mike returns to an assertion i made::
>Diane wrote:
>the problem of pragmatics and theory is always in this lust for proof
>
and responds:
>
>
>Speaking absolutely personally, Dianne, and not as a person particularly
>knowledgable about pragmatism, I thought that the whole point of
>Dewey's work ("The quest for certainty") being one prominent place where
>it is expressed, is that it assumes that uncertainty NEVER goes away and
>that all we can know, for certain, in general, is that whatever we think
>is wrong/incomplete/still becoming.
What Dewey wrote about, in terms of pragmatism, and how
pragmatism functions today are, i think, two different ends of a process -
pragmatism in Dewey's writings do concede to the uncertainties of
any activity, that all we can do is what we think is "best" - humbling
text, perhaps,
although not quite so in practice: Dewey's Chicago School was
"experimental" in every sense of the word;
today, in discourse trends of education, pragmatism means practical
results, effects, less theory and more action, but the effects of whatever
activity is encouraged are still subject to a rigourous proof - in terms of
determining a result, and pragmatic researchers do not usually do what they
think is "best" so much as what the "literature" in their specialized field
of "knowledge" indicates -
i find pragmatics rely quite heavily on kinds of proofs of effect, and less
on theory that might call the activity into question - less interest in
engaging
in conflicting ideas, and more investment in establishing "what works" -
and this, with an interest in teasing out a general or universal element
that would make all such activity "work" - similar agendas to theoretical
argument, but different practices in terms of application - not good or
bad,
but dependent upon different kinds of evaluation.
>
>Seems from a comment Paul made in response to the Kristeva quote is
>that Kant was an activity theorist! :-)
>mike
Kristeva is hardly an activity theorist, and her 'thesis' is aimed at
pointing to where Kant and Hegel failed to see past their own particular
crisis
... there is no transcendence for Kristeva, rather there is only the
subject-in-process, and she asserts that the subjects of any theory are,
or must be,
themselves subjects in infinite analysis - something Husserl, Hegel, Kant,
et al.
could not do -
it is a woman who can finally admit to what she can not know (the crisis)
as she becomes aware of the inanity of Being -
diane
**********************************************************************
:point where everything listens.
and i slow down, learning how to
enter - implicate and unspoken (still) heart-of-the-world.
(Daphne Marlatt, "Coming to you")
***********************************************************************
diane celia hodges
university of british columbia, centre for the study of curriculum and
instruction
==================== ==================== =======================
university of colorado, denver, school of education
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Jun 01 2000 - 01:01:32 PDT