One caveat.
The language game of this email is of *practical* meta-theory of activity,
that is, how it is that WE proceed to use activity theory as a way of
shared understanding. It is not an epistemological message, but rather
more methodological. It is NOT an appeal for a methodology of activity
theory as a set of a priori rules, procedures, and definitions. Would
such a methodology include a series of rhetorical questions with dubious
answers?
Polemics aside please. While it certainly is true that in general
"anything goes", some things go farther than others. This is an appeal for
a formative ensemble of meta-theoretical tools that will provide a way to
share objects of our activity. The emphasis is on the formative and
provisional nature of this activity - objects are held provisionally as
consensus emerges. For this, we must step outside the bounds of activity
theory per se, as it presently stands, denoted theory AT(N), and consider
what is a path to theory AT(N+1) or higher.
On definitions.
So it goes with definitions, at least as a means to develop a common
understanding of some thing or other. Not to argue on general grounds
about definitions, which would insist that people use them on a daily basis
without dichotomy or despair, and even post-modernistically without any
fixed sense. But to promote a process through which two or more people
can use language *consistently* about a common OBJECT, the 'commonality' of
such object being a condition yet to be defined! Provisionally one can
offer a definition as a statement of the shared meaning of a word, the act
of defining as a process of describing, explaining, or making definite and
clear.
A personal definition of object.
Not to lose sight of my original goal, and before going too far, I had
better tell you what I am writing about in the penultimate sentence of the
previous paragraph, lest you misinterpret. In the paper "The Problem of
Activity in Psychology" (Soviet Psychology, XIII, No. 2, 4-33.
(Translation from Voprosy filosofii, 1972, No. 9, 95-108. (1975).) Leont'ev
uses "object" in this sense: "Activity necessarily puts human beings in
practical contact with the very objects that deflect, change, and enrich
human activity." Promoting objects as both ideal and material, Leont'ev
does NOT distinguish object from artifact at this point. Please DO notice
that object is defined relationally with respect to subject. I welcome
some modification of this definition!
One reason why I have chosen this early paper is to facilitate the notion
of definitions as provisional constructs. Later writings, such as Cultural
Psychology, spend considerable space devoted to characterizing artifacts,
and for seemingly good reason, although artifacts certainly do deflect,
change, and enrich human activity. This is where my question arises -
where does that then leave "object?" How do we now re-define it? One
COULD choose the path of dichotomously defining object as "those things
that deflect, change, and enrich human activity, that ARE NOT ARTIFACTS,
but that is NOT the only path. One could also inclusively put artifacts in
the category of objects.
Definition as Provisional Shared Term, or whoever insisted that definitions
be fixed?
The activity of re-defining is proposed as a formative process,
consequently one of the ensemble of meta-theoretical tools (see
definition). The process is meta-theoretical, not subordinate to the
domain of the theory.
Oops: A definition of tool.
"A tool mediates activity that connects a person not only with the world of
objects but also with other people" (Leont'ev, 1975) Hmm... Seems like a
tool is an object? This does become puzzling here as one tries to
delineate these things. What I mean by meta-theoretical tools is
essentially what Wartofsky considers tertiary artifacts - coloring the way
we see theories -- more specifically here, what we use to determine the
viability and utility of theories like AT. My interest is to develop
interventions from AT.
So for example, Leont'ev, who was not apprehensive of definitions, offered
several in his 1975 activity theory, termed here AT(0). The primitive
elements at that time were essentially only SUBJECT and OBJECT, although
activity, action, etc. were also delineated there. As AT(N-x)*, which here
refers to the one in Cultural Psychology page 119, includes ARTIFACT, it is
not necessary to define object dichotomously. This condition is true only
within AT(N-x) in which the primitive entities are only SUBJECT, OBJECT,
and ARTIFACT. In AT(N), which here denotes that which appears in CP p.
140,* other primitives include COMMUNITY, RULES, and DIVISION OF LABOR, and
so object CANNOT be dichotomously defined as "everything that is not
artifact." You see, definitions appear dichotomous only within certain
theories, but are not necessarily so when one steps outside the theory, and
views the theory as a state of development.
* AT(N-x) denotes some state of Activity Theory prior to AT(N), without
knowing exactly what "x" is.
**Please excuse use of CP, when Engestrom 1987 is the prime reference -- I
presently do not have access to that work.
I propose the use of "Provisional Shared Term" as a construct (a PST
itself) to help us clarify our language. I would like to state for the
record that my use of "definition" is as an abbreviatory device, which is
typographically convenient, and with content that is theoretically
dispensible. "Shared" is used in lieu of "Common" which would render the
three letter acronym the same as "Positive Critical Theory". The
condition of "Sharability" or "Commonality" is still yet to be determined.
More on this at another time.
An appeal for a re-definition of OBJECT.
Or call it an appeal for clarifying "object" as a Provisional Shared Term
(PST). (Or: Why do I have to go through so many contortions to elicit
some clarification of "object"?) If you have noticed that the 1975
Leont'ev definition of object is in relation to subject, then please notice
that things change in 1987 with the inclusion of artifact, rules,
community, and division of labor. There are other relations to be
determined between object and these new primitives. This is my desire:
What are these new relations and how do they relate back to our shared
understanding of 'object"?
"The meeting of desire with an object is an extraordinary act, an act of
objectifying the desire -- of 'filling it up' with content drawn from the
surrounding world." (Leont'ev 1975)
My request is now much less ill-defined than my original. My desire is
still the same. I am not an activity-theorist, nor a wannabe. I place
myself more in the realm of what Mike calls (I think) Positive Critical
Theory (PCT), that is, trying to apply Activity Theory to
interventions/design experiments, in my case in education. The results of
my work can feed back to the theorists. But I cannot proceed well
without some well-defined sense of what the theorists are talking about!
Eva offers from Kari Kuutti's chapter "Activity Theory as a Potential
Framework for Human-Computer Interaction Research" in Bonnie Nardi (ed)
"Context and Consciousness", which sharpens the definition further by
including the conditions of sharability, manipulation and transformation,
and further delineating the relation of object to activity and motivation.
"An activity is a form of doing directed to an object, and activities are
distinguished from another according to their objects. Transforming the
object into an outcome motivates the existence of an activity. An object
can be a material thing, but it can also be less tangible (such as a plan)
or totally intangible (such as a common idea) as long as it can be shared
for manipulation and transformation by the participants of the activity."
Thank you Eva!
Separately, we can tackle the problem of dealing with the individual
knowing, which again, Leont'ev seems to handle well in 1975. And by the
way, PCT seems to be a nice meta-theoretical tool, relatively theory free.
Bill Barowy, Associate Professor
Technology in Education
Lesley College, 29 Everett Street, Cambridge, MA 02138-2790
Phone: 617-349-8168 / Fax: 617-349-8169
_______________________
"One of life's quiet excitements is to stand somewhat apart from yourself
and watch yourself softly become the author of something beautiful."
[Norman Maclean in "A river runs through it."]