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To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu
cc: (bcc: David H Kirshner/dkirsh/LSU)
Subject: Re: sociogen redux
Nate said:
If the individual dimension is historical, as I assume it is, it can not be
a-social, a-historical. I think Cobb does make a mistake of confusing the
beginning and ending of a process with a cause/effect mentality. The
action and individual agency occurs within this process not alien to it.
To say, social is primary, how can it not be, does not imply a
social-individual transmission. The double nature of mediation occurs, so
the process itself goes through development. I would also disagree it
leaves no room for psychological approaches, I think Vygotsky showed it
does. To say, mathmatical conceptions are "derieved" from interpersonal
relations would assume an individual not as participant not active in the
activity, a view of individual seperate from the social. If we see the
individual in "activity" it seems we could mutually study, understand
his/her development/transformation in/of the practice (externalization) and
the development/transformation of "activity" toward internal consciousness
(internalization).
Kirshner said:
>
> I feel uncomfortable interpreting what Cobb et al. _might_ have
> meant, but at least let me attempt a redescription. It seems
> that they are interpreting the notion of individual consciousness
> as "derivative and secondary" as indicating that it is directly
> derived from the social dimension. Now you may argue that
> Vygotsky's notion of "derivative and secondary" incorporates
> a true dialectic. But how this is theorized (and not just claimed)
> is by no means obvious. If two elements are dialectically
> constituted, can one speak of a major and minor partner?
> In their emergent approach Cobb et al. are arguing for a balance,
> which, perhaps, is a more natural way to conceive a dialectic.
Nate said:
I think a possible problem with a balance is an assumption of an a-social,
a-historical individual. The individual is social at its very core I would
assume. By this I mean that we, as individual we are part of the "social"
so the interaction or dialectic occurs within the social not as one
seperate from it. Within the social I have certain interests, motivations,
needs but they are not a-social or a-historical. Hommi Bhabha discusses
the historical "I" which is useful for me, an I that is dynamic - always in
the process of change. So, yes there is a dialectic but it is not between
an "I" (the capitalist I, sorry I couldn't resist) as priori to the social,
but one who can not be seperated from it.
Nate
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Nate.
We're chasing two issues at the moment.
The first (from your first paragraph, above) is whether seeing the social
as primary implies that the individual is not fully active--somehow derivative.
This seems to me a basic philosophical conundrum.
I appreciate your arguments that no such implication is necessary. But
I'm still trying to come to grips with it in my own terms.
The second, more preliminary, issue is whether the social, indeed, is primary.
The Vygotskyan position, reflected effectively in your second paragraph,
above, answers the question in the affirmative. But, as far as I understand it,
the American pragmatists (especially G. H. Mead) emphatically opted for an
equal balance. (It is the pragmatists' theory of symbolic interactionism that
grounds Cobb's work, so this may explain his divergence from CHAT
assumptions.) What one buys by taking the social as primary is the
opportunity to theorize the social/cultural independently of the individual.
But that's just what the pragmatists feared (how American!). Taking the
two as balanced means that the theorizing of either is problematized.
So, yes, one does somehow come away with a partial picture of the
individual as non-social. But that's the price to be paid for establishing
a dialectical balance in which the social (along with the individual) is
emergent.
David