I really like Naoki's points about sociocultural and historical origin of
children's "preconceptions." I'm following closely xmca discussion on
Piaget and Vygotsky (Piaget is rehabilitated from considering him mere as a
psychologist of individual!) and found myself talking to my computer -- I'm
so busy at the end of the semester not having time opportunity to write.
A few words about V&P. I think both Piaget and Vygotsky were "last
modernists" in psychology (i.e., pushing modernism to its limits) and they
both are dear for many of us (including myself) because, in different degree
and ways, they mapped a road to postmodernism in psychology that we are
still struggling with. They both were very modern in their empirical
research (i.e., focus on individual, autonomous skills, cognition in
individual's heads) but many their theoretical insights and concepts defined
and transcended their empirical modernism. Since 60s we have created the
period of Vygotsky and Piaget renaissance of almost talmudist interpreting
and reinterpreting both Piaget and Vygotsky (fighting quote with quote) .
And like in the Historical Renaissance that tried to rebuild ancient Greece
and Rome but instead created a new epoch, we have created new approaches
such as social constructivism, educational constructivism, sociocultural
approach, legitimate peripheral participation, community of practice, and so
on. Is it time to recognize we are not just continuing Piaget and Vygotsky,
that we have a bit different projects? Or should we keep going in
"purifying efforts" (Latour's term) to "access" "real" classics a bit
longer? (I think that postmodernist Bakhtin will be our next renaissance
figure.) My point is not to call for stopping talking about what V&P said
but rather focus on our own projects (using Sartre's term), what we really
after (using Eva's terms). What do you think?
Anyway, I want to comment on "preconceptions" or to be a bit more precise on
"misconceptions."
Two months ago, at a small conference "Designing for science" in Pittsburgh,
Miki (Michelene) Che made an interesting presentation about two types of
misconceptions. She separated "easy" misconceptions from "deep"
misconceptions (I forgot specific terms she were using, sorry). According
to Miki, easy misconceptions can be overturned by individuals (i.e.,
students, children) themselves through their own reflection. Her example of
easy misconception is a misconception that the Earth is flat. Deep
misconception can't be corrected by individual's own device but requires
external guidance. Her example of a deep misconception is the notion of
heat a liquid.
In talking with her, I tried to make two main critical points:
1) Both conceptions and misconceptions are semiotic models (she agreed).
What makes them "correct" or "incorrect" consequences of their usage for
practitioners. For example, it is very confusing to use the model according
to which the Earth is a sphere when you try to find a new bank office in
your town. The flat model of the Earth is more appropriate in this case and
it is not a mere misconception. Some models are privileged in some specific
discourses and practices (e.g., the model of sphere Earth in physics)
because our practice and discourse not yet push the models to their
boundaries yet (e.g., "actually" the Earth is not exactly sphere). This
point makes the notions of misconceptions and true conception relative to an
activity and a practice of their use (she disagrees).
2) If my point#1 is correct than difficulties of understanding of models
originates not in structure of semiotic models themselves (as Miki seems to
believe) but in individuals' access to activities and practices where these
models originate (i.e., make sense, guide participants to their
satisfaction). For example, the idea that the Earth is a sphere was very
difficult for many people in Middle Age and "easy" now even for many
children is, in my view, because there are many activities, discourses, and
practices now (and very few were there) when "the sphere and not flat
Earth" makes sense (e.g., flying on a plane, calling grandma who lives in
another time zone, watching weather prognosis, seeing photos of the Earth,
travelling in another time zone, listening parents talking about the Earth).
I think this point is similar to what Naoki made.
Although Mike disagreed with me, she raised an interesting question of what
the "access to activities, discourses, and practices that require a semiotic
model" means psychologically and how it translates in person's
understanding. She asked if someone does such research. I don't know
anybody. Do you? What do you think?
Eugene
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Naoki Ueno [mailto:nueno@nier.go.jp]
> Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 1998 3:00 PM
> To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu
> Cc: Naoki Ueno
> Subject: Re: Those radical constructivists...
>
>
> At 10:47 AM 5/5/98 -0400, Bill Barowy wrote:
> > Rather I should write that
> >"Children participate in situations with patterns of description
> about the
> >physical world that are often quite different from scientists and often
> >quite resistent to change. "
>
> Bill,
>
> Patterns of description is different thing from that 'a kind of
> preconceptions
> are also mutually, collaboratively, situatedly constituted with a
> teacher'.
