xmcamail.9907: Psychology of Art

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Here is a section from the intro Mike mentioned, which also seemed =
pertinent to the discussion.

Bekhterev claims that =93. . . obviously, the psychology of individuals =
is not suitable for explaining social movements. . . .=9415 The same =
view is held by other social psychologists (like McDougall, Le Bon, =
Freud, et al.), who regard the social psyche as secondary, originating =
from the psyche of the individual. They assume that there is a special =
individual psyche and that from the interaction of individual psyches or =
psychologies there arises a collective psyche or psychology common to =
all individuals Thus, social psychology is regarded as the psychology of =
a collective individual, in the same way that a crowd is made up of =
single
individuals, even though it has a supra-individual psychology. We see =
that non-Marxist social psychology has a primitive empirical approach to =
the social entity, regarding it as a crowd, a collective entity, a =
relation between individuals or persons. Society is taken to be an =
association of people, and it is regarded as an accessory activity of =
one individual. These psychologists do not admit that somewhere, in a =
remote and intimate corner of his thought, his feelings, etc., the =
psyche of an individual is social and socially conditioned. It is easy =
to show that the subject of social psychology is precisely the psyche of =
the single individual. Chelpanov=92s view, frequently quoted by others, =
according to which specifically Marxist psychology is a social =
psychology that studies the genesis of ideological forms according to a =
specifically Marxist method, involving the study of the origin of given =
forms based on the social economy, is incorrect. Equally incorrect is =
his view that empirical and experimental psychology cannot become =
Marxist, any more than minealogy, physics, chemistry, etc., can. To =
corroborate his view, Chelpanov refers to Chapter VIII of Plekhanov=92s =
Fundamental Problems of Marxism, in which the author expounds the origin =
of ideologies. The exact opposite is more likely to be true, namely that =
only the individual (i.e., the empirical and experimental) psychology =
can become Marxist. Indeed, how can we distinguish social psychology =
from individual psychology if we deny the existence of a popular soul, a =
popular spirit, and so forth? Social psychology studies precisely the =
psyche of the single individual, and what he has in his mind. There is =
no other psyche to study. The rest is either metaphysics or ideology; =
hence, to assert that this psychology cannot become Marxist (i.e., =
social), just as mineralogy and chemistry cannot become Marxist, is =
tantamount to not understanding Marx=92s fundamental statement which =
says that =93man in the most literal sense is a zoon politicon (social =
animal Aristotle), an animal to whom social intercourse is not only =
peculiar but necessary in order to stand out as a single individual.=94 =
To assume the psyche of the single individual (the object of =
experimental and empirical psychology) to be as extrasocial as the =
object of mineralogy, means to assume a position diametrically opposed =
to Marxism. Of course, physics, chemistry, mineralogy, and so on, can be =
either Marxist or anti-Marxist if we take science to be not only a bare =
listing of facts, a catalogue of relationships and functions but a =
systematized knowledge of the world in its entirety.

There now remains only the question concerning the genesis of =
ideological forms. Is it really the task of social psychology to study =
the dependence of these forms on social economy? It seems to me that it =
is not. This is the general task of each particular discipline as a =
branch of general sociology. The history of religion and jurisprudence, =
the history of art, and the history of science accomplish this task for =
their own fields of endeavor.

The incorrectness of the previous point of view becomes evident not only =
from theoretical considerations but also from the practical experience =
of social psychology. Wundt, in establishing the origin of social =
creativity, was finally forced to resort to the creativity of the single =
individual.=93 16 He says that the creativity of one individual can be =
recognized by another individual as an adequate expression of his own =
ideas and emotions; hence, a number of different persons can be =
simultaneously the creators of one and the same concept. In criticizing =
Wundt, Bekhterev quite correctly shows that =93in this case there can be =
obviously no social psychology since there are no new tasks other than =
those that are comprised in the psychology of single individuals.=94 17 =
As a matter of fact, the earlier viewpoint, according to which there is =
a fundamental distinction between the processes and the products of =
popular and individual creativity, appears now to have been unanimously =
discarded. Today no one would dare assert that an ancient bylina (a =
Russian popular epic) written from the words of an Arkhangel=92sk =
fisherman, and a Pushkin poem carefully corrected and edited by the =
poet, are the products of different creative processes. The facts =
testify to exactly the opposite. Accurate investigation reveals that the =
difference here is purely quantitative. The narrator of the bylina does =
not recount it in exactly the same way in which he received it from his =
predecessor. He introduces changes, cuts, additions and he reshuffles =
words and parts. Thus, he becomes the author of that particular version =
using the ready made standards and clichks of popular poetry. Hence, the =
notion that popular poetry is unsophisticated in the sense that it is =
created by an entire people and not by professionals (narrators, =
troubadours, storytellers) of artistic creativity applying a =
traditional, rich, and specialized technique to their craft and using it =
in exactly the same way as the writers of later periods, is completely =
wrong. On the other hand, an author who puts down in writing the product =
of his creativity is by no means the sole creator of his work. Pushkin, =
for example, is not the individual author of his poems. He did not =
invent the methods of writing verse and rhymes, or of construing a =
subject or theme in a specific way. Like the narrators of the byliny, he =
passes on the immense heritage of literary tradition which to a great =
extent depends on the evolution of language, verse writing techniques, =
traditional subjects, themes, images, compositional subjects, and so on.

