In Chapter 1, Wertsch established his general objective as
accounting for how "mental functioning is related to cultural,
institutional, and historical contexts" (p. 3) without giving analytic
primacy to either psychological or societal processes. In chapter
2, he lays out the assumptions underlying his central theoretical
construct, mediated action. The chapter is organized to
systematically explore ten such assumptions. In this review, we
briefly summarize these assumptions, and then focus in on what
we see as a potential difficulty or inclarity in his basic approach.
Rather than an impediment to further reading, we regard this
problematic as a tool to orient our further reading, at least
initially. Thus the issue we raise need not be completely resolved
before we continue, collectively, in our reading of Mind As Action.
Summary
1. Agent and Mediational Means: An Irreducible Tension
Two possible extremes are rejected. On the one hand, agent and
mediational means (i.e., cultural tools) can be seen as
autonomous constructs, each conceived independently of the
other. On the other hand, it is possible to regard the dyad as
irreducible. Wertsch stresses that fundamentally he conceives of
mediated action as always relative to an agent using a cultural
tool. Thus he rejects, in principle, conceptions of either
independent of the other. However, for purposes of analysis it
frequently is useful to consider them independently. For example,
he describes the act of pole vaulting as incomprehensible without
full consideration of both the pole and the vaulter; however,
analysis of the pole or the vaulter, independently, can enhance the
investigation.
2. Materiality of Mediational Means
In this section, Wertsch addresses a potential confusion
concerning the nature of mediational means. Many cultural tools
have obvious materiality, from poles to written language to maps
and diagrams. Oral language is less obviously material: It
"evaporate[s] after moment of existence" (p. 31). But it still has a
material existence as acoustic signal, regardless how fleeting. For
Wertsch, the materiality of mediational means is central to the
analysis of mediated action.
3. Multiple Goals of Action
Here, Wertsch addresses the relationship between mediated action
and "goals" and "settings" --two of the pentad of analytic elements
that Wertsch borrows from Burke (see Chapter 1). Actions can
be analyzed at varying "circumferences" (p. 32) of setting. For
instance the pole vaulter
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?s goal of clearing a cross bar can be
viewed less immediately in terms of impressing an audience or of
overcoming a general sense of personal failure, depending on the
circumference of setting chosen for analysis.
4. Developmental Paths
The purpose of this section is to locate mediated actions in
historically specific trajectories. From the earlier section, we recall=
that the sense of development of interest here is neither
development of the agent nor of the cultural tools independently.
For instance designing new aircraft has changed considerably
since the 1960s. To attribute these changes in the designers
(engineers) alone is obviously misguided. It is the system of agent
and mediational means together that has changed. Wertsch also
takes up the question of how we come to associate change with
development. Development implicates some sort of "?telos,? or
end point" (p. 36). This implies some fixed (even if implicit)
perspective.
5. Constraints and Affordances
This section stresses the necessary co-occurrence of constraints
and affordances in mediational means. Even though the
possibilities afforded by a new cultural tool may be salient and
compelling, it is necessary to keep in mind that other possibilities
and approaches are thereby excluded. Some theorists (e.g.,
Vygotsky) tended to focus on affordances; others (e.g., Burke)
tended to focus on constraints.
6. Transformations of Mediated Action
By far the most pervasive source of transformation of mediated
action occurs through the introduction of new cultural tools which
"?alters the entire flow and structure? of mediated action" (p. 43).
Changes can be analyzed in the "?genetic domains? ... of
phylogenesis, sociocultural history, ontogenesis, and
microgenesis" (p. 43). New cultural tools can cause a ripple effect
in which agents may change. Sometimes it is a difficult call as to
whether the result is a transformed or a new mediated action.
7. Internalization as Mastery
Mastery is offered as an interpretation of internalization that
resists the usual dualist assumptions of internal representations
guiding behavior. Mastery provides a more satisfactory view of
the co-production of mediated action by an agent and a cultural
tool. Wertsch points out that skill development needs to be
viewed in its specificity; many attempts to attribute skills to
general aptitudes of an agent have served to confound
inexperience using particular cultural tools with some kind of
deficit. Connectionism is highlighted as an approach to cognition
compatible with mastery in this sense.