> Without collaborative organization of contexts, giving a specific problem,
> children never automatically invent a specific patterns of description.
> Very simple thing. For example, have children ever seen the a
> series of problems
> or a way of asking questions in physics problems before?
> Probably, these are new for them. If so, having patterns of description
> in advance is impossible.
> Diagnosis of preconceptions does not purely diagnose the inside or the
> pattern of description that is already there.
>
> This disucssion is partially related to the formulation of Andy
> diSessa' s
> 'ad hoc' explanation of children for physics problems. After that, he was
> going to p-prims. I think that his p-prims are also mutually constituted.
>
> >One can say that
> >it is difficult to socially, reciprocally constitute situations in which
> >the students describe the physical world using the same language game as
> >scientists or one can say the students have difficulty learning the
> >pre-ordained science. I have not yet been able to advantage the
> former to
> >formulate better interventions.
>
> Have you ever read my paper on "Newtonian Physics" in
> Cognition and instruction, 1993, 10(2 & 3), 239-248?
> Longer verison of my paper on Newtonian Physics is in LCHC newsletter,
> April 1993, Vol 15, Number 2.
> My answer of this your question is there.
>
> If you have ever read my papers, and if these are nothing new for you,
> this time I retire from this discussion on e-mail. I need another place
> and time for this discussion.
>
> >It does go farther than that. In the work I did with Paul Horwitz and Ed
> >Taylor, I found research indicating the reason for one kind of
> difficulty
> >with visually observing objects in motion, to be traced to eye-tracking.
> >The human visual system tends to track objects in such a way
> that makes it
> >difficult to 'percieve' an event the way a physicist conceptualizes it.
>
> I think that it is difficult to see the "pure" perceptual system or
> perceptual observation. Very simple example is socially, mediationally
> constituted observation when one tries to draw a picture.
> For example, you may stand a pencil in the center of scene in order
> to organize your obsevation. Your drawing itself also organize and give
> the direction to lead your observation of scene.
>
> History of drawing is a rich resource for such mediationally organized
> observation. For example, perspective drawing uses various tools.
> Perspective drawing is not a copy of retina but the product
> of organized observation by the specific tools.
> Further, drawing and tool use has been embedded in language
> game of what is reality and of drawing for what.
>
> Science history is the same. (it is better to say that history of
> drawing and scientific practice has been overlapped.)
> Scienctists have invented various tools in order to organize their
> observation. Actually, newtonian experiments use various artifacts
> in orde to make visible of mass, force, gravity, motion of earth,
> various types of motion and others. The observation of these things
> is impossible without various specific tools.
> Tools such as a telescope was also a very important artifact for
> reorganizing the langauge game of physics.
> Further use of telescope was ingeniously located in a specific
> langage game by Galileo, for example.
> Ingenious tools for organizing a specific observation or
> preception has no meaning without organizing a specific langauge game.
>
> Suddenly given pysics problems such as famous coin problem
> conceal all these things, organized contexts of newtonian
> physics. That makes school physics be funny language game.
>
> Various everyday practices use various artifacts for organizing
> observation in a specific language game.
> In this way, there is no pure perceptual observation anywhere.
>
> Interaction analysis in educational setting will also shows
> that observation of pehnomenon is collaboratively, mutually,
> mediationaly consituted and it is acompanied with collaborative
> organgization of langauge game.
>
> See the Gibsonian experiments. In the experimental session, Gibsonian
> direct perception is mediationally, socially organized.
> One of my colleauge did the interaction analysis of "direct perception"
> experimental setting. Actually, it is impossible to pick up "critical
> imformation" without coding categories, instructions, prepared motion
> patterns on the monitor organized in a specific way.
> In this way, "direct perception" is also socially, mediationally
> organized.
> if so, what is human visual system? How did you know "illusion"
> as "illusion"?
>
> Pattern of eye scanning or a way of observation cannot be understood
> only by "perceptual system" or only by the human visual system.
> The "human visual system" is not destiny of our way of organizing
> observation and langauge game.
> Rather, one can say that we need tools and to organize a specific
> langauge game in order to observe the pure human visual system itself.
>
> Micheal Lynch and Steve Woolar' s book "Representation in Scientific
> Practice" also gives another examples of how scientists socially,
> mediationally organize their observation. The picture on the cover of
> this book shows just tool use of perspective drawing.
>
> Naoki Ueno
> NIER, Tokyo
>
>