Were we to determine in a literary work what is created by the author =
himself and what he has taken ready made from the literary tradition, we =
would find that the author=92s creativity amounts to selecting certain =
elements, combining them within given, generally accepted standards, =
transposing certain traditional elements into other systems, and so =
forth. In other words, in both the Arkhangel=92sk narrators of byliny =
and in Pushkin we can always detect the existence of both elements: the =
individual authorship and the literary traditions. The difference, as =
stated before, consists only in the quantitative relationship between =
the two. In Pushkin the individual authorship prevails, while in the =
bylina narrative it is the literary tradition that prevails. To use =
Silverswan=92s well chosen simile, both remind us of a swimmer crossing =
a river and being dragged away by the current. The swimmer=92s path, =
like the writer=92s creativity, is the resultant of two forces, the =
swimmer=92s own effort and the deviating
force of the current.

We have enough reasons to assert that from a psychological point of view =
there is no fundamental difference between the processes of popular and =
individual creativity. Thus, Freud is completely right when he states =
that individual psychology from the incept is at the same time also =
social psychology. Tarde=92s intermental psychology (interpsychology) as =
well as the social psychology of other authors must therefore be viewed =
in a completely different light.

In agreement with Siegel, de La Grasserie, Rossi, and others, I am =
inclined to believe that we must distinguish between social and =
collective psychology, but I feel that the way to do this must be =
fundamentally different. Because this distinction is based on the degree =
of organization of the collective under study, this opinion is not =
generally accepted in social psychology.

The difference becomes self evident if we consider the psyche of the =
single individual as the subject of social psychology. It is obvious =
that the subject of individual psychology coincides with that of =
differential psychology, the task of which is the study of individual =
differences in single individuals. The concept of general reflexology, =
as opposed to Bekhterev=92s collective reflexology, also completely =
coincides with this. =93In this respect there is a certain relation =
between the refltxology of the single individual and collective =
reflexology; the former aims at clarifying the peculiarities of the =
single individual, tries to find differences in the individual =
mentalities of persons, and show the reflexologic basis of these =
differences, while collective reflexology, which studies mass or =
collective manifestations of correlative activity, is essentially aimed =
at clarifying how social products of a correlative activity are obtained =
by the correlation between single individuals in social groups and by =
smoothing away their individual differences.=94 18

It is obvious that we are dealing here with differential psychology in =
the precise acceptance of that term. What, then, is the subject of =
collective psychology as such? There is a simple answer to this =
question: Everything within us is social, but this does not imply that =
all the properties of the psyche of an individual are inherent in all =
the other members of this group as well. Only a certain part of the =
individual psychology can be regarded as belonging to a given group, and =
this portion of individual psychology and its collective manifestations =
is studied by collective psychology when it looks into the psychology of =
the army, the church, and so on.

Thus, instead of distinguishing between social and individual =
psychology, we must distinguish between social and collective =
psychology. The difference between social and individual psychology in =
aesthetics appears to be the same as that between normative and =
descriptive aesthetic because, as shown quite correctly by Miinsterberg, =
historical aesthetics was connected with social psychology, and =
normative aesthetics with individual psychology.19

People with great passions, people who accomplish great deeds,
People who possess strong feelings even people with great minds
and a strong personality, rarely come out of good little boys and girls
L.S. Vygotsky=20

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Here is a section from the intro Mike mentioned, which also seemed = pertinent=20 to the discussion.

