though still lacking in time (hopefully soon to change! I'd also like
to comment on the meme point of view and beg for being allowed to come
to that later) and unable to really carefully read all those recent
"interactions" among people about people and objects, I cannot resist
adding a thought. I understand, the discussion began with the question
of whether the use of the word "interaction" should include objects or
artefacts or should be restricted to people and Mike arguing the former.
I would not like to fight over the word, however, we certainly are in
need of a word including both. "Entity" might be a (not entirely
satisfying) candidate. Like Mike I tend to use the word interaction for
the process of influence of anything that can have effects upon
anything else discernible. It might be restricted to processes of a
non-necessary and not fully contingent (as I say, semiotive) character.
But almost negligible are cases of things having effects at all where
influence is not mutual, even if sometimes quite onesided (such as e.g.
in gravity systems of large and very small masses). The reason is that
artefacts and persons, physical structures and people, in general, make
each other up in the long run. The term transaction appears to be aptly
used in cases of interaction that leave one or both interactants
changed (including moved in time and space); because this is the basic
process in all evolution: biotic, individual, or cultural, in
particular.
Now, my question is: why should we afford and even be happy to make a
separation (supposedly real difference, not only our distinction,
whether total or in certain respects only!) between people and
artefacts on an a priori basis by attempting to define such entities in
one of the two very ubiquitous ways: either (A) as classes of entities,
defining each class by itself, such that any candidate token must be
either a member or a nonmember of that class; or (B) both classes
together by claiming a dichotomizing difference (in reality) or
distinctive feature (of our convenience or arbitration) in such a way
that any classifiable exemplar must belong either to A or to B? (We The
consequences of both these procedures seem to me to be devastating, if
we talk of consequential definitions, at least, definitions that lead
to blinding one's sight in that they go beyond simple provisional
markings of entities to allow for communication.
Simply put, in case (A) we are left with insulae of "not-yet-knowledge"
but taken for "knowledge", each defined by itself as a class, which
cannot ever be brought into real connections but remain connected only
in our heads; there they will remain nominal terms forever, as the
medieval philosophers well knew; and the words stuck onto them start
their proper life cycles.
In the second case (B), it's the same problem, but, in addition, even
worse, for two reasons at least; Because, firstly, by defining firstly
one entity class in isolation, and, secondly, including a second class,
entirely dependent on the first, we simply double our difficulties by
believing to define two classes by defining one. Secondly, I know of no
dichotomies in evolving systems that allow for a clearcut boundary
between one class of entities and its, in some way, contrasting class.
So we pay by multiplied difficulties and consequences of dwelling in a
nominal world of terms that looses connection to its presumed reference
field.
(In fact there is a second, even more serious problem behind my present
argument which I want to neglect for the moment (since it is presently
discussed on the list, and intensively, so, in a very concrete form):
namely the consequences of defining generals in the form of class
membership and thus being forced to use extensional logic. The latter
may be a good thing for dealing with well-defined symbols but quite
problematic for dealing with "natural" or even with evolving systems
and their parts. Knowledge is not in any kind of definition but in
understanding interaction among definables. Definitions say only how
things have effects upon the definer, rather than how they effect upon
each other. The former is not really interesting in a general sense,
though it might interest a narcisst.)
Obviously, any distinction (in our view) or difference (referring to
some variation among things existing or having effects independently of
our way of conceiving it) between people and artefacts on the class
level is an example of my case (B) above. The borderline between the
two mututally dependent classes can mostly to always be conceived in
probably several dozens of ways in a manner that could be of at least
some value. Say, in the case of persons vs. things: living vs.
non-living; operating on inherited vs. (also) on individually acquired
guidelines; symbolizing vs. non-symbolizing in any of several kinds of
definitions of symbols; internally vs. (also) externally symbolizing;
intential vs. non-intentional, again in a variety of understandings of
intentionality; rational vs. non-rational; creative vs. dumb; endowed
with spoken language vs. not so; etc. etc. But I would not want now to
go into any of such possible distinctions of differences. My point is
another one, at the same time more general and more specifically
pertinent.
My point is with kinds of "definitions". To pack it in a question,
first a general question, then one pertaining to the particular field:
(1) Can we ever, if we realize we deal with a world of relatively
self-sustained parts interacting and transacting selectively among each
other and by exactly such transactions changing as well as stabilizing
each other, often constituting each other in the first place -- can we
ever hope to come to grips with such a world by using insularized or
dichotomized concepts? Should we not use concepts capable to
dynamically interact among each other (like their references) and thus
generating new or alterating existing conceptions as it is the case
with at least some of the real entities our concepts are supposed to
refer? (For those who want to follow the line: a little more, though
not enough, of this idea of constructive methodology is to be found in
my recent article in C&P 3/1997 on Boesch.)
(2) In the particular distinction discussed here (and possibly to be
generalized to many more similar topics): how can we ever understand
the difference or differences between entities we are inclined to
categorize mutually exclusively as either persons or objects (natural
or artefactual) when we put a difference into our definition(s) in the
first place? Do we not deprive ourselves of the very possibility of
understanding possible differences by depriving the entities in
question of the chance of demonstrating such differences? Said again in
the form of procedural advice: allow all sorts of exemplars of both or
any types of things that you might have such an interest in and that
may be loosly described as "interacting" in a very broad sense to
really interact under "natural" conditions, i.e. such conditions under
which these entities occur and encounter without your intervention, and
then observe how they mutually deal with each other. (You might look
for or arrange occasions where such encounters happen more often than
naturally; of course you may vary such occasions in planned fashion to
experiment on decisive questions; but to experiment from the very
beginning can only make you blind.)
I think you would soon find, that both people and many artefacts would
not exist as you find them or would be quite different, if they had to
exist without interactions of the kind you had your view on in the
first place. The conclusion, of course, is that you could not
understand either of the two classes of entities without understanding
the other and also the kind of process binding then into one system of
common evelution. So you have to investigate on the basis of a
conception bringing them together into one single conceptual system.
The real differences then might gradually arise out of observing their
behavior within the single conception embracing both parts and their
evolving, of their forming one type of system and yet being
nevertheless so different and even apparently self-sustainded that in
their interaction they would, each as an exemplar or token, complement
and drive each other.
Would this not in the long run lead to better science and understanding
than fighting about this or that aprior definition the reason of which
would probably not lie in the things discernible but rather in strings
attached to the supposed distinction such as a desire to reserve a
better place for humans in this world against anything else?
Sorry, I didn't expect, once again, my glimpse of a response to grow
into a note so long. Anyhow, for long I plan to write something "On the
Tragedy of Definitions Fixed" or so. Naturally, all of the above does
not at all imply that I might believe there are no real differences
between people and artefacts. It only states my objections to
presupposing any particular such distinction or difference rather than
investigating it based on experience with the real "thing".
All the best and Yours, Alfred
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Alfred Lang, Psychology, Univ. Bern, Switzerland --- alfred.lang who-is-at psy.unibe.ch
Website: http://www.cx.unibe.ch/psy/ukp/langpapers/
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