=46unny to get into this topic over the list after our sideline exchange
concerning my old paper on Skinner's verbal self-discipline! I'd say even
behaviorists cherish the behavior of talking about paths of reasoning
within curricular subjects... isn't it just the terminology of "reflection"
they'd prohibit?
There aren't so many -ists in Mikes chapter text -- only innatists,
environmentalists and nationalists (which agrees well with the main purpose
of steering away from religious beliefs in ubiquitous testing, which I see
as the main goal of the chapter. I got the feeling the Coles wouldn't
burden their student readers with too many contending schools, which was
why I formulated myself a bit vaguely. Wondering if the audience would not
be ready for a somewhat less cognitivist discourse.
But... why should cognitive processes be what is accessible (or not) to
introspection? Can't they be what IS accessible in the interpersonal
exchanges of talk about all kinds of topics, including meta talk about
cognition. I mean, except for the still-dominance of cognitivism in public
consciousness :-)
Eva
At 12.55 -0500 99-07-06, dkirsh who-is-at lsu.edu wrote:
>Connectionist theorists, on the other hand, reject the idea that
>cognitive processes are accessible to introspection at all, so
>the reflection they espouse is a reflective practice (i.e., a cultural
>practice of reflection) valued for other than the introspective access
>implied by metacognition. I think this is what Eva is hoping Mike is
>valuing through his references to metacognition.