Genevieve wrote, in part:
[The] structuration of cognition found in the
computer lab merged the social, the psychological,
and the physical, and it in turn was the historical
product of social practices. These three levels of
context are in constant dynamic interaction.
Leont'iev's "idea of internalization-externalization
as transitive processes in the system of man's object-
related activity" (Asmolov, 1986-7, p. 93) is particularly useful in
detailing the processes described here: Contextual constraints are
first
located in the tool (i.e., the computer imposes
its limits), externalized in interaction with the
user (mostly through frustrated user moves),
internalized by that user (who recognizes and
remembers these limits), and then externalized
again if the user seeks assistance (e.g., when a
user seeks to circumvent a given limit through
consulting).
In a spatially intersting way this part of the message emblemizes
the two notions of context I like to write about: context as something
that has levels (usually represented as concentric circles) and
context as -that which weaves together.
But one of the ideas I also push is the difficulty of putting one
part of the system "before" another as in "first located in the
tool." Luiz picks up on this and says, using Bordieu, "first
located in the context." But the tool is a constituent of of
the context, the two emerging as parts of a single process.
mike