8. Internalization as Appropriation
Appropriation is another interpretation of internalization
compatible with Wertsch?s sense of mediated action. Wertsch
traces the notion of appropriation to Bakhtin, stemming from the
fundamental distinction between one?s own and the other: to
appropriate is to make the other one?s own. Even
though mastery and appropriation usually are intertwined, they
are still distinct processes. For instance a Jewish school child may
master Christmas songs, but resist their ownership.
9. Mediated Actions Through Technological Spin-offs
A full account of mediated actions must explore their source as
well as their character. Usually it is assumed that cultural tools are
developed to serve the needs of the agent. But Wertsch points out
that many innovations are not intended for the purposes to which
they eventually are applied; often applications are maladapted for
the purposes to which they are put. This makes it even more
important to focus on constraints, as well as affordances. As an
important example of an unintended spin-off, Wertsch quotes
David Olson?s observation that "?writing systems provide the
concepts and categories for thinking about the structure of spoken
language?" (p. 62) ...not vice versa.
10. Power and Authority
The concluding section situates mediated action in the broader
context of relations of power and authority. Usually power is
analyzed relative to agents (including institutions). But the focus
on mediated action reveals mediational means, themselves, as
effective in transforming power relations. For example, the rise of
print media has had a profound effect on the social organization
of power. Similarly authorized perspectives often rest on
particular mediational means.
Critique
In the section on internalization, Wertsch points out that the
exemplars used often are more significant in determining the
scope of a theory than the abstract formulations of the theory
itself. Taking this as method, we wonder if the scope of
Wertsch?s notion of mediated action extends to the full range of
phenomena indicated in his goal of accounting for how "mental
functioning is related to cultural, institutional, and historical
contexts" (p. 3). Mental functioning includes a broad range of
intrapsychic processes including musing, planning, emoting, etc.
But, consistent with his assumption of the _materiality_ of
mediational means, all of Wertsch?s examples concern actions
that are physically manifest: pole vaulting, solving multiplication
problems with paper and pencil algorithms, etc. It is not clear how
these analyses might extend to more private actions.
This problem is reflected in others of his assumptions.
Developmental paths are defined as historical: "The fourth claim
... is an elaboration of the general assertion that mediated action is
historically situated" (p. 34), and many of his examples concern
broad historical changes encompassing many individual agents.
But citing Vygotsky, he incorporates ontogenetic interpretations:
"Vygotsky?s genetic method was motivated by the assumption
that we can understand many aspects of mental functioning only
if we understand their origin and the transformations they have
undergone" (p. 34). Indeed, as he reports, Vygotsky himself
stumbled over defining the telos (end point) of development: "At
certain points in his writing, he was quite clear in positing a kind
of Enlightenment rationality as the ideal outcome of human
mental development, but at other points he seems to have
envisioned the ?harmony of imagination? as the ideal end point"
(p. 37). While Enlightenment rationality might be ambiguously
historical or individual, "harmony of imagination" seems
unambiguously intrapsychic. Thus we are left with an impression
of slippage, as intrapsychic processes are tacked on to a
framework mainly designed for analyses of public actions.
As discussed in the section on Transformations of Mediated
Action, the critical link between historical and psychological
processes is the "psychological tool" or sign, which "?alters the
entire flow and structure of mental functions ... just as a technical
tool alters the process of a natural adaptation by determining the
flow of labor operations?" (p. 43). As Wertsch frames it, one can
choose any one of a number of "?genetic domains? ...
phylogenesis, sociocultural history, ontogenesis, and
microgenesis" (p. 43) for one?s analysis: "One could have in mind
the transformations that occur in ontogenesis as children
encounter new cultural tools such as written texts and numeral systems.=
Alternatively, one could focus on the emergence and
influence of a new mediational means in sociocultural history
where forces of industrialization and technological development
come into play" (p. 43). With these concerns in mind, we look
forward to the subsequent chapters of the book to see if the
analogy of internal mental processes to external effects of
mediational means can be carried through in particular analyses.
David Kirshner with Bill Blanton
Louisiana State University Appalachian State Universit=
y
(504) 388-2332
dkirsh who-is-at lsu.edu
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