Just a quick message - have to unsubscribe for a while to focus on other
things.
Jay wrote:' Because the phenomenon has been shown to not be a function of a
non-standard box, does not mean it is a function of something solely outside
the box. The phenomenon is the product of the working-box-and-whatever
system'
Agreed. Observer/instrument/phenomena are best described as a system.
Scientists seek to describe the phenomena independently of the
observer/instrument to the best degree possible and so other observers apply
other instruments, and/or the measurements are compared to theory. In my
story this is where the theoretician brought results from other experiments
-- electron scattering for example, and theoretical knowledge -- here about
Rydberg molecules.
' We do not just factor out the box. We factor in a working box, as opposed
to a faulty box. As Latour points out it is rather arbitrarily asymmetrical
to attribute our 'mistakes' only to our technology and our 'findings' only to
nature. .'
Actually in my story, the rebuilding of the technology made possible the new
observation. Bybee (1989) and Layton et al (1993) describe more positive
views of the interaction between science and technology, as do the standards
and benchmarks which draw from this and similar work. Insofar as technology
is 'human innovation in action' (emerging technology standards), it is
difficult to attribute 'mistakes' anywhere else -- with the one exception, of
course, ultimately being human understanding of the 'system' and, given the
goals of science, of the 'system sans observer/instrument'. As an aside, the
new TAA standards encourage a systems view of technology and include a
perspective of an ecological (systems) view.
'Epistemologically, I will say only this (as I have before on xmca in these
discussions): We know from inside the system, as participants, and the
observer stance is a dangerous illusion.'
I did not mean to offend by asking for a 'position', rather I was seeking to
clarify and avoid unnecessary conflict. Across disciplines there is a lot
of variation in epistemological beliefs (btw, I ultimately choose not to
distinguish belief from knowledge, but will operationally allocate different
epistemological status) and some beliefs almost have religion-like
practices. Oh - and to clarify 'epistemology' -- I use the term to describe
theories of the nature of knowledge, which is more in an operational sense
(such as for creating materials to help students learn the nature of science)
than a philosophical one. Activity theory fits this description and
sometimes acts as a means for theory laden observations of the scientific
enterprise.
I'll look forward to when I can resubscribe!
Bill Barowy