Mike comments (quite appropriately:)
>Edouard-- That was all very interesting. But would you characterize for
>me what you take to be the "activity theory position" and relate it to
>your argument in the notes? Are you saying that for activity theory,
>knowledge is an ontological primitive in a cartesian paradigm? I am just
>not getting what it is you are saying activity theory is saying. I have
>in mind her writers like Leontiev, Rubenshtein, Engestrom, Davydov, and
>the American interpreters.
I'm certainly no expert in activity theory, but I'm confident that it =
avoids the Cartesian view of knowledge. Activity theory "smushes" =
knowledge all through the setting. Knowledge isn't located in heads =
- it is all over the place. In this respect, activity theory and =
social practice theory are in harmony, and Jean and Etienne do =
acknowledge this in chapter 1 of the situated learning book.
Where I perceive a problem is one level further "down" in the =
ontology of things. Ontology is the branch of Philosophy concerned =
with what sorts of "stuff" actually exist in the universe and how =
they relate to each other. Activity theory doesn't seem to have a =
distinct ontological account of its own, instead, it seems to inherit =
one the social milieu. If it seems to draw on any philosophical =
tradition it is pragmatism. Pragmatism seems to have some =
ontological troubles of its own.
Let's get out of this philosophical "mumbo jumbo," look at a hard =
problem I'm stuck with right now. I want to design a =
high-performance internet-based distance learning "engine." What I =
mean by engine is a collection of software that mediates between =
traditional students and traditional educators (TAs, Professors.) =
The performance requirements are high: The system should be "plug =
and play," that is to say, the software should allow Professors and =
TAs to assume roughly equivalent duties as they do now. The system =
must provide for "quality control," students taking the class =
electronically should be as competent as students in conventional =
classes.
My plan for accomplishing these lofty goals is simple: I want =
students to actively participate in the construction of the course in =
order to take load off of the instructors. I want to do this in a =
software constructed "activity system." Just like the maze of the =
5th dimension, I want my software to mediate interactions between =
students, course material, and instructors.
Okay, everything seems cool so far. I can use say the Engestr=F6m =
account of mediation. My software is the mediating artifact, the =
object is the material to be learned, the subject are my students, =
the community is ?? Students, Students+staff, something like that. =
Rules: standard rules of school work. Now I *NEED* some sort of =
activity system that I can depend on. There will be *1* (countem 1) =
software apparatus. However the students choose to divide =
themselves, they all need to "jump through the loop" of the same =
software - otherwise I don't have a clue of how they are doing.
Now alas reality comes in and smashes our hopes. Suppose we want to =
replace a Psychology 101 class, 1 instructor, 15 TAs, 300 students. =
Is anyone crazy enough to believe that these 316 people are just =
going to clump up into a happy community? Wrong answer, in large =
lecture classes, little communities pop up, accomplish some =
particular bit of learning and dissolve away - exactly as Heidegger =
describes "beings-in-the-world."
If we simply try to move a 300 person lecture class on the net, =
something horrible happens. The instructors and TAs are bombarded =
with email, students are unable to get coordinated, they feel lost =
and isolated. It is a "lose-lose" proposition. The instructional =
staff works much harder, and the student performance overall =
decreases. Heidegger can give us interesting clues as to why this =
happens.
Lecture classes have their own figure/ground distinction. The =
lecture is the figure, the actual physical containment of students =
(in one "box") is the ground. A lot of behind the scenes =
coordination, problem solving, and community building happens as a =
result of being boxed in. The box is far more important than anyone =
ever imagined, because removing the box results in what Heidegger =
called a "breakdown." Chat rooms, email, newsgroups, and other =
devices that could be used to substitute for the lost lecture =
community simply aren't used. Why? - my guess is that we have taken =
for granted the importance of bringing people together to one spot. =
Without that mediation of the learning experience, communities don't =
happen.
Okay, so we need some sort of a "spark" to get communities fired up =
in the electronic setting. No problem, we can employ a number of =
devices from education and organizational psychology. Here is a very =
simple-minded example: We don't want TAs bombarded with 60+ email =
messages when assignments are due. Instead, we pair up students =
randomly, they exchange their work and only after they have corrected =
each others work and reconciled their differences can they are =
allowed to ask the TA for help. Boom, 150 tiny communities of =
practice . . . or not?