Nate

Bekhterev claims that =93. . . obviously, the psychology of = individuals is not=20 suitable for explaining social movements. . . .=9415=20 The same view is held by other social psychologists (like McDougall, Le = Bon,=20 Freud, et al.), who regard the social psyche as secondary, originating = from the=20 psyche of the individual. They assume that there is a special individual = psyche=20 and that from the interaction of individual psyches or psychologies = there arises=20 a collective psyche or psychology common to all individuals Thus, social = psychology is regarded as the psychology of a collective individual, in = the same=20 way that a crowd is made up of single
individuals, even though it has = a=20 supra-individual psychology. We see that non-Marxist social psychology = has a=20 primitive empirical approach to the social entity, regarding it as a = crowd, a=20 collective entity, a relation between individuals or persons. Society is = taken=20 to be an association of people, and it is regarded as an accessory = activity of=20 one individual. These psychologists do not admit that somewhere, in a = remote and=20 intimate corner of his thought, his feelings, etc., the psyche of an = individual=20 is social and socially conditioned. It is easy to show that the subject = of=20 social psychology is precisely the psyche of the single individual. = Chelpanov=92s=20 view, frequently quoted by others, according to which specifically = Marxist=20 psychology is a social psychology that studies the genesis of = ideological forms=20 according to a specifically Marxist method, involving the study of the = origin of=20 given forms based on the social economy, is incorrect. Equally incorrect = is his=20 view that empirical and experimental psychology cannot become Marxist, = any more=20 than minealogy, physics, chemistry, etc., can. To corroborate his view,=20 Chelpanov refers to Chapter VIII of Plekhanov=92s Fundamental Problems = of Marxism,=20 in which the author expounds the origin of ideologies. The exact = opposite is=20 more likely to be true, namely that only the individual (i.e., the = empirical and=20 experimental) psychology can become Marxist. Indeed, how can we = distinguish=20 social psychology from individual psychology if we deny the existence of = a=20 popular soul, a popular spirit, and so forth? Social psychology studies=20 precisely the psyche of the single individual, and what he has in his = mind.=20 There is no other psyche to study. The rest is either metaphysics or = ideology;=20 hence, to assert that this psychology cannot become Marxist (i.e., = social), just=20 as mineralogy and chemistry cannot become Marxist, is tantamount to not=20 understanding Marx=92s fundamental statement which says that =93man in = the most=20 literal sense is a zoon politicon (social animal = Aristotle), an=20 animal to whom social intercourse is not only peculiar but necessary in = order to=20 stand out as a single individual.=94 To assume the psyche of the single = individual=20 (the object of experimental and empirical psychology) to be as = extrasocial as=20 the object of mineralogy, means to assume a position diametrically = opposed to=20 Marxism. Of course, physics, chemistry, mineralogy, and so on, can be = either=20 Marxist or anti-Marxist if we take science to be not only a bare listing = of=20 facts, a catalogue of relationships and functions but a systematized = knowledge=20 of the world in its entirety.

There now remains only the question = concerning the genesis of ideological forms. Is it really the task of = social=20 psychology to study the dependence of these forms on social economy? It = seems to=20 me that it is not. This is the general task of each particular = discipline as a=20 branch of general sociology. The history of religion and jurisprudence, = the=20 history of art, and the history of science accomplish this task for = their own=20 fields of endeavor.

The incorrectness of the previous point of = view=20 becomes evident not only from theoretical considerations but also from = the=20 practical experience of social psychology. Wundt, in establishing the = origin of=20 social creativity, was finally forced to resort to the creativity of the = single=20 individual.=93 16 He says that the = creativity of one=20 individual can be recognized by another individual as an adequate = expression of=20 his own ideas and emotions; hence, a number of different persons can be=20 simultaneously the creators of one and the same concept. In criticizing = Wundt,=20 Bekhterev quite correctly shows that =93in this case there can be = obviously no=20 social psychology since there are no new tasks other than those that are = comprised in the psychology of single individuals.=94 17=20 As a matter of fact, the earlier viewpoint, according to = which there=20 is a fundamental distinction between the processes and the products of = popular=20 and individual creativity, appears now to have been unanimously = discarded. Today=20 no one would dare assert that an ancient bylina (a Russian popular epic) = written=20 from the words of an Arkhangel=92sk fisherman, and a Pushkin poem = carefully=20 corrected and edited by the poet, are the products of different creative = processes. The facts testify to exactly the opposite. Accurate = investigation=20 reveals that the difference here is purely quantitative. The narrator of = the=20 bylina does not recount it in exactly the same way in which he received = it from=20 his predecessor. He introduces changes, cuts, additions and he = reshuffles words=20 and parts. Thus, he becomes the author of that particular version using = the=20 ready made standards and clichks of popular poetry. Hence, the notion = that=20 popular poetry is unsophisticated in the sense that it is created by an = entire=20 people and not by professionals (narrators, troubadours, storytellers) = of=20 artistic creativity applying a traditional, rich, and specialized = technique to=20 their craft and using it in exactly the same way as the writers of later = periods, is completely wrong. On the other hand, an author who puts down = in=20 writing the product of his creativity is by no means the sole creator of = his=20 work. Pushkin, for example, is not the individual author of his poems. = He did=20 not invent the methods of writing verse and rhymes, or of construing a = subject=20 or theme in a specific way. Like the narrators of the byliny, he passes = on the=20 immense heritage of literary tradition which to a great extent depends = on the=20 evolution of language, verse writing techniques, traditional subjects, = themes,=20 images, compositional subjects, and so on.

