthesis
as a moment -- an essential part -- but the mediating whole posits the
essence of the sublated moment. Talking to oneself outloud is sublated in
the posterior unity as inner speech. The idea of commensurability of even
this moment (like the quantitatification of IQ or other abilities (reading,
math, quantification of multiple intelligences, etc.) is simply an empty
abstraction from the process that posits it but that abstractuib has some
content and is clearly related to other social functions. But the idea of
commensurability of the former and latter unities doesn't make sense at all.
To use the Vygotskyan example, when talking out loud to oneself becomes
silent speech, it doesn't make any sense to talk about the commensurability
of the child's talking outloud to herself at one stage with the inner
speech at another. One thing is for sure though: children do stop talking
to themselves out loud.
But there is also a great deal in Jay's posts that deserves careful reply.
Many people have a very stereotyped notion of the dialectical materialist
tradition. The reification of the working class into a thoroughly
non-dialectical concept (contrast with Marx's own analysis of the 1848-1851
French Revolution) , the entire Lukasian theory of class consciousness and
the Leninist theory of the party, leading inevitably (at least according to
Kolakowski) to the Stalinist state tells the story of the imposition of a
single truth through the silencing of many that Jay so strongly cautions
against. And there is truth in this. One naturally thinks of the Stalinist
state especially as Orwell depicted. Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge comes
to mind as a grisly example of a marxist inspired government that reified
an abstract incarnation of the class that in-itself bore the unitary
historical truth (a peasant class corresponding to the country's stage of
development). But the working class is diverse in the simple division of
labor let alone all of the other cutural (eg, religious, ethnic, etc)
dimensions of the groups who have "nothing to sell but their labor power" in
an economy where everything is a commodity. Criticisms of dialectical
materialism that raise these historical spectres merit careful treatment.
Someone may be listening.
I want to make other comments directly to Jay concerning the descriptions
he uses to illustrate the inadequacies he ascribes to Peter's Materialsm
and I'm presuming to dialectical materialism in general.
Tomorrow. It's very late here.
Closing I want to say I agree fundamentally with the sentiment of your post;
ie, a good knowledge of Hegel's Logic is necessary to be able understand
how most common criticisms of the shortcomings of dialectical materialism
are in fact satisfactorily handled.
Paul H. Dillon
----- Original Message -----
From: Andy Blunden <a.blunden@pb.unimelb.edu.au>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Monday, June 12, 2000 6:20 PM
Subject: Re: Lang embodied? dialectics and ecologies
> My reading of Hegel's Logic has led me to the conclusion that the entire
> Logic, and all its little syllogisms, judgments and moments, make perfect
> sense if you understand him as talking about how rational social relations
> develop, and that he expresses this description of the "laws of motion of
> social rationality" in the form of a critique of the types of thinking
that
> rationalise each stage of the process.
>
> See http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/iup.htm
>
> Andy
>
>
> At 00:11 13/06/2000 +0000, you wrote:
> >Eva, thanks for your question, and Jay for the response. Eva discerned
what
> >had been muddled in my response to Bill -- I'd been thinking of
dialectics
> >as characteristic of thought, whether thought about material reality or
> >about us-in-material/social-reality. In fact, despite Jay's persuasive
case
> >for conflictual relations among elements in any system, I'm inclined to
> >assert unknowability about systems we're not part of and the principles
of
> >'life' -- a bit of mysticism? or is it humility (Hah!)
> >a wishful thinker is never a humble thinker
> >
> >jay wrote:
> >>My deepest understanding of dialectics is that it embodies the insight
that
> >>heterogeneity combined with interaction leads to change. In dynamic
system
> >>terms, rather than as a purely philosophical argument, the issue here is
> >>about what happens when differences collide -- not trivial differences
of
> >>variation on a theme, but profound differences of a kind we have never
> >>really been able to characterize (contradiction is certainly not the
right
> >>condition, incommensurability may be too strong a condition). How does a
> >>whole hold together when it contains incompatible or antagonistic
elements,
> >>and especially when those elements need each other, or imply each other?
> >>when the whole cannot resolve the conflict, but in fact arises itself
out
> >>of this conflict? theories of emergence of higher levels of
organization,
> >>now a cornerstone of ecological models, are direct descendants of
> >>philosophical dialectics (albeit by a different path than, say,
historical
> >>materialism's).
> >
> >
> >
> >Judith Diamondstone (732) 932-7496 Ext. 352
> >Graduate School of Education
> >Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
> >10 Seminary Place
> >New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1183
> >
> >
> >
> **************************************************
> * Andy Blunden, Teaching Space Consultant,
> * and Manager of Videoconferencing Operations
> * http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> * University of Melbourne 9344 0312 (W) 9380 9435 (H)
> **************************************************
>
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