Now the problem of ontology rears it's ugly head. As long as =
activity theory is only dealing with "warm bodies," we didn't have to =
worry too much about what exists and what doesn't - our "God-given" =
intuitions work fine. The instant we start trying to spawn =
communities of practice, that begs the existential question: do these =
communities of practice exist or not? This little "rubbing of bodies =
together" is unlikely to produce many communities of practice, but in =
order to leverage the course on the students: many communities of =
practice shall be needed. Suppose, we make a requirement for the =
course that the class as a whole produce a web site summarizing the =
material covered in the course? Will all 316 people contribute to =
the task? - not a chance. Separate groups will eventually divvy up =
the work and those communities will ultimately assemble the pieces.
Now Five paragraphs ago I proposed to employ Yrj=F6 Engestr=F6m's =
account of mediation to describe my software system. I also noted my =
software is fixed, I can't have 50 different versions of the program =
of all the potential communities of practice formed. Now what is my =
is my subject?, object?, community?, even my rules of interaction? =
In my Existential analysis of communities of practice, I go into gory =
detail of how precisely these aspects of the community are created as =
part of its "project" and "being-in-the-world."
Thus, I present to you a live and very compelling case of the =
contradiction between an activity theory approach and an existential =
social practice approach. As the analyst, I can sit atop my activity =
system (software) and watch the flow of students in and out, but I =
lose direct access to their existential properties, I don't know why =
they whose to be there at that time, I have no clue of they are =
trying to become (nor do they, "coming to be" is not a conscious =
phenomenon.) Alternatively, I can choose to "ride" a community of =
practice as I did in my dissertation. From that view, I see the =
community in multiple activity settings, classroom, beach, =
restaurant, etc, and still view the community as a whole, coping with =
the world as any existential object does: by "being in the world."
If researchers were cheap, you could I suppose try to combine both =
types of analysis: monitor the site with the "usual tools" and then =
have ethnographers "riding" on each community as it weaves its way in =
and out of your activity system, but that may be of little help. =
Cultures have considerable tolerance of distinct meaning systems. =
After the research team is pulled together - there may be little that =
can be shared. Also the project could be impossible due to the sheer =
number of possible communities. My analysis of communities of =
practice suggests that there are many "micro-communities" that are =
born, exist for as little as 1/2 hour, and disappear - their =
"project" accomplished. Even a hardcore Ethnomethodology approach =
might not detect such existential "ripples," and such a project would =
require 3 to 5 researchers per participant!
As I start sketching this distance learning architecture, I have the =
fear of starting a community of practice Juggernaut. Activity theory =
gives me the tools to local probable sites of community formation, =
but once communities start, I lose them in the milieu of social =
activity. If the setting is small (say a small lecture class or a =
5th dimension site) you may be able to detect the presence of a =
community by effects on the mediating artifacts. I co-wrote a paper =
with Bruce Jones and a number of students from my 1994 classes that =
elegantly observed the effects of community on the mediating artifact =
of electronic mail. Unfortunately, you almost have to stifle =
community formation so that you can indirectly keep track of the =
communities through artifacts. If distance learning is really going =
to become viable, we shall need to "take the plunge" and allow =
students to really take ownership of the courses, otherwise they will =
fail purely due to higher labor costs.
Oh well, sorry, another Juggernaut of a message. I hope that helps =
people see where my problem lies. Activity theory is "right on" when =
it comes to treatment of what is knowledge. What I can't get a =
handle on is how to deal with slippery existential object while still =
keeping with activity system "frame of reference."
Pass on the indigestion rolls and happy eating :-)
Peace, Edouard
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: Edouard Lagache, Lecturer :
: Department of Communication (0503) :
: University of California, San Diego :
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:...................................................................:
: Freedom and constraint are two aspects of the same necessity, :
: the necessity of being the man you are and not another. You :
: are free to be that man, but not free to be another. :
: Saint-Exup=E9ry, _The wisdom of the Sands_, 1948 =
:
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