Were we to determine = in a=20 literary work what is created by the author himself and what he has = taken ready=20 made from the literary tradition, we would find that the author=92s = creativity=20 amounts to selecting certain elements, combining them within given, = generally=20 accepted standards, transposing certain traditional elements into other = systems,=20 and so forth. In other words, in both the Arkhangel=92sk narrators of = byliny and=20 in Pushkin we can always detect the existence of both elements: the = individual=20 authorship and the literary traditions. The difference, as stated = before,=20 consists only in the quantitative relationship between the two. In = Pushkin the=20 individual authorship prevails, while in the bylina narrative it is the = literary=20 tradition that prevails. To use Silverswan=92s well chosen simile, both = remind us=20 of a swimmer crossing a river and being dragged away by the current. The = swimmer=92s path, like the writer=92s creativity, is the resultant of = two forces,=20 the swimmer=92s own effort and the deviating
force of the = current.

We=20 have enough reasons to assert that from a psychological point of view = there is=20 no fundamental difference between the processes of popular and = individual=20 creativity. Thus, Freud is completely right when he states that = individual=20 psychology from the incept is at the same time also social psychology. = Tarde=92s=20 intermental psychology (interpsychology) as well as the social = psychology of=20 other authors must therefore be viewed in a completely different=20 light.

In agreement with Siegel, de La Grasserie, Rossi, and = others, I am=20 inclined to believe that we must distinguish between social and = collective=20 psychology, but I feel that the way to do this must be fundamentally = different.=20 Because this distinction is based on the degree of organization of the=20 collective under study, this opinion is not generally accepted in social = psychology.

The difference becomes self evident if we consider = the psyche=20 of the single individual as the subject of social psychology. It is = obvious that=20 the subject of individual psychology coincides with that of differential = psychology, the task of which is the study of individual differences in = single=20 individuals. The concept of general reflexology, as opposed to = Bekhterev=92s=20 collective reflexology, also completely coincides with this. =93In this = respect=20 there is a certain relation between the refltxology of the single = individual and=20 collective reflexology; the former aims at clarifying the peculiarities = of the=20 single individual, tries to find differences in the individual = mentalities of=20 persons, and show the reflexologic basis of these differences, while = collective=20 reflexology, which studies mass or collective manifestations of = correlative=20 activity, is essentially aimed at clarifying how social products of a=20 correlative activity are obtained by the correlation between single = individuals=20 in social groups and by smoothing away their individual differences.=94 = 18

It is obvious that we are dealing here with differential psychology = in the=20 precise acceptance of that term. What, then, is the subject of = collective=20 psychology as such? There is a simple answer to this question: = Everything within=20 us is social, but this does not imply that all the properties of the = psyche of=20 an individual are inherent in all the other members of this group as = well. Only=20 a certain part of the individual psychology can be regarded as belonging = to a=20 given group, and this portion of individual psychology and its = collective=20 manifestations is studied by collective psychology when it looks into = the=20 psychology of the army, the church, and so on.

Thus, instead of=20 distinguishing between social and individual psychology, we must = distinguish=20 between social and collective psychology. The difference between social = and=20 individual psychology in aesthetics appears to be the same as that = between=20 normative and descriptive aesthetic because, as shown quite correctly by = Miinsterberg, historical aesthetics was connected with social = psychology, and=20 normative aesthetics with individual psychology.19

Nate Schmolze
http://www.geocities.com/~n= schmolze/
schmolze@students.wisc